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This thesis consists of three studies that utilize financial analyst career events as 
quasi-natural experiments to examine the factors that explain analyst forecasting 
performance. The purpose of this thesis is to minimize endogeneity problems that have 
hampered the financial analyst literature and at the same time add to the literature by 
showing that important life events can have a significant impact on analyst forecasting 
performance.  
First, I examine how employment change affects analyst herding behavior in their 
forecasts. My results show that analysts exhibit stronger herding behavior following an 
employment change. Specifically, they have a greater tendency to imitate other analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. Also, relative to their peers, they are slower in issuing forecasts and, 
as a result, issue revisions less frequently. This has a consequential negative effect on the 
market impact of their forecasts. I argue that the results are due to the need for newcomers 
to contend with the unfamiliarity of their new workplace environment and demonstrate 
that my results hold across several robustness tests, including a quasi-natural experiment 
using brokerage firm M&As that utilizes the estimation of an average treatment effect. 
This study raises a significant human resource question on how brokerage firms should 
support employees who have recently switched jobs.  
Second, I examine the impact that work specialization has on the performance of 
superior and inferior analysts. My results show that the forecast accuracy of superior 
analysts improves when their coverage is more concentrated within a few industries. 
However, there is no evidence of an equivalent improvement for inferior analysts. I argue 
that this is due to superior analysts being better able to utilize intra-industry relevant 
information when pricing stocks within the same sector, leading them to benefit more 
viii 
 
from specialization. My results are robust when I conduct quasi-natural experiments by 
utilizing brokerage firm M&As to capture changes to the work specialization of analysts 
who continue to work in the merged firms after the M&A events. The findings of this 
study have implications for how brokerage firms allocate coverage to analysts with 
different abilities.  
Third, I examine a channel that can explain analyst forecast pessimism. 
Specifically, I investigate the forecasting performance of analysts who have been rehired 
after experiencing a recent job loss following their brokerage firm closures and find that 
their forecasts will be more pessimistic relative to both their peers and actual earnings. 
Importantly, this leads to a decline in the accuracy of their forecasts at their new job. 
These results are theoretically supported by the career transitions literature, which shows 
that a job loss will affect the mental disposition of an employee and which I argue leads 
to analysts providing more pessimistic recommendations. This raises an important 
question as to how brokerage firms should support new employees who have recently 
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1.1. The importance of financial analysts to capital markets 
Financial analysts are known as sophisticated information intermediaries who 
enhance capital market efficiency. Their main role is to process financial information and 
provide financial forecasts and recommendations to the market. Previous studies (Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996; Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2003; Zhang, 2006) have 
shown that financial analyst forecasts and recommendations reflect news in earnings 
announcements. In addition, there is evidence that analysts also integrate information not 
related to earnings into their forecasts (Stickel, 1993; Burgstahler and Eames, 2003; 
Bratten et al., 2016).  
Given the important role of financial analysts, other market participants do rely 
on analyst forecasts and recommendations to make investment decision. For example, 
Barber et al. (2001) and Barth and Hutton (2004) find that investors can generate 
abnormal returns if they structure their trading strategies based on analyst 
recommendations/forecasts. At the same time, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) and Elgers, 
Lo and Pfeiffer (2003) document that market underreaction to financial news is partially 
explained by analyst underreaction to such news. Therefore, the efficiency of analysts in 
processing information (or their forecasting performance) is strongly related to the 
efficiency of the whole capital market.  
Much evidence has also shown that the market is selective in utilizing analyst 
forecasts and recommendations based on analyst forecasting performance. For example, 
market participants exhibit stronger reaction to forecasts issued by superior, more reputed, 
and more experienced analysts (Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2004; Sorescu and 
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Subrahmanyam, 2006). In addition, the market can also recognize several factors that 
explain analyst forecast errors (Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 1997; Clement and Tse, 
2003; Chan and Hameed, 2006, Bradley, Gokkaya and Liu, 2017) and forecast biases 
(Michaely and Womack, 1999; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Barber, Lehavy and Trueman, 
2007) to adjust their reaction accordingly.  
Given the important role of financial analysts to capital markets, there has been a 
lot of research in this area. In the next sections of the introduction, I will provide a brief 
review of the literature and highlight the gaps that still exist in the literature. Finally, I 
will present a summary of the three studies in my PhD thesis, which focus on investigating 
unexamined factors that affect financial analyst forecasting performance using different 
analyst career events as quasi-natural experiments. 
 
1.2. A brief literature review 
There has been an enormous number of studies in the financial analyst area, most 
of which focus on examining the determinants of analyst forecasting performance.  
The most popular and important measure of analyst forecasting performance is 
forecast accuracy, which is the deviation of analyst forecast from the actual earnings per 
share. Dating back to Mikhail et al. (1997), it is documented that firm-specific experience 
can enhance analyst forecast accuracy. A later study by Clement (1999) supports this view 
and suggests that brokerage firm size and analyst work load can also explain the accuracy 
in analyst forecasts. Jacob, Lys and Neale (1999) add that forecast frequency, or the 
number of forecast revisions issued within a forecasting period, can enhance forecast 
accuracy. Another view by Brown (2001), however, shows that past forecast accuracy is 
better in explaining future accuracy compared to a model that utilized multiple analyst 
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characteristics to identify superior analysts. Clement, Koonce and Lopez (2007) also find 
that the impact of several analyst characteristics, including brokerage firm size, analyst 
years of experience, and the number of stocks in analyst portfolio, on forecast accuracy 
disappears once they control for analysts’ innate ability. Similar results are documented 
by Bradley et al. (2017) after they control for the related industry experience that analysts 
have gained before they start working as a financial analyst.  
 Another aspect of analyst performance is herding behavior in analyst forecasts, or 
the tendency of financial analysts to avoid issuing forecasts that are distinctly different 
from other analysts following the same stock. Herding is important to detect as it implies 
that analysts simply revise their forecasts to mimic others instead of fully reflecting their 
private information (Trueman, 1994; Hong, Kubik and Solomon, 2000). This leads to 
increased forecast errors (Clement and Tse, 2005), reduced forecast timeliness (Hong et 
al., 2000), and causes news releases to have a longer lasting impact on the market as one 
piece of news is reflected repeatedly in a series of forecasts (Welch, 2000). In other words, 
herding behavior affect the informativeness of analyst forecasts, which can subsequently 
undermine market efficiency.  
There are several studies that investigate the explanations for analyst herding 
behavior. For example, Stickel (1992), Trueman (1994), and Clement and Tse (2005) find 
that analysts who are less certain about their ability to predict earnings tend to follow 
other analysts’ forecasts instead of issuing innovative forecasts. Graham (1999) adds that 
if both an analyst and their employer are uncertain about the analyst’s ability, the analyst 
can send a positive signal about their ability by herding. Hong et al. (2000) and Clement 
and Tse (2005) find that inexperienced analysts, who are less certain about their job 
security compared to experienced analysts, tend to display herding behavior to minimize 
their chance of being fired. Clarke and Subramanian (2006) document a U-shaped 
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relationship between analyst performance and herding behavior. They find that top 
outperforming (underperforming) analysts who have very low (high) employment risk are 
less likely to herd in their forecast. More recently, Nolte, Nolte and Vasios (2014) 
document that during periods of banking stress when job security is low, analysts are more 
likely to imitate others. 
Recently, studies in the financial analyst literature also focus on examining analyst 
forecast optimism or the tendency of analysts to issue forecasts that give more optimistic 
predictions than other analysts. Since forecast optimism implies analysts’ deviation from 
their fair judgement, there is strong evidence that it is negatively associated with analyst 
forecast accuracy (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Cowen, Groysberg and Healy, 2006).  
So far, there are two main factors that have been examined as explanations for 
analyst forecast optimism. The first explanation is analyst work incentives. For example, 
Hong and Kubik (2003) find that analysts who issue more optimistic forecasts tend to 
have better career outcomes. They argue that brokerage firms reward relatively optimistic 
analysts to promote their underwriting business and generate more trading commissions. 
Cowen et al. (2006), however, find that analysts working for full-service banks with 
underwriting services issue less optimistic forecasts compared to those who work for non-
underwriter banks. Their results suggest that trading commission is an important factor 
that explains analyst forecast optimism. Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2007) document 
that analysts lower their earnings forecasts before the announcement date to generate 
positive earnings surprise for the firms. The bias is more pronounced when analysts have 
a stronger desire to win investment banking clients.  
The second factor that explains forecast optimism are analyst career concerns. For 
example, Ke and Yu (2006) show that analysts tend to issue optimistic forecasts at the 
beginning of a forecasting period and pessimistic forecasts before the earnings 
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announcement to please firm management to get access to private information. This 
allows them to issue more accurate forecasts and avoid being fired. Another study by 
Horton, Serafeim, and Wu (2017) investigates banking analysts and report evidence that 
banking analysts adjust their forecast optimism during the year to please a bank that could 
be their future employers, which also leads to favorable career outcomes.  
 
1.3. Gaps in the literature 
Despite the wealth of research that has examined analyst forecasting performance, 
there still exist a number of areas that have not been fully examined. In this section, I 
focus on two of these that are directly related to my thesis. The first is a methodological 
issue relating to endogeneity concerns and the second is a gap in the empirical literature 
that has yet to fully explore the impact that life events have on analyst forecasting 
performance. 
 
1.3.1. Endogeneity problems 
Though previous studies investigate several factors to explain financial analyst 
performance, the findings are sometimes mixed. This is possibly due to the problems of 
endogeneity causing bias to both the sign and significance of regression coefficients. 
Endogeneity problems arise due to three main causes: self-selection bias, reverse-
causality and omitted variables. This results in a correlation between an explanatory 
variable and the error term, violating one assumption of Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) 
regressions. As a result, the regression coefficients can be biased and inconsistent, leading 
to spurious results (Woolridge, 2012).  
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In studies on the performance of analysts, two primary endogeneity concerns are 
usually raised. The first is a reverse causality relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. This happens when it is hard to determine the direction of causality 
between the two variables. For example, Clement (1999) find that larger brokerage firm 
size, longer years of experience, and lighter workload can lead to analysts’ better 
forecasting performance. However, it can also be argued that analysts who are performing 
well are more likely to work for larges firm, to survive for a longer time in the brokerage 
industry, and to negotiate for less workload. Second, endogeneity problems may arise due 
to self-selection bias, in which the studied sample is biased to a specific group of 
observations. The study by Mikhail et al. (1997) is a typical example of self-selection. In 
this study, the authors restrict their sample to analysts who have 32 continuous quarters 
of forecast for the same company, excluding all the analysts who switch the tracking 
company or who leave the industry. This requirement, therefore, biases the sample to the 
group of well-performing analysts. 
One methodology that has arisen in popularity from research in accounting and 
finance (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Derrien and Kecskés, 2013; 
Chen, Harford and Lin, 2015; Irani and Oesch, 2016) is the use of quasi-natural 
experiments that takes advantage of examining the impact of exogenous shocks on the 
variables of interest. A quasi-natural experiment is an empirical study that utilizes an 
event as an exogenous shock to an independent variable and examines the impact of this 
exogenous shock on the dependent variable. The difference between a natural experiment 
and a quasi-natural experiment is the degree of randomization. While a natural experiment 
involves actual randomization, a quasi-natural experiment is “patterned after randomized 
experiments”, which then requires the use of a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach 
that provides a before-after comparison between the treatment and control groups of 
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observations (DiNardo, 2010). Given the advantage of this methodology in dealing with 
endogeneity problems, I aim to utilize quasi-natural experiments to provide more robust 
results than the extant literature on analyst performance has provided. This is a departure 
from the standard empirical analysis that has previously examined analyst behavior, with 
few exceptions to the rule (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010; Irani and Oesch, 2013; Derrien 
and Kecskés, 2013; Chen et al., 2015; Irani and Oesch, 2016). 
 
1.3.2. The impact of life events on analyst forecasting performance 
Although a large amount of work has been done in exploring factors that explain 
analyst forecasting performance, prior research has paid little attention to the impact that 
life events have on analyst performance. In the seminal work by Holmes and Rahe (1967), 
the authors provide a list of 61 life events (seven of which are work related events) and 
an estimation of a social readjustment score for each event. Since then, several studies 
(Bhagat, 1983; Ivancevich, 1986; Pugh, Skarlicki and Passell, 2003; Georgellis, Lange 
and Tabvuma; 2012) have been done to investigate the impact of different life events on 
individual work performance.  
Recent studies the financial analyst literature start directing their attention to 
explore how analysts respond to certain exogenous events, however, little attention has 
been paid to the impact of life events on analyst forecasting performance. For example, 
Bourveau and Law (2016) find that analysts who work in Louisiana during the arrival of 
Hurricane Katrina show more pessimism in their subsequent forecasts. This impact lasts 
for 12 to 18 months after the natural event. Antoniou, Kumar and Maligkris (2016) also 
document more pessimism in analyst forecasts among those who locate near terrorist 
attacks. This pessimism still persists one year after the attacks. The most related study in 
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the financial analyst literature that mentions analyst personal life event is the paper by Wu 
and Zang (2009), which examines the factors that affect analyst career outcomes (i.e. get 
promoted, be retained in the merged firm, or leave the merged firm) following a merger 
of their employer with another brokerage firm. This study, however, does not explore how 
this career event affect analysts’ subsequent performance.  
My thesis utilizes different analyst career events as quasi-natural experiments to 
study the determinants of analyst forecasting performance, from the change to analyst 
work arrangement or an employment change following a brokerage M&A, to a job loss 
following a brokerage firm closure. This research approach allows my study to fill the 
gap in the literature by examining how analyst work performance is affected by important 
career events. It also opens an avenue for future research that focuses on the impact of 
important life events on financial analyst forecasting performance. 
 
1.4. Summary of the three studies 
As aforementioned, I aim to utilize different career events of analysts as quasi-
natural experiments to study the unexamined determinants of analyst forecasting 
performance. Specifically, my idea is to examine brokerage firm mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) and closures, in which I investigate different life events that are associated with 
financial analyst careers. Based on this idea, I conduct three studies for my thesis. First, I 
focus on the impact of job change on analyst herding behavior among those analysts 
whose decision to change jobs is triggered by the M&A event of their former employer. 
Second, I examine how analyst forecast accuracy is affected by a change in their work 
specialization caused by the rearrangement of workload among analysts following an 
M&A between two brokerage firms. Finally, I examine how analyst forecast optimism is 
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affected by a previous job loss resulting from their brokerage firm closure. I provide 
further details of each of these three studies below. 
 
1.4.1. Study 1: The impact of employment change on analyst herding behavior 
This study examines how employment changes affect analyst herding behavior. 
This research question is motivated by the findings from the career transitions literature 
that newcomers will need extra time and effort to adapt to their new workplace 
environment (Brett, Feldman and Weingart, 1990; Miller and Jablin, 1991; Saks, 
Uggerslev and Fassina, 2007; Bauer et al., 2007). This includes, for example, the need to 
learn different operational processes (Pinder and Schroeder, 1987; Huckman and Pisano, 
2006) and to build new social networks within the firm (Bauer et al., 2007) in order to 
rebuild the nontransferable human capital that is lost when an analyst moves to a new 
employer (Groysberg, Lee and Nanda, 2008). In doing so, analysts will have less time to 
focus on tracking stocks within their portfolio and will therefore be more likely to adopt 
time-saving strategies, such as herding, when making forecasts.  
In addition, the career transitions literature also shows that unfamiliarity with a 
new work environment also leads to individuals experiencing a greater level of 
uncertainty (Pinder and Schroeder, 1987; Feldman and Brett, 1983; Brett et al., 1990; 
Bauer et al., 2007; Saks et al., 2007). This itself can lead to herding behavior. For example, 
much evidence has shown that analysts herd when they are uncertain about their own 
ability (Stickel, 1992; Trueman, 1994; Clement and Tse, 2005) or when they are 
concerned about their relative performance against peers (Hong et al., 2000; Clement and 
Tse, 2005; Nolte et al., 2014). This, together with the time constraints faced by analysts 
when they start working in a new environment, leads to my research question of whether 
an employment change can increase the likelihood that analysts herd in their forecasts. 
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To answer this question, I first utilize a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach 
with a treatment sample of 312,242 annual earnings forecasts during the period from 2005 
to 2016. Next, to minimize endogeneity concerns, I also perform quasi-natural 
experiments by focusing on analysts who change job following brokerage firm M&As. 
My results show that analysts exhibit strong herding behavior following an employment 
change. Specifically, they have a greater tendency to imitate other analysts’ earnings 
forecasts. Also, relative to their peers, they are slower in issuing forecasts and, as a result, 
issue revisions less frequently. This has a consequential negative effect on the market 
impact of their forecasts. My study, therefore, raises a significant human resource 
question on how brokerage firms should support employees who have recently switched 
jobs.  
 
1.4.2. Study 2: The heterogeneous impact of work specialization on analyst performance  
This study examines the impact that work specialization has on the performance 
of superior and inferior analysts. Dating back to Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999), 
work specialization has been identified as one of the key factors that promote analyst 
forecast accuracy. Similarly, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Chan and Hameed 
(2006) find that analysts are able to identify the common industry component of each 
firm-specific news event, which they then utilize to make inferences on other stocks 
within the same industry. This means that the more stocks an analyst follows within the 
same industry, the more opportunity they will have to facilitate the transfer of intra-
industry information. In contrast, other research finds no systematic relationship between 
analyst forecast accuracy and how many industries the stocks that they cover are in 
(Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement et al., 2007; Kim, Lobo and Song, 2011; Bradley et al., 
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2017). Rather, they argue other factors, such as the innate ability of superior analysts 
(Clement et al., 2007) can explain differences in analyst performance.  
Given the above fact that analysts play an important role in disseminating 
industry-relevant information to the market, and that we should expect superior analysts 
to do a better job at this due to their innate ability to benefit from task-specific knowledge 
(Clement et al., 2007), I conduct my second PhD study to test for the heterogeneous 
impact that work specialization has on analyst forecast accuracy. This can potentially 
explain the mixed results within the extant literature, as one cohort of analysts (i.e. 
superior analysts) benefit from specialization while another cohort (i.e. inferior analysts) 
do not. 
I utilize the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure how concentrated the 
stocks that an analyst follows are within a limited number of industries (i.e. work 
specialization). I first generate panel regression results using the full sample of 535,203 
analyst earnings forecasts during the period from 2005 to 2016. After this, and to deal 
with endogeneity concerns, I conduct quasi-natural experiments by utilizing brokerage 
firm M&As to capture changes to the work specialization of analysts who continue to 
work in the merged firms after the M&A events. My results show that the forecast 
accuracy of superior analysts improves when their coverage is more concentrated within 
a few industries. However, there is no evidence of an equivalent improvement for inferior 
analysts. My findings, therefore, have implications for how brokerage firms allocate 




1.4.3.  Study 3: The impact of job loss on analyst forecast pessimism 
This study examines whether a previous job loss can lead to analyst forecast 
pessimism. While the extant literature mostly focuses on explaining analyst forecast 
optimism (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Cowen et al., 2006; Horton et al., 2017), little has been 
known about the factors that can lead to forecast pessimism and the implications of it. 
Empirical evidence has shown that analyst forecast optimism is associated with a 
reduction in forecast accuracy (Hong and Kubik, 2003; Cowen et al., 2006). However, I 
conjecture that both forecast optimism and pessimism can have adverse impact on analyst 
forecasting performance since they both indicate a diversion of analyst forecasts from 
their fair judgement. Therefore, it is equally important to study analyst forecast 
pessimism.  
At the same time, previous studies (Cohn, 1978; Donovan and Oddy, 1982; Pugh 
et al., 2003; Waters, 2007) from the career transitions literature document that job loss 
can cause several psychological issues to the displaced employees including a reduction 
in self-esteem, anxiety, and other symptoms of depression due to the change in the social 
status of the displaced employees. In addition, one obvious causal effect from a reduction 
in self-esteem is an increased pessimistic outlook. There already exists strong evidence 
of a positive relationship between self-esteem and optimism/pessimism (Mäkikangas, 
Kinnunen and Feldt, 2004; Heinonen, Räikkönen and Keltikangas-Järvinen, 2005; 
Lyubomirsky, Tkach and DiMatteo, 2006). This leads to my research question asking 
whether financial analysts who have previously lost their job will be pessimistic when re-
employed and how this affects their work performance. 
In this study, I utilize brokerage firm closures as quasi-natural experiments. 
Specifically, I focus on analysts who lose job following their brokerage firm closures and 
subsequently move to another firm during the period from 2004 to 2016. I find that 
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individuals who have recently experienced a job loss tend to issue more pessimistic 
forecasts compared to both their peers and the actual earnings. Importantly, this leads to 
a decline in their forecast accuracy in their new job. My findings, therefore, raise an 
important question on how brokerage firms should support their new employees who have 








The paper in this Chapter examines how employment changes affect the tendency 
of financial analysts to avoid issuing forecasts that are distinctly different from other 
analysts following the same stock (i.e. herding behavior). My investigation is motivated 
by observations from the career transitions literature that find newcomers will expend 
time and effort to adapt and assimilate within their new workplace environment (Brett et 
al., 1990; Miller and Jablin, 1991; Saks et al., 2007; Bauer et al., 2007). This includes, for 
example, the need to learn different operational processes (Pinder and Schroeder, 1987; 
Huckman and Pisano, 2006) and to build new social networks within the firm (Bauer et 
al., 2007) in order to rebuild the nontransferable human capital that is lost when an analyst 
moves to a new employer (Groysberg et al., 2008). In doing so, analysts will have less 
time to focus on tracking stocks within their portfolio, and will therefore be more likely 
to adopt time-saving strategies, such as herding, when making forecasts.  
Interrelated with this, the career transitions literature highlights that unfamiliarity 
with a new work environment also leads to individuals experiencing a greater level of 
uncertainty (Pinder and Schroeder, 1987; Feldman and Brett, 1983; Brett et al., 1990; 
Bauer et al., 2007; Saks et al., 2007). This itself can lead to herding behavior. Analysts, 
for example, have been shown to herd when they are uncertain about their own ability 
(Stickel, 1992; Trueman, 1994; Clement and Tse, 2005) or when they are concerned about 
their relative performance against peers (Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005; Nolte 
et al., 2014). This uncertainty, plus the additional time constraints placed on newcomers 
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in becoming familiar with their new environment, leads me to hypothesize that 
employment change increases the likelihood that analysts will herd. 
Herding is important to detect as it has a significant market impact. It is inefficient 
and implies that analysts simply revise their forecasts to mimic others instead of fully 
reflecting their private information (Trueman, 1994; Hong et al., 2000). This leads to 
increased forecast errors (Clement and Tse, 2005) and causes news releases to have a 
longer lasting impact on the market as one piece of news is reflected repeatedly in a series 
of forecasts (Welch, 2000). Since analysts act as information intermediaries who enhance 
market efficiency, and given that in any single year over the past decade almost 10% of 
all analysts change jobs, any market effect of herding behavior from analysts switching 
jobs is potentially significant.1 
 To provide some anecdotal evidence in support of my primary hypothesis, Figure 
2.1 shows the relationship between analyst job change and herding behavior. I use a 
sample of 312,242 annual earnings forecasts. The data is extracted from the Institutional 
Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database between 2005 and 2016 and the figure 
compares the probability to issue Bold forecasts for analysts that change jobs within a 
particular year with those of analysts that do not change jobs in that year. Following 
Clement and Tse (2005) and Gleason and Lee (2003), I define Bold forecasts as forecasts 
that deviate from both the consensus and the analyst’s most recent forecast for the same 
stock. The figure illustratively shows that, on average, analysts who experience a job 
change consistently exhibit a lower probability of issuing bold forecasts (i.e. more 
herding) compared to those who remain in their job. 
 
                                                          
1 This is based on forecasts that are recorded in the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) 
database from 2005 to 2016. 
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Figure 2.1: Analyst job change and the probability of issuing bold forecasts.  
 
This figure shows the difference in herding behavior between analysts who change jobs in any given year, 
and those who do not, from 2005 to 2016. The comparison is based on the average probability of analysts 
to issue Bold forecasts (forecasts that deviate from both the consensus and the analysts’ previous forecast 
for the same stock).  
 
There are, of course, problems with inferring too much from this figure. There are 
several reasons why analysts change jobs, inclusive of the fact that it can be endogenously 
related to analysts herding in the first place. In particular, analysts who tend to herd may 
be more likely to change jobs. Therefore, any observable herding witnessed after analysts 
change jobs may simply be a function of the herding behavior they previously exhibited. 
In addition, analysts who change jobs may, for instance, be given different stocks to 
follow, leading to a potential rise in herding behavior due to the unfamiliarity with the 
stocks they must track, rather than it being due to the change in job itself. Other factors, 
including analyst resources and experience, could also potentially explain why herding 
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To minimize the effect that the above factors can have in influencing the results, 
I utilize three different identification strategies, on top of my baseline results, to construct 
three types of treatment and control samples to test my hypothesis. The first strategy is to 
utilize a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach to compare the herding behavior of 
forecasts for a specific stock from a particular analyst that changes their job (my treatment 
sample) with forecasts for the same stock from an analyst that exhibits similar herding 
behavior but does not experience any job change (my control sample). I also match to 
account for differences in the workload that the analyst experiences in the new job, as 
well as differences in resources available between the analyst’s prior and new employer. 
I examine the herding behavior between the treatment and control samples of the 
above strategy from three different perspectives. The first measure, Bold, is used to 
capture herding behavior from a pricing perspective. I then use a measure to gauge how 
quick analysts are at posting their forecasts. We would expect an analyst that is exhibiting 
herding behavior to prefer to wait until other analysts have posted their forecasts in order 
to determine what forecast they will make. My second measure, Speed, identifies whether 
an analyst is timely in issuing their first forecast for a stock relative to all other analysts 
that are tracking the same stock. Finally, I follow Hong et al. (2000) and use Frequency 
to determine if analysts are more or less likely to provide forecast revisions for a stock.   
As an alternative to matching analysts based on their ex ante level of herding 
behavior, my second approach is to create a treatment and control set following Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2010), who match based on the likelihood that analysts will herd. This is 
achieved by matching several analyst and stock characteristics between the treatment and 
control group of forecasts. These characteristics include the resources of the brokerage 
firm the analyst works for, analyst experience, analyst coverage of the stock, the 
annualized stock return, and the book-to-market value of the stock. Finally, to avoid any 
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selection bias arising from matching one treatment forecast with only one control forecast, 
my third identification strategy involves examining the results generated from forming 
portfolios of control forecasts based on the above characteristics to test whether there is a 
difference between my treatment forecasts and a comparable portfolio of control 
forecasts.  
Regardless of how I construct my treatment and control samples, my results show 
that herding is prevalent for analysts that change jobs. My baseline results from my DiD 
analysis using the simplest treatment and control group split (of those analysts who switch 
jobs and those that do not) shows that the probability of an analyst who has recently 
changed jobs issuing a Bold forecast is reduced by 8.7%. In addition, the timeliness of 
earnings forecasts from these analysts declines, such that their Speed in issuing the first 
forecast for any given stock in the fiscal year reduces by 16%. This has a knock-on effect 
on how often these analysts post revisions to their forecasts. I show that these analysts 
will tend to wait until most of the other analysts following a stock have posted their 
forecasts, implying the need for them to revise their own forecasts to match others 
becomes less important. The Frequency of revisions declines by 8.2%.  
Next, I investigate whether analyst herding varies with the degree of familiarity 
analysts are likely to encounter in their new job. I find that analysts who move to a new 
firm together with colleagues from their former firm, thus providing some familiarity 
surrounding who they work with, show less herding behavior compared to those who are 
alone in moving to a new firm. In addition, I perform several sub-sampling analyses to 
examine whether my results are driven by a group of atypical analysts that are unduly 
influencing my results. I find that analysts who undergo a job change will exhibit more 
herding behavior regardless of whether the analyst (i) has higher or lower forecast 
accuracy; (ii) shows more or less herding behavior prior to a job change; (iii) takes a 
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longer time to find a new job; and (iv) moves to larger or smaller brokerage firms. 
Furthermore, my results remain consistent when I account for analysts who reappear 
many times in the sample, and when I account for stocks with higher forecasting 
complexity (i.e. stocks with low analyst coverage or stocks of large firms). Furthermore, 
I re-run my analyses using my treatment and control portfolios of analyst forecasts where 
the average herding estimate is used for each of my three herding measures. The results 
remain the same.   
I also perform a test using a quasi-natural experiment. Wu and Zang (2009) show 
that turnover is higher among analysts with high forecasting abilities following brokerage 
M&As. And as analysts with high forecasting performance are not those that herd 
(Clement and Tse, 2005), I will likely reduce the probability that the reason analysts are 
changing jobs is due to their ex ante herding behavior if I restrict my analyses to analysts 
that switch jobs due to an M&A. Also, to reduce the risk that there are other endogenous 
factors which lead analysts to change jobs following an M&A, I utilize a method of 
estimating the average treatment effect through a two-stage regression procedure 
(Wooldridge, 2002 p.614-621). In the first-stage, I regress the treatment effect on two 
exogenous covariates plus all other control variables.  
The two covariates I utilize are based on the findings of Wu and Zang (2009) that 
show analyst turnover following an M&A is higher among the target analysts and analysts 
who have a direct competitor analyst following similar stocks in the counterpart firm. 
Therefore, the first covariate I use is a dummy variable that identifies whether the analyst 
is from the target firm. It is exogeneous since analysts have no power in determining 
whether they belong to the target or to the acquirer firm. The second covariate is a dummy 
variable that identifies whether the analyst has a direct competitor in the counterpart firm. 
It is also exogeneous for similar reasons as with the first covariate, namely that the analyst 
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has no control over whether they have a direct competitor in the counterpart firm.2 From 
the first-stage regression results, I generate a predicted series of the treatment effect (i.e. 
the average treatment effect). I then use this predicted series as the regressor in my DiD 
models in the second stage, replacing the treatment dummy. Again, my results are 
consistent to my baseline results, demonstrating the robustness of my findings.  
Finally, I document that herding after an employment change leads to both a 
statistically and economically significant impact of analyst forecasts on the market. On 
average, the two-day cumulative market-adjusted return surrounding a forecast 
announcement from an analyst that has recently changed jobs is 7.7% less than before 
they changed jobs.  
My study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, while previous studies 
document that herding can be linked to analyst forecasting ability and experience (Stickel, 
1992; Trueman, 1994; Graham, 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005), no one 
has examined analyst job changes as a source of herding behavior. Given that 10% of 
analysts change jobs each year, the impact of employment changes on the performance of 
the intermediary function that analysts serve within the market can be potentially 
significant.  
My second contribution is to highlight the value of the career transitions literature 
to the financial analyst literature. Specifically, I emphasize that job changes lead 
newcomers to contend with unfamiliar environments (Katz, 1980; Klein and Weaver, 
2000), which  encompasses the need to build new social networks (Brett et al., 1990; 
Bauer et al., 2007; Saks et al., 2007) and deal with differences in operational processes 
(Pinder and Schroeder, 1987; Huckman and Pisano, 2006), all of which take both time 
                                                          
2 A competing analyst from a counterpart firm is an analyst whose portfolio is at least 50% similar to the 
studied analyst.  
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and effort and place constraints on how analysts produce their forecasts. In addition, the 
uncertainty caused by unfamiliarity of the new workplace (Morrison, 1993; Ashforth, 
Sluss and Saks, 2007) can, itself, be a source of herding.  
My study provides an ideal setting to examine the above behavior as performance 
can be tracked over time and for a large cohort of individuals. In finding significant 
evidence of herding behavior following a job change, I also suggest that there is a 
substantial human resource management implication from my findings. In particular, I 
highlight the need for brokerage firms to adopt appropriate newcomer organizational 
socialization strategies (see Saks et al., 2007) to manage the unfamiliarity that arises from 
employment changes in order to enhance the quality of analyst forecasts.  
Finally, I contribute to the literature which examines the intermediary function 
that analysts serve in disseminating information into capital markets (Chung and Jo, 1996; 
Hong et al., 2000). I show changing jobs can affect the efficacy of analyst forecasts, and 
given the sizable number of analysts who change jobs in any given year, that the impact 
on the market at-large is substantial and warrants further research with respect to how 
career events influence analyst performance. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides a 
literature review of the career transitions literature plus hypothesis development, while 
section 2.3 outlines my data and methodology. In section 2.4 I present my empirical 
results and discuss the main findings and in section 2.5 I provide additional robustness 




2.2. Literature review and hypothesis development  
A key area of research that the career transitions literature focuses on concerns 
itself with organizational socialization – how newcomers deal with a new workplace 
environment. Katz (1980, p.88) refers to organizational socialization as the “introductory 
events and activities by which individuals come to know and make sense out of their 
newfound work experiences”. It is viewed as the way in which newcomers acquire new 
attitudes, behavior and thought processes to function in their new work environment 
(Klein and Weaver, 2000) and examines how well individuals assimilate within their 
workplace, as well as the consequential effects the transition can have on, for example, 
employee performance (Ashforth et al., 2007; Saks and Gruman, 2014). 
Newcomers are faced with a number of sources of unfamiliarity even if the activity 
profile for the new job is identical to what the individual was required to do previously. 
One main source is the need to contend with a new social network. When working for a 
new firm, newcomers will need to interact with a different set of colleagues and managers, 
which will require them not only to work out where they fit into the social structure of the 
new work environment, but how to utilize the new social network to perform in the job. 
This is commonly achieved by developing information seeking strategies, primarily in the 
form of seeking feedback from new co-workers and supervisors (Brett et al., 1990; Bauer 
et al., 2007; Saks et al., 2007). This strategy requires both effort and time.  
In addition to being surrounded by unfamiliar co-workers and managers, Pinder 
and Schroeder (1987) highlight that individuals also encounter dissimilarities in the 
processes and tools that are used in the new workplace to execute the role. This includes 
new operational procedures and the need to familiarize oneself with how to access and 
utilize the tools necessary to complete the job. Huckman and Pisano (2006), for example, 
find that the operational assets available in one organization will be different to another, 
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and how familiar an individual is with these assets, which are organization-specific, can 
affect performance. 
All of the above factors are relevant within the context of the financial analyst 
industry. Groysberg et al. (2008) provide evidence of this. They examine the performance 
of star analysts when they change jobs and find that these analysts can only bring a part 
of their human capital when they move to a new brokerage firm. They argue that there is 
a non-transferable component of an analyst’s human capital that is brokage firm-specific 
and is attributable to an analysts’ familiarity with the specific operational procedures and 
internal network of their former employer. When they move to a new employer, they are 
unable to transfer this component of their human capital. Therefore, analysts who join a 
new brokage house will undergo a transition period, where they will need to acquaint 
themselves with a new social network, as well as differences in operational processes, in 
order to re-build part of the human capital they left behind with their former employer. 
This leads me to link, for two interrelated reasons, analyst employment change 
with herding behavior. First, since analyst efforts will be partly consumed in expending 
time on information seeking strategies (Miller and Jablin, 1991) to build a new social 
network within the firm (Bauer et al., 2007) and contend with differences in operational 
processes (Pinder and Schroeder, 1987; Huckman and Pisano, 2006), less time will be 
available for analysts to complete other work-related tasks. In particular, in attempting to 
re-build their lost non-transferable human capital (Groysberg et al., 2008), analysts will 
have less time to devote to tracking their portfolio of stocks, forcing them to take short-
cuts and develop less time-consuming strategies to complete their work, such as relying 
on peer forecasts (i.e. display herding behavior).  
Second, in following the career transitions literature, the desire of the newcomer 
to acquire information is based on removing the uncertainty they experience in their new 
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job (Morrison, 1993; Ashforth et al., 2007). I postulate that this uncertainty, caused from 
being unfamiliar with the new workplace environment, can also be a source of herding 
behavior. Indeed, herding behavior is a common instinct for most social animals, 
including humans, when facing duress (Hamilton, 1971; Raafat, Chater and Frith, 2009). 
Financial analysts are also known to show herding tendencies when they are faced with 
uncertainty. For example, Stickel (1992), Trueman (1994) and Clement and Tse (2005) 
all find that analysts herd when they are uncertain about their own ability and reputation, 
while Hong et al. (2000), Clement and Tse (2005), and Nolte et al. (2014) show that 
analysts herd when they are concerned about their relative performance against their 
peers.  
Taken together, the above two arguments lead to my main hypothesis that the 
unfamiliarity arising from an employment change will lead to herding behavior in analyst 
forecasts: 
H2.1: Analysts show more herding behavior after they experience an employment 
change. 
To test this hypothesis, I examine analyst herding behavior from three different 
perspectives, providing me with three sub-hypotheses to test. I first focus on the 
probability of analysts issuing a bold forecast (i.e. a forecast that diverts from both the 
consensus and the analyst’s most recent forecast for the same stock). According to 
Clement and Tse (2005) and Hong et al. (2000), when analysts herd, they are more likely 
to issue forecasts that are closer to the average forecast of other analysts for the same 
stock, and less likely to issue bold forecasts. Therefore, I expect that after analysts 
experience a job change, the probability that they issue bold forecasts will also decline:  
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H2.1a: The probability that analysts issue a bold forecast declines after they 
experience an employment change. 
Another aspect of analyst herding behavior is related to forecast timeliness (i.e. 
how quickly analysts issue their forecasts). This is an important measure in its own right, 
as Cooper, Day and Lewis (2001) conclude that analyst performance rankings based on 
forecast timeliness are even more informative than rankings based on analyst forecast 
accuracy or trading volume. If analysts are herding, then they will want to wait until the 
majority of analysts have issued their forecasts so that they can learn from the crowd. In 
addition, my primary hypothesis is partly premised upon newcomers having less time to 
spend on tracking stocks as they develop familiarity with their new workplace 
environment, and therefore are less likely to be timely in the forecasts that they make. As 
such, forecast timeliness should be negatively associated with herding behavior. This 
leads to my second sub-hypothesis: 
H2.1b: Analyst forecast timeliness declines after they experience an employment 
change. 
Finally, I also study the frequency with which analysts revise their forecasts for a 
stock within a forecast period. There is mixed evidence regarding the link between analyst 
herding behavior and how frequently they provide revisions. On the one hand, Hong et 
al. (2000) argue that when analysts herd, they tend to issue more forecast revisions to 
accommodate other analysts’ opinions. On the other hand, Clement and Tse (2005) and 
Jegadeesh and Kim (2009) find that herding analysts issue less forecast revisions since 
they are less likely to update new stock relevant information into their forecasts. My 
hypothesis, however, is premised on a slightly different argument. First, my argument for 
analysts herding after a job change is based on them having less time to properly track the 
stocks in their portfolio. This would imply less time to consider making revisions to their 
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forecasts. Second, given that I suspect analysts who herd are more likely to post their first 
forecasts after the majority of other analysts have (H2.1b), I argue that this diminishes the 
need for them to make revisions in the light of other forecasts. Therefore, contingent on 
H2.1b being true, there should be a corresponding decline in the frequency of analysts 
revising their forecasts following an employment change: 
H2.1c: Analyst forecast revision frequency declines after they experience an 
employment change. 
 
2.3. Data and methodology 
I collect data on annual earnings per share forecasts from analysts between 2005 
and 2016 from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. My period 
of analysis starts from 2005 so that I only examine analyst forecasts after Global 
Settlement was introduced, which can potentially affect analyst forecasting behavior.3  
For my econometric model, I employ three different measures to capture herding 
behavior. The first measure, Boldijt, adopted from Clement and Tse (2005), is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if the forecast for stock i issued by analyst j in forecast 
period t is either greater than both the pre-revision consensus and the analyst’s most recent 
forecast for stock i, or less than both the pre-revision consensus and the analyst’s most 
recent forecast for stock i. Otherwise, it is equal to zero. I calculate the pre-revision 
consensus as the average of the most recent forecasts for stock i made by other analysts 
excluding analyst j during the same forecast period. I also require at least three forecasts 
to construct the pre-revision consensus and to avoid the effects of reiteration, I only use 
                                                          
3 This is an enforcement agreement reached in 2003 that requires the physical and operational separation 
between the investment banking and research departments of brokerage firms to mitigate the potential of 
bias forecasts for an investment banking client. 
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the analyst’s most recent forecast for each stock in their tracking portfolio prior to the end 
of each forecast period (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2010). This results in my final sample of 
312,242 forecasts. 
I utilize Speedijt as my measure of forecast timeliness (i.e. how quick analysts issue 
their forecasts). I create a normalized timeliness measure by first ranking all analysts 
covering the same stock within one forecast period based on the order they issue their first 
forecasts. The first analyst that issues a forecast for the stock receives the lowest Rank. I 
then estimate Speedijt using Equation (2.1) below, where the denominator is the Number 
of analysts who issue forecasts for the same stock in one forecast period. A higher value 
of Speedijt indicates more forecast timeliness. The variable has a range between 0 and 100, 






] ×100 (2.1) 
My final measure, Frequencyijt, is derived from Hong et al. (2000). This is the 
number of forecast revisions issued by analyst j for stock i in forecast period t (Revijt) 
minus the average number of forecast revisions issued by all analysts for the same stock 
within the same forecast period (Revijt̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅).  
Frequency
ijt
=Revijt - Revijt̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ (2.2) 
As for my main independent variable of interest I employ Moveijt, a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the forecast is issued by an analyst who experiences an 
employment change in year t, and zero otherwise.4 In regard to my control variable set, I 
utilize a number of variables to account for analyst proficiency in their work. This 
                                                          
4 I identify analysts who change jobs based on when the analyst experiences a change in their broker ID 
across two consecutive years.  
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includes brokerage firm size (Sizekt) to control for analyst resources, analyst years of 
general experience (Gen Experjt), analyst years of experience with a particular industry 
(SIC Experjt), and years of experience with the stock (Stock Experjt). I also control for the 
analysts’ workload using the number of stocks (Stocksjt) and the number of industries they 
cover (Industriesjt). Finally, I control for several stock characteristics to account for the 
complexity of forecasting the stock itself, which includes the number of analysts 
following the stock (Coverageit), the stock’s firm size (Lnsizeit), the stock’s return and 
variance of return (Retannit and Sigmait), the stock’s book-to-market ratio and profitability 
ratio (Lnbmit and Profitabilityit), the stock’s return-on-equity ratio and its variance (ROEit 
and Var ROEit), and whether the stock is included in the S&P500 index (SP500it). The 
above data is collected from a number of sources. I obtain data on stock returns from the 
CRSP database; data on stock fundamentals from the Compustat database; and data on 
brokerage firms and financial analysts from the I/B/E/S database. Appendix A provides a 
detailed description of all the variables.  
My basic regression model to examine analyst herding behavior after a job change 
is: 
Herdijt=α + β1Moveijt + γ'Xijkt + εijt (2.3) 
In this model, each of my herding measures, represented by Herd, is regressed 
against Move and a vector X, representing my control variables. The coefficient 
𝛽1 represents the impact that a job change has on analyst herding behavior.
5 
The above model does not, however, account for any fixed effects that may be 
related to the brokerage firms, analysts, and stocks. To accommodate this, my main results 
                                                          
5 I utilize panel OLS regressions when the dependent variable is continuous, and panel logistic regressions 
when the dependent variable is discrete (i.e. a dummy variable).  
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are derived from a difference-in-differences (DiD) regression approach by comparing the 
herding behavior of analysts that change their job (my treatment group) with those who 
do not experience any job change during the same event window (my control group). I 
follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and use a two-year window around the analyst job 
change (i.e. one year before and one year after). In order to observe the change in the 
herding level of individual forecasts, I only look at forecasts for stocks that appear in an 
analyst’s portfolio both before and after a job change. This reduces the risk of capturing 
analyst herding due to being assigned new stocks. In addition, I only focus on forecasts 
issued for the forecast periods that are closest to the analyst job change,6 and I strictly 
require that all treated analysts experience no other job change across the event window. 
Doing so reduces the size of my sample to 37,692 earnings forecasts.  
As for my independent variables, I employ Treat, a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the forecast belongs to my treatment sample and zero if it belongs to the control 
sample, and Post, a dummy variable that is equal to one if the forecast is issued after the 
analyst job change and zero if it is before the job change.  
 My DiD regression model is therefore: 
Herdijt=α + β1Treatijt + β2Postijt + β3Treatijt×Postijt + γ'Xijkt + εijt (2.4) 
Here, each of my herding measures is regressed against the Treat and Post 
dummies, plus their interaction, and a vector X of control variables. The coefficient of the 
interaction term represents the impact that a job change has on analyst herding behavior.  
 
                                                          
6 I identify the time of an analyst job change as the period from the date of the analyst’s last forecast issued 
under the former brokerage firm ID to the date of her first forecast under the new brokerage firm ID.  
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2.4. Empirical results on analyst herding behavior after a job change 
2.4.1. Summary statistics and preliminary regression results  
Table 2.1 shows the summary statistics of my variables split between my treatment 
group (of forecasts from analysts who change jobs) and my control group (of forecasts 
from analysts that do not change jobs) before any matching has taken place and during 
the period before the treatment group of analysts have switched jobs. I find in relation to 
my herding measures that my treatment group of analysts are significantly more likely, at 
the 1% level, to issue bold forecasts (Bold), and more timely in issuing their forecasts 
(Speed).  
My statistics also show that analysts in my treatment sample are more experienced 
(Gen Exper, SIC Exper, Stock Exper) and tend to have a heavier workload (Stocks, 
Industries) compared to my control group of analysts. The former group also work for 
smaller firms (Size) compared to the latter. I also find analysts who switch jobs tend to 
cover stocks where there is greater analyst coverage (Coverage), have lower returns 
(ROE), lower risk (Sigma, Var ROE), lower book-to-market ratio (Lnbm), and are more 
likely to be stocks from the S&P500 index (SP500).   
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 Treatment sample 
(Analysts who change jobs) 
 Control sample  
(Analysts who do not change jobs) 
 
Diff. in means 
 Mean Median StDev  Mean Median StDev  
Dependent variables 
 
   
      
Boldij Dummy  0.7068 1 0.4553  0.6267 1 0.4837  0.0801*** 
Speedij NA  54.6539 56.0488 30.3619  52.7624 52.9412 32.5090  1.8915*** 
Frequencyij Revision  0.0336 0 2.3735  0.0066 0 2.5702  0.0270 
Control variables 
 
   
      
Gen experj Year  6.1019 6 3.6540  4.4587 3 3.7740  1.6432*** 
SIC experj Year  5.3948 5 3.5449  3.8200 3 3.7121  1.5748*** 
Stock experj Year  3.5258 3 3.0721  1.6054 0 2.0401  1.9204*** 
Stocksj Stock  17.0757 16 7.3906  12.3095 12 9.1230  4.7662*** 
Industriesj Industry  3.9047 3 2.0107  3.3731 3 2.2416  0.5316*** 
Sizek Analyst  59.0931 40 54.9183  71.9802 46 69.7122  -12.8871*** 
Coveragei Analyst  18.9950 18 11.1461  15.3566 13 11.3030  3.6384*** 
Lnsizei NA  8.3671 8.3823 1.9320  8.3722 8.3388 2.0960  -0.0051 
Sigmai %  39.9910 34.2377 23.0640  40.4972 34.7500 21.8737  -0.5062 
Retanni %  10.9786 12.8242 45.2699  12.5179 13.1628 45.7828  -1.5393** 
Lnbmi NA  -0.8835 -0.8444 0.9256  -0.6909 -0.7472 1.2052  -0.1926*** 
ROEi NA  0.0865 0.1992 3.0231  0.6285 0.2179 12.4814  -0.5420*** 
Var_ROEi %  0.8246 0.0154 3.8860  1.8832 0.0220 6.2963  -1.0586*** 
Profitabilityi NA  0.0191 0.0756 2.9774  0.0636 0.0749 0.2344  -0.0445 
SP500i Dummy  0.3041 0 0.4600  0.1619 0 0.3684  0.1422*** 
This table presents the summary statistics of my variables for the treatment and control samples during the period before a job change. Appendix A provides a detailed 
description of the variables. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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 In Table 2.2, I run some preliminary regressions using the above treatment and 
control samples. For brevity, I only show the coefficient results for the control variables 
in Panel A, which are for my panel regressions (using Equation 2.3). Panel B shows the 
results for the DiD regressions (using Equation 2.4). The results in both panels are 
consistent with each other and support my hypothesis that analysts tend to herd more after 
they move to a new job.  
To provide some economic significance to these results, while focusing my 
attention on the DiD regressions of Panel B, I find that the coefficient for the interaction 
term (Treat x Post) is -0.2830 in Column (1). As this value is from a logistic regression, 
I estimate the marginal effect of this impact on Bold forecasts when all other variables are 
calibrated to their mean values. Doing so reveals that the probability of analysts issuing a 
bold forecast after changing jobs reduces from 70.7% to 64.5% (a proportional decline of 
8.7%).7  
In Column (2), that focuses on Speed, the coefficient for the interaction term is -
8.7653. Given that the mean value of Speed for my treatment sample prior to the job 
change is 54.6539 (see Table 2.1), it implies that analyst timeliness, on average, declines 
by 16% after they experience a job change. Also, as Speed now drops below the value of 
50, these analysts are effectively slower in posting their forecasts than the majority of 
analysts following the same stock. To provide further evidence of this I re-run my 
regression using a simple binary measure to capture the probability of an analyst being in 
the slowest third of analysts to post forecasts. I find that the probability of analysts who 
have recently changed jobs being in the slowest third jumps from 25% to 45% after their 
job change.  
                                                          
7 The calculation is based on the average value of Bold for my treatment sample prior to the job change 
(70.7% - see Table 2.1). 
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Finally, the number of forecast revisions for a stock, measured by Frequency, also 
reduces. Column (3) shows it decreases by 0.27 revisions, synonymous with an 8.2% 
decline.8 I attribute this decline to the fact that analysts who have changed jobs are more 
likely to post their first forecasts after the majority of other analysts have, removing the 
need to update their revisions in the light of other forecasts.9  
Taken together, these results indicate that analysts reduce their forecast boldness, 
timeliness and frequency, after they change their job. In other words, they show greater 
herding behavior for the year proceeding a job change.10 
 Panel C of Table 2.2 reports regression results when I examine aggregated herding 
behavior at the analyst level. The above DiD regressions only examine forecasts for stocks 
that appear in an analyst’s portfolio both before and after an employment change. This 
means any stocks that the analyst drops after the job change, and new stocks that they are 
assigned by the new firm, are not accounted for. To address this issue, I aggregate and 
average each herding measure across the forecasts of all stocks in the analyst portfolio 
and re-run my regressions at the analyst level.11 I utilize Equation (2.4) for my regressions 
but now must exclude stock-level control variables. The results align with my previous 
findings although the coefficient for the interaction term in Column (3) is no longer 
statistically significant. Overall, these results allow me to conclude that analysts show, on 
average, stronger herding behavior across the stocks in their portfolio after an 
employment change.   
                                                          
8 This is when compared with the average number of forecast revisions for my treatment sample prior to 
the job change (3.3 revisions). 
9 Providing support for this explanation I find that the probability of analysts, who have changed jobs, 
making a revision is higher than average if their forecasts are within the first third of posted forecasts. It is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, but not economically significant as the probability increases only by 
0.5%.      
10 My tabulated results are based on using robust standard errors, but also hold if I cluster them by analyst. 
11 My results remain qualitatively the same if I aggregate by median values.  
44 
 
Table 2.2: The impact of employment change on analyst herding behavior.  
Panel A: Basic regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Moveij -0.1098*** -8.4628*** -0.3390*** 
 (0.0116) (0.1622) (0.0127) 
Gen experj 0.0025 0.3598*** 0.0052* 
 (0.0023) (0.0332) (0.0029) 
SIC experj 0.0071*** 0.2303*** 0.0119*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0354) (0.0031) 
Stock experj 0.0097*** 2.0132*** 0.0814*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0290) (0.0027) 
Stocksj 0.0010* 0.1676*** 0.0222*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0093) (0.0008) 
Industriesj 0.0207*** -0.1702*** -0.0363*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0369) (0.0029) 
Sizek -0.0004*** 0.0367*** 0.0028*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0011) (0.0001) 
Coveragei -0.0006 0.0596*** 0.0037*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0086) (0.0009) 
Lnsizei -0.0092** -0.9000*** -0.0582*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0608) (0.0062) 
Sigmai 0.0004 0.0313*** 0.0011*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0040) (0.0003) 
Retanni 0.0004*** -0.0018 -0.0003** 
 (0.0001) (0.0016) (0.0001) 
Lnbmi -0.0276*** 0.0462 0.0275*** 
 (0.0058) (0.0854) (0.0074) 
ROEi 0.0004 0.0013 0.0002 
 (0.0008) (0.0140) (0.0013) 
Var_ROEi -0.0055*** 0.0901*** 0.0036* 
 (0.0013) (0.0204) (0.0019) 
Profitabilityi 0.0758** -0.0820 -0.0055 
 (0.0348) (0.2946) (0.0227) 
SP500i 0.0055 -1.2677*** -0.0983*** 
 (0.0126) (0.1860) (0.0225) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 312,242 312,242 312,242 
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Table 2.2 (continued) 
Panel B: DiD regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Treat 0.3442*** 1.2513*** 0.0235 
 (0.0345) (0.4621) (0.0361) 
Post 0.1968*** -1.5982*** 0.2566*** 
 (0.0322) (0.2848) (0.0334) 
Treat×Post -0.2830*** -8.7653*** -0.2715*** 
 (0.0461) (0.5294) (0.0443) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 37,692 37,692 37,692 
Panel C: DiD regressions at the analyst level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Treat 0.0093** 2.1884*** -0.3406*** 
 (0.0038) (0.3216) (0.0353) 
Post -0.0586*** -4.4330*** -0.0530*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0945) (0.0074) 
Treat×Post -0.0611*** -9.6278*** 0.0125 
 (0.0056) (0.4255) (0.0413) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 48,391 48,391 48,391 
This table reports regression results testing the impact that a job change has on analyst herding behavior. 
Panel A reports regression results when utilizing Equation (2.3) and Panel B reports DiD regression results 
when applying Equation (2.4). Panel C presents DiD regression results at the analyst level. Columns (1) to 
(3) show the results for each of the three different herding measures being used as the dependent variable. 
Appendix A provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
 
2.4.2. Analyses using refined matching techniques 
The above results do not account for differences in the characteristics of the 
analysts between the treatment and control samples. This may be driving my results that 
analysts who change jobs subsequently tend to herd more. To address this, I apply three 
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different approaches to match treatment forecasts with comparable control forecasts and 
then rerun my analyses.  
First, using the data during the period prior to the analyst job change, I match each 
of my treatment forecast with a control forecast issued for the same stock by an analyst 
who does not change jobs yet exhibits similar herding behavior to the treatment analyst. 
Specifically, I match based on propensity scores estimated from logit regressions where 
the dependent variable is Treat and the covariates include the number of stocks an analyst 
covers (Stocks) and one of the herding measures.12 The first covariate ensures that the 
analysts who issue the matched forecasts have similar workload so that they do not differ 
in their tendency to herd, as analysts with a heavier workload tend to herd more in their 
forecasts (Clement and Tse, 2005). I then use one of the three herding measures as the 
second covariate to make sure that the matched forecasts come from analysts with similar 
herding characteristics. In addition, in order to control for the potential difference in 
resources a brokerage firm can provide analysts in making forecasts, I require that both 
the treatment and control forecasts are issued by brokerage firms of similar size. 
Specifically, I split brokerage firms into terciles based on the number of employees each 
firm has, and require that the matching of analyst forecasts occurs between analysts from 
firms with the same tercile ranking.13 I further require the control forecast to be within 30 
days of the treatment forecast of the same stock to mitigate any change to the information 
environment surrounding the stock that may affect analyst forecasting performance. This 
whole process yields three separate pairs of treatment and control groups (i.e. one for each 
herding measure).  
                                                          
12 I use a standard caliper of 0.1 for matching propensity scores.  
13 I follow the literature and use tercile splits. My results still hold when I use alternative splits.   
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The results from the matching process is reported in Panel A of Table 2.3, where 
the summary statistics, as well as difference-in-mean tests, of the variables that are 
matched are displayed. The results show, as I would want, that there is no statistical 
difference between any of the covariates used in each the corresponding treatment and 
control groups. The DiD regression results are presented in Panel B and reveal that all of 
the coefficients for the interaction terms are significant and hold the right sign. It is 
noteworthy that these DiD regressions are conducted on a substantially smaller subset of 




Table 2.3: Analyses where the treatment and control samples are matched by stock and 
analyst herding behavior. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the matching criteria 




 Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
Pair 1 Boldij 0.7094 1 0.4542 0.6960 1 0.4601 0.3658 
 Stocksj 15.1066 15 6.1287 14.8505 15 6.1343 0.1967 
         
Pair 2 Speedij 56.1491 57.1429 26.3006 55.0778 55.5556 26.6585 0.2596 
 Stocksj 15.0376 15 5.9906 14.7949 15 6.0516 0.2618 
         
Pair 3 Frequencyij -0.0321 -0.0385 1.6328 0.0020 0 1.6556 0.6385 
 Stocksj 15.0074 15 5.9857 14.7703 15 6.0585 0.3720 
Panel B: DiD regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyij 
    
Treat 0.2366** 0.0002 -0.0558 
 (0.1006) (1.2107) (0.0961) 
Post 0.1661* -1.6813** 0.2606** 
 (0.0993) (0.7737) (0.1078) 
Treat×Post -0.3106** -12.8889*** -0.3860*** 
 (0.1363) (1.4805) (0.1416) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 4,809 3,930 2,564 
This table reports the results of DiD regressions (Equation 2.4) to test the impact that a job change has on 
analyst herding behavior when I compare the treatment sample with a matched control sample of forecasts 
for the same stock and from analysts with similar herding behavior (based on a nearest neighbor match). 
Columns (1) to (3) show the results for the models utilizing three different herding measures. Appendix A 
provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all 
regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Next, I follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and match treatment and control 
forecasts on the likelihood that analysts will herd, rather than base it on ex ante herding 
behavior. To enable this, I use several analyst and stock characteristics to match treatment 
forecasts with suitable control forecasts. Similar to the previous matching strategy, I 
require that both the treatment and control forecasts are issued by brokerage firms of the 
same Size tercile ranking to control for the resources that analysts are provided. Also, both 
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forecasts must be within 30 days of each other. I then proceed to match additional 
characteristics based on propensity scores estimated from logit regressions where the 
dependent variable is Treat and the covariates include the years of general experience that 
each analyst has (Gen Exper), the return of the stock being forecasted (Retann), the log 
of the book-to-market ratio of the stock (Lnbm), and analyst coverage of the stock 
(Coverage). The results in Panel A of Table 2.4 show that for all the variables I use in my 
propensity score matching process there are no statistical differences between my 
treatment and matched control samples. The resulting DiD regressions reported in Panel 
B of Table 2.4 also show consistent results to those of Tables 2.2 and 2.3.  
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Table 2.4: Analyses where the treatment and control samples are matched by brokerage 
firm, analyst and stock characteristics. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the matching criteria 
 Treatment sample Control sample p-value for diff. in 
means test  Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
Retanni 13.3534 13.2923 30.0295 14.0283 14.9257 29.4574 0.4164 
Gen_experj 5.4763 5 3.7837 5.4089 5 3.6621 0.4101 
Coveragei 16.3473 15 9.0562 16.0633 15 9.3499 0.1606 
Lnbmi -0.8326 -0.7946 0.7618 -0.8329 -0.8050 0.7431 0.9893 
Quin_rankk 2.9708 3 0.1685 2.9708 3 0.1685 1.0000 
Panel B: DiD Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Treat 0.4727*** -0.9732 0.6808*** 
 (0.0695) (0.9417) (0.0690) 
Post 0.2671*** -0.9311* 0.4416*** 
 (0.0646) (0.5398) (0.0803) 
Treat×Post -0.2916*** -5.2671*** -0.6973*** 
 (0.0937) (1.0525) (0.1014) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 9,226 9,226 9,226 
This table reports the results of DiD regressions (Equation 2.4) to test the impact that a job change has on 
analyst herding behavior when I compare the treatment sample with a matched control sample of forecasts 
using different characteristics of brokerage firms, analysts, and stocks (based on a propensity score match). 
Columns (1) to (3) show the results for the models utilizing three different herding measures. Appendix A 
provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all 
regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
I also use a method where treatment forecasts are paired with a benchmark 
portfolio constructed from forecasts contained in the control group. The advantage of 
doing this is that it reduces selection bias that can arise when only one control forecast is 
used to match with each treatment forecast. I construct benchmark portfolios using a 
procedure employed by Fama and French (1993) when constructing their size and book-
to-market portfolios. Specifically, I sort all forecasts within each year into terciles 
according to the size of the brokerage firm that issues the forecast (Size). Then, I repeat 
the sorting process using Gen Exper, Retann, Lnbm, and Coverage. All forecasts 
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belonging to the same tercile for all the sorting criteria forms that benchmark portfolio. 
This process results in 243 (or 35) benchmark portfolios for each year. I then proceed to 
match each of the treatment forecasts with one benchmark portfolio that the treatment 
forecast belongs to.  
Using the benchmark specification, I construct the benchmark-adjusted DiD 
estimation for my variables of interest using the following equation: 
BDiDij=(Tpost - Tpre) - (BC̅̅ ̅̅ post - BC̅̅ ̅̅ pre) (2.5) 
where the first component (𝑇𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝑝𝑟𝑒) is the difference in the herding measure of 
forecasts for stock i issued by analyst j in my treatment sample before and after a job 
change; and the second component (𝐵𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐵𝐶̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑝𝑟𝑒) is the difference in the average 
value of the herding measure for the corresponding benchmark portfolio.  
 I perform univariate tests for the significance of the benchmark-adjusted DiD 
estimation of each herding measure and report the results in Table 2.5. The results are, 
again, consistent with my earlier findings, although the magnitude of the impact on 
herding is larger than my baseline regression results. This is due to the change in herding 
behavior among my control sample being deflated by taking averages across my 




Table 2.5: Analyses where the treatment forecasts are matched with a benchmark 
portfolio of control forecasts by brokerage firm, analyst and stock characteristics. 
 Number of observations BDiD estimation 
Boldij 7817 -0.0581*** 
Speedij 7817 -9.0282 *** 
Frequencyij 7817 -0.3589*** 
This table reports Benchmark DiD (BDiD) univariate test results to test the impact that a job change has on 
analyst herding behavior when I compare the treatment sample with a matched benchmark portfolio of 
control forecasts using different characteristics of brokerage firms, analysts, and stocks (based on portfolio 
sorting technique). Appendix A provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
2.4.3. Market implications  
Given that analysts who have recently changed jobs will likely provide less 
informative forecasts if they are herding more, the market reaction to these forecasts 
should be less. To test this, I compare the cumulative abnormal returns of stocks around 
analyst forecast announcement dates based on whether the analyst has recently changed 
jobs (my treatment group) or not (my control group). To perform the test, the dependent 
variable in Equation (2.3) becomes the absolute value of the two-day market-adjusted 
cumulative daily returns, CARijt, from the day of, to the day after, the analyst forecast date 
for stock i of forecast period t: 
CARijt=|(Stock returnijt-Market returnt)+(Stock returnijt+1-Market returnt+1)| (2.6) 
In Table 2.6, I show the results from using both value and equally weighted market 
indices plus results from using the S&P 500 index.14 I find a significant reduction in CAR 
for forecasts coming from analysts that have recently changed jobs, regardless of the 
proxies I use for market returns. For example, in Column (1), the results from using the 
value weighted market index show a reduction of 0.2601% in CAR, significant at the one 
                                                          
14 Stock returns and market returns are obtained from the CRSP database. 
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percent level. Given that the median value for the two-day CAR is 2.45% before an 
employment change, this reduction is equivalent to a decline of 10.6%. The significant 
reduction in CAR is also present if I exclude from the regression forecasts that overlap 
with other analyst forecasts plus forecasts that overlap with EPS disclosure events. The 
two-day CAR becomes 2.26%, representing a decline of 7.7%. Overall, my findings are 
consistent with the previous studies that document weaker market reactions to herding 
forecasts (Gleason and Lee, 2003; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2009), although in my case it is a 
result of analysts switching jobs.  
 
Table 2.6: Market reactions to analyst forecasts after an employment change. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CARij 






    
Treat 1.8416*** 1.8319*** 1.8384*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0579) (0.0582) 
Post 0.0071 0.0128 0.0060 
 (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0362) 
Treat×Post -0.2601*** -0.2536*** -0.2615*** 
 (0.0778) (0.0777) (0.0779) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Panel OLS Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 35,827 35,827 35,827 
This table reports the results of DiD regressions using Equation (2.6) where the dependent variable is the 
two-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding analyst earnings forecasts after an employment change. 
Columns (1) to (3) show the regression results when I utilize the value weighted market index, equally 
weighted market index, and the S&P500 index, respectively, as a proxy for market return. Appendix A 
provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all 





2.5. Additional analyses 
2.5.1. Subsampling  
 My first subsampling analysis aims to provide evidence that analyst herding 
behavior following a job change is moderated by the degree of unfamiliarity that analysts 
encounter in their new job. I examine two subsamples of analyst forecasts with the first 
containing forecasts issued by analysts who move to a new firm together with a group of 
at least two other colleagues from the former firm, and the second subsample contains 
forecasts from those who move alone to the new firm. I expect that analysts who move as 
a group encounter more familiarity in their new work environment, as at least they will 
be working with some colleagues that are known to them and so part of their social 
network is transferred with them to the new firm. This should lead to them exhibiting less 
herding behavior following their job change. The results reported in Table 2.7 support for 
this. I find that the coefficients for the interaction term in the regressions focusing on 
Speed and Frequency are no longer significant (Columns 2 and 3) for the subsample of 
forecasts from analysts who move in a group. Chi-squared tests also show that these two 
coefficients are significantly different from the corresponding coefficients obtained from 
the subsample of analyst forecasts who move alone (Columns 5 and 6).15 However, I find 
that there is no significant difference in the impact of job change on Bold between these 
two subsamples. These results suggest that the benefit of analysts having at least part of 
their social network transfer with them significantly improves timeliness and the ability 
to post revisions. 
                                                          
15 χ2 statistic = 125.36 (p-value=0.00) for the test for the difference in coefficients between Columns (2) 
and (5). χ2 statistic = 20.29 (p-value=0.00) for the test between Columns (3) and (6). 
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Table 2.7: Subsample analyses based on whether the analysts change jobs alone or together with a group.  
 Move as a group  Move individually 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyij  Boldij Speedij Frequencyij 
        
Treat 0.2979*** -0.1037 0.3160***  0.3419*** 1.9134*** -0.0881** 
 (0.0564) (0.7309) (0.0562)  (0.0373) (0.4928) (0.0388) 
Post 0.1839*** -1.8416*** 0.1937***  0.1931*** -1.5787*** 0.2555*** 
 (0.0332) (0.2800) (0.0340)  (0.0324) (0.2813) (0.0335) 
Treat×Post -0.3353*** 0.0778 0.0287  -0.2546*** -11.5572*** -0.3377*** 
 (0.0763) (0.9294) (0.0667)  (0.0502) (0.5841) (0.0475) 
        
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS  Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 22,692 22,692 22,692  33,061 33,061 33,061 
This table reports the results of DiD regressions (Equation 2.4). The first subsample contains forecasts by analysts who have at least two other colleagues moving from the 
former brokerage firm to the same new firm within the same year. And the second subsample contains forecasts by analysts who are the only one to move to the new brokerage 
firm. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance 
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Next, I address an argument that my prior results showing the increase in herding 
behavior after analysts move to a new brokerage firm is driven by a small subset of 
analysts who experience a significant rise in their career concerns, rather than the results 
being representative of the whole treatment sample. I address this issue by examining 
different subsamples of analyst forecasts based on the attributes associated with the 
analysts and their process of finding a new job.  
In Panel A of Table 2.8, I examine earnings forecasts from analysts who belong 
to the top 30% of most accurate analysts (i.e. analysts with the lowest forecast errors) 
across the whole industry during the one-year period prior to the job change and those 
who belong to the bottom 30% (i.e. analysts with the highest forecast errors). I measure 
forecast errors as the absolute difference between the analyst forecast and the actual EPS, 
adjusted for the mean forecast errors across all other analysts following the same stock 
within a fiscal year. It may be that it is the poor analysts, for example, that will herd more 
after changing jobs. However, the results show that herding behavior after a job change 
can be found in both subsamples regardless of the analyst’s ex ante forecast accuracy. 
In Panel B of Table 2.8, I test whether all analysts show stronger herding behavior 
after a job change regardless of their ex ante herding level. It may be, for example, that it 
is analysts who already display herding behavior before they switch jobs that are driving 
the results. To examine this, I first subsample forecasts from analysts who belong to the 
top 30% of analysts who show the greatest tendency to issue Bold forecasts across the 
whole industry prior to a job change; and those who belong to the bottom 30%. 
Interestingly, the tabulated results in Columns (1) and (4) reveal that it is those analysts 
who previously issued Bold forecasts that are more likely to herd following a job change 
and those who previously had a tendency to herd refrain from it. However, the results 
from using Frequency and Speed indicate that herding is present in both subsamples.
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Table 2.8: Subsample analyses based on analyst past performance and past herding behavior. 
Panel A: Analysts who have higher – low forecast accuracy  
 High accuracy  Low accuracy 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyij  Boldij Speedij Frequencyij 
        
Treat 0.3314*** 2.0121** 0.0994  0.3227*** 1.3984 0.1058 
 (0.0683) (0.9389) (0.0700)  (0.0657) (0.8872) (0.0779) 
Post 0.2181*** -0.7591 0.2115***  0.2292*** -1.8456*** 0.3544*** 
 (0.0635) (0.5592) (0.0590)  (0.0614) (0.5628) (0.0791) 
Treat×Post -0.3302*** -6.3049*** -0.2715***  -0.2171** -11.2539*** -0.4147*** 
 (0.0917) (1.0663) (0.0869)  (0.0877) (1.0309) (0.1002) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS  Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 9,565 9,565 9,565  10,441 10,441 10,441 
Panel B: Analysts who are more likely to issue bold forecasts and those who are less likely to issue bold forecasts 
 More bold  Less bold 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyij  Boldij Speedij Frequencyij 
        
Treat 0.6061*** 1.5417* 0.0181  0.1008 2.5498** 0.2123** 
 (0.0738) (0.9031) (0.0587)  (0.0776) (1.1156) (0.1026) 
Post 0.1074* -2.1767*** 0.2568***  0.2801*** -1.1502* 0.4072*** 
 (0.0647) (0.5689) (0.0529)  (0.0696) (0.6375) (0.1054) 
Treat×Post -0.6682*** -11.2792*** -0.1970***  0.1820* -4.7795*** -0.4377*** 
 (0.0965) (1.0434) (0.0713)  (0.1030) (1.2053) (0.1363) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS  Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 10,018 10,018 10,018  6,957 6,957 6,957 
This table reports the results of DiD regressions (Equation 2.4) to test the impact that a job change has on analyst herding behavior across different subsamples of analyst 
forecasts. Panel A shows the results for forecasts by analysts who have high forecast accuracy and those who have low accuracy (measured by forecast errors) across the whole 
industry during the one-year period before an analyst job change. Forecast error is measured as the absolute difference between the analyst forecast and the actual EPS, adjusted 
for the mean forecast errors across all other analysts following the same stock within a fiscal year. Panel B shows the results for forecasts by analysts who are prone to issue 
bold forecasts and those who are not during the one-year period before analysts change jobs (measured by Bold). Columns (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) show the results for the 
models utilizing three different herding measures. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all 
regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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In Panel A of Table 2.9, I compare analysts who belong to the top 30% in the 
treatment sample for the time it takes them to find a new job against those who belong to 
the bottom 30%. It can be that those analysts who take longer to find employment will be 
more insecure and therefore will herd more. I measure the time it takes an analyst to get 
a new job as the number of days between them posting their last forecast with their former 
employer, to the first forecast they make with their new brokerage firm. In Panel B, I 
compare those who move to a larger firm (with respect to the number of employed 
analysts) compared to their former employer against those who move to a smaller firm. 
This is to account for the possibility that those who move to a larger/smaller firm may be 
under differing degrees of pressure to perform, leading to differences in herding behavior. 
However, the coefficients of the interaction terms in Panels A and B predominantly 




Table 2.9: Subsample analyses based on the process and outcome of finding a new job. 
Panel A: Analysts who need a shorter time to get a new job and those who need a longer time 
 Short time to find a new job  Longer time to find a new job 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyij  Boldij Speedij Frequencyij 
        
Treat 0.2418*** 0.3463 0.3308***  0.3913*** 1.3542** -0.4135*** 
 (0.0547) (0.7195) (0.0580)  (0.0517) (0.6503) (0.0495) 
Post 0.1837*** -1.9321*** 0.1862***  0.1815*** -1.6331*** 0.2304*** 
 (0.0329) (0.2793) (0.0339)  (0.0332) (0.2781) (0.0340) 
Treat×Post -0.2514*** -4.4121*** -0.1530**  -0.4001*** -9.3804*** -0.0213 
 (0.0744) (0.9356) (0.0670)  (0.0701) (0.8624) (0.0580) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS  Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 23,044 23,044 23,044  23,899 23,899 23,899 
Panel B: Analysts who move to a larger firm and those who move to a smaller firm 
 Move to a larger firm  Move to a smaller firm 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyij  Boldij Speedij Frequencyij 
        
Treat 0.3665*** -0.2452 0.2850***  0.2977*** 2.3066*** -0.1912*** 
 (0.0653) (0.8369) (0.0676)  (0.0551) (0.7094) (0.0547) 
Post 0.1827*** -1.7113*** 0.1841***  0.1822*** -1.6404*** 0.2099*** 
 (0.0334) (0.2810) (0.0341)  (0.0334) (0.2785) (0.0339) 
Treat×Post -0.2981*** -3.8996*** -0.2821***  -0.1690** -11.8584*** -0.4628*** 
 (0.0883) (1.0610) (0.0765)  (0.0763) (0.9413) (0.0655) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS  Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 21,489 21,489 21,489  22,953 22,953 22,953 
This table reports the results of DiD regressions (Equation 2.4) to test the impact that a job change has on analyst herding behavior across different subsamples of analyst 
forecasts. Panel A shows the results for forecasts by analysts who take a shorter time to find a new job and those who need a longer time (measured by the number of days from 
their last forecast for the former broker till their first forecast for the new broker).  Panel A shows the results for forecasts by analysts who move to a firm with a higher decile 
ranking, in terms of firm size, and those who move to a lower ranked firm (measured by Size). Columns (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) show the results for the models utilizing three 
different herding measures. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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Next, I account for the fact that some analysts cover a large portfolio of stocks, 
leading to their forecasts appearing multiple times in the treatment sample. To ensure the 
forecasting behavior of these analysts are not driving the whole of my results, I exclude 
forecasts issued by analysts who belong to the top 10% of my sample in terms of portfolio 
size and rerun my regressions. The results, reported in Panel A of Table 2.10, remain 
consistent with my main findings.  
 I also consider if my results are being influenced by forecasts of stocks where 
analyst coverage is low. For example, if there are three analysts covering one stock, the 
consensus is driven by only two analysts (as the studied analyst is excluded). This 
consensus can be very sensitive to the forecasts of either analyst. Therefore, I rerun my 
regressions but exclude forecasts for stocks covered by three or less analysts from my 
sample. The results, reported in Panel B of Table 2.10, continue to be consistent with my 
prior results. 
 Finally, I examine the possibility that analysts will have a greater tendency to herd 
for stocks of large firms as those stocks are associated with less disperse information 
(Nolte et al., 2014). To account for this, I exclude forecasts for stocks belonging to the 
top 10% of the largest firms (in terms of total assets) in my sample and rerun the 




Table 2.10: Further robustness tests for the impact of employment change on analyst 
herding. 
Panel A: DiD regression results after excluding forecasts issued by analysts with large portfolios 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Treat 0.3442*** 1.3251*** 0.0298 
 (0.0355) (0.4701) (0.0365) 
Post 0.1968*** -1.6331*** 0.2487*** 
 (0.0324) (0.2814) (0.0334) 
Treat×Post -0.2772*** -8.9152*** -0.2753*** 
 (0.0478) (0.5486) (0.0454) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 35,631 35,631 35,631 
Panel B: DiD regression results after excluding forecasts for stocks with low analyst coverage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Treat 0.3769*** 1.5445*** 0.0369 
 (0.0349) (0.4649) (0.0371) 
Post 0.1990*** -1.5805*** 0.2622*** 
 (0.0327) (0.2898) (0.0347) 
Treat×Post -0.2805*** -8.8722*** -0.2806*** 
 (0.0467) (0.5318) (0.0457) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 36,499 36,499 36,499 
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Table 2.10 (continued) 
Panel C: DiD regression results after excluding forecasts for stocks of large firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Treat 0.3234*** 1.2748*** 0.0187 
 (0.0356) (0.4788) (0.0367) 
Post 0.1947*** -1.5831*** 0.2537*** 
 (0.0322) (0.2838) (0.0334) 
Treat×Post -0.2744*** -9.0544*** -0.2681*** 
 (0.0476) (0.5522) (0.0453) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 35,646 35,646 35,646 
This table reports the results of DiD regressions (Equation 2.4) for my further robustness test for the impact 
that a job change has on analyst herding behavior. Panel A shows the results when I exclude from my 
treatment sample forecasts issued by analysts who belong to the top 10% in terms of Stocks. Panel B shows 
the results when I exclude forecasts for stocks with Coverage less than or equal to three analysts. Panel C 
reports the results when I exclude forecasts for stocks that belong to the top 10% in terms of Size. Columns 
(1) to (3) show the results for the models utilizing three different herding measures. Appendix A provides 
a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. 
***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
2.5.2. Analyses using Quasi-natural experiments and the Average treatment effect 
I adopt brokerage M&As as my quasi-natural experiments and focus on a 
treatment sample of analysts who change jobs when their brokerage firm undergoes an 
M&A. According to Wu and Zang (2009), turnover is higher among analysts with high 
forecasting abilities following brokerage M&As. And as analysts with high forecasting 
performance are not those that herd (Clement and Tse, 2005), I am reducing in my sample 
the likelihood that the reason analysts are changing jobs as a result of an M&A is due to 
their ex ante herding behavior. 
I collect data on broker M&As between 2005 and 2016 from the SDC Mergers 
and Acquisition database. I follow the method to identify broker M&As by Wu and Zang 
(2009) and require that the target’s four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
codes are either 6211 (investment banks and brokerage firms) or 6282 (independent 
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research firms), whereas the acquirers belong to either the two-digit SIC code 60 
(commercial banks), 62 (securities firms), or 63 (insurance companies). In addition, I only 
examine completed M&As of which the acquirers wholly own the targets after the 
transactions. This is to make sure I am capturing M&As where a restructure of the merged 
brokerage firm has taken place.  
I manually match target and acquirer broker names with brokerage house IDs 
(name abbreviations) from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. 
To confirm my match, I also require that the target IDs disappear from the database and 
a large proportion of analysts from the target firms change their broker IDs to the acquirer 
IDs after the effective date of the M&A.  
To supplement the M&A list from the SDC Mergers and Acquisition database, 
which only covers listed firms, I also try to identify M&As involving non-listed firms by 
looking for broker IDs that disappear in the I/B/E/S database during the studied period. 
For those broker IDs which disappear, I investigate whether a large proportion of their 
employees move to one new brokerage house. This may indicate there is an M&A 
between the two firms. I confirm this by manually searching for M&A news in Factiva 
which matches with the broker IDs. In total, my sample consists of 25 M&As involving 
256 analysts who get a new job after the M&A,16 and their 1,825 forecasts before and 
1,825 forecasts after the M&A. 
For the DiD regressions, I use a two-year window around the M&A date. 
However, I include a cooling-off period from six months before to six months after the 
event to avoid any changes to analyst forecasting behavior caused by M&A news and to 
account for the fact that the date analysts change their job can happen a few months before 
                                                          
16 I identify this group of analysts as those who change their broker ID after an M&A, and where the new 
brokerage ID is not the same as the ID of the merged firm. 
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or after the M&A effective date. My initial control sample contains all forecasts issued 
by analysts who are not involved in M&As and do not change their broker ID during the 
event window. In Panel A of Table 2.11 I show the results from running DiD regressions 
on this sample. The results remain consistent with my main findings. In Panel B of Table 
2.11, I rerun the regressions using a propensity score matched control sample based on 
the characteristics of the analyst and the stock as I previously did for Table 2.4. Finally, 
in Panel C of Table 2.11, I adopt the portfolio matching technique to pair one treatment 
forecast with a comparable portfolio of control forecasts (as in Table 2.5).17 In all cases, 
my findings remain robust.  
 
  
                                                          
17 I could not perform matching using analysts with similar herding behavior and following the same stock 
due to a lack of sufficient observations.   
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Table 2.11: DiD analyses using an M&A treatment sample.  
Panel A: DiD regression results using an M&A treatment sample and an unmatched control sample 
of forecasts 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Treat 0.1890** 4.0024*** -0.3844*** 
 (0.0823) (0.9712) (0.0979) 
Post -0.0740* -0.8590* 0.0459 
 (0.0403) (0.4554) (0.0560) 
Treat×Post -0.2159** -9.2497*** -0.3942*** 
 (0.1047) (1.2455) (0.1033) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 15,313 15,313 15,313 
Panel B: DiD regression results using an M&A treatment sample and a matched control sample 
based on the characteristics of brokerage firms, analysts, and stocks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Boldij Speedij Frequencyj 
    
Treat 0.0667 2.1252* -0.4387*** 
 (0.1086) (1.2833) (0.1588) 
Post 0.0184 1.3914 0.4613* 
 (0.1058) (1.1387) (0.2492) 
Treat×Post -0.2572* -11.0740*** -0.7529*** 
 (0.1466) (1.6430) (0.2548) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 3,690 3,690 3,690 
Panel C: DiD analyses using benchmark portfolios of control forecasts based on the characteristics 
of brokerage firms, analysts, and stocks 
 Number of observations BDiD estimation 
Boldij 1103 -0.0547*** 
Speedij 1103 -18.6707*** 
Frequencyij 1103 -0.5644*** 
This table reports the results of DiD regressions (Equation 2.4) to test the impact that a job change has on 
analyst herding behavior when I utilize brokerage firm M&A as a quasi-natural experiment. Panel A shows 
the results when I compare my M&A treatment sample against an unmatched control sample of forecasts. 
Panel B shows the results when I utilize a matched control sample of forecasts regarding different 
characteristics of brokerage firms, analysts, and stocks (based on a propensity score match). Panel C shows 
Benchmark DiD (BDiD) univariate test results when I use a matched benchmark portfolio of control 
forecasts regarding different characteristics of brokerage firms, analysts, and stocks. Columns (1) to (3) 
show the results for the models utilizing three different herding measures. Appendix A provides a detailed 
description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, 
and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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In Table 2.12, I address the concern that the increase in analysts herding after a 
job change is due to the M&A itself, and is not necessarily caused by the uncertainty that 
analysts face in their new job. To do this I employ forecasts issued by analysts who 
undergo the same M&A but are retained to work in the merged firms as my new control 
sample and rerun the DiD regressions. This method allows me to account for the 
unobserved impact of the M&A on analyst herding behavior. 
I also attempt to minimize the risk that there still may be other unobservable 
endogenous factors that lead to analysts changing their jobs after an M&A by utilizing a 
method of estimating the average treatment effect through a two-stage regression 
procedure (Wooldridge, 2002 p.614-621). According to Wooldridge (2002), this method 
is more efficient when applied to binary endogenous variables (such as my treatment 
effect) compared to the usual instrumental variable regression method. In the first-stage, 
I regress the treatment effect (Treat) on two exogenous covariates plus all other control 
variables. The first covariate identifies whether the analyst is from the target firm (Target) 
and the second identifies whether the analyst has a direct competitor in the counterpart 
firm (Compete). I adopt these covariates based on the findings of Wu and Zang (2009) 
that show analyst turnover following an M&A is higher among the target analysts and 
those having a direct competitor in the counterpart firm. At the same time, both covariates 
are exogenous since analysts cannot decide whether they belong to the target or the 
acquirer firm, and whether they have a direct competitor. From the first-stage regression 
results, I generate a predicted series of the treatment effect (i.e. the average treatment 
effect). This predicted series is free of endogeneity and is used as the regressor in my DiD 
models in the second stage, replacing the treatment dummy.  
My first-stage regression results show that Treat is positively associated with both 
Target and Compete, and significant at the 1% level. This further supports my use of the 
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two covariates. The results of the second-stage regressions align with my main findings 
in terms of the sign and significance of the coefficients of the interaction term, although I 
document the magnitude of these coefficients are lower than my reported baseline results.  
 
Table 2.12: Analyses utilizing the estimation of the average treatment effect. 










      
Targetjt 2.0965***     
 (0.0630)     
Competejt 1.1979***     
 (0.1028)     
Pr(Treat)   0.0220 0.5662 0.1642*** 
   (0.0300) (0.4029) (0.0310) 
Post   -0.2321*** -1.8220** -0.1162** 
   (0.0717) (0.8515) (0.0515) 
Pr(Treat)×Post   -0.0441* -1.9874*** -0.1177*** 
   (0.0265) (0.3239) (0.0199) 
      
Control variables Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Regression model Logistic panel  Logistic panel Panel OLS Panel OLS 
Observations 10,152  10,152 10,152 10,152 
This table reports the results of two-stage regressions to test the impact that a job change has on analyst 
herding behavior when I compare an M&A treatment sample against a control sample of forecasts issued 
by analysts who are retained to work in the merged firm after an M&A. Column (1) shows the first-stage 
regression to estimate the average treatment effect. Columns (2) to (4) are second-stage regressions showing 
the results of DiD regressions (Equation 2.4) utilizing three different herding measures. Appendix A 
provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all 







This study examines how an employment change affects analyst herding behavior. 
I find that analysts who switch jobs are significantly less likely to issue bold forecasts, 
more likely to be slow at posting their forecasts and consequently revise their forecasts 
less often. Additionally, the observed herding behavior of analysts who have changed jobs 
also significantly reduces the market impact of their forecasts. Taken together, I show that 
analyst employment change can be a significant source of herding behavior.  
This finding raises an important human resource question in relation to how 
employers should support analysts who have recently switched jobs. Although I am 
unable to observe this with my dataset, I expect that where employers facilitate a better 
transition from one workplace environment to another the tendency for analysts to herd 
will be reduced. The quicker an analyst familiarizes themselves with their new 
surroundings, the less likely their performance will suffer. Indeed, I find some evidence 
to support this in that simply having familiar faces in the new workplace improves the 
timeliness of their forecasts. Finally, and more generally, my research opens an avenue 
for future research on the impact that other career events may have on analyst behavior 




3. The heterogeneous impact of work specialization on analyst 
performance 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The paper in this chapter addresses the question: is there a benefit for analysts to 
specialize in their work? Dating back to Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999), work 
specialization has been identified as one of the key factors in explaining analysts’ 
forecasting performance. While the aforementioned research finds that analysts benefit 
when their coverage of stocks is not spread too widely across multiple industries, other 
research finds no systematic relationship between analyst forecast accuracy and how 
many industries the stocks that they cover are in (Mikhail et al., 1997; Clement et al., 
2007; Kim et al., 2011; Bradley et al., 2017). Rather, they argue other factors, such as the 
innate ability of superior analysts (Clement et al., 2007) can explain differences in analyst 
performance.  
While the above papers highlight characteristics that explain differences in analyst 
performance, a separate stream of literature, examining the types of information analysts 
impound into markets, finds that they play a crucial role in incorporating industry-specific 
information into stock prices (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Chan and Hameed, 2006). 
They find that analysts are able to identify the common industry component of each firm-
specific news event, which they then utilize to make inferences on other stocks within the 
same industry. An implication of this being that the more stocks an analyst follows within 




Given the above fact that analysts are an important conduit in disseminating 
industry-relevant information to the market, and that we should expect superior analysts 
to do a better job at this due to their innate ability to benefit from task-specific knowledge 
(Clement et al., 2007), I hypothesize that the benefit of concentrating coverage to a limited 
number of industries will be pronounced for superior analysts. Conversely, inferior 
analysts will not be able to benefit from work specialization to the same degree. This 
heterogeneous impact that work specialization has on analyst performance can also 
potentially explain the mixed results within the extant literature, as one cohort of analysts 
(i.e. superior analysts) benefit from specialization while another cohort (i.e. inferior 
analysts) does not.  
My hypothesis requires me to be able to capture how concentrated an analyst’s 
workload is across different industries. While prior studies utilize a count variable to 
capture industry coverage, I employ a measure of the concentration of stocks each analyst 
covers across the industries that these stocks are in. I achieve this by applying the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure how concentrated the stocks that an 
analyst follows are within a limited number of industries (i.e. work specialization). While 
a naïve industry count could show, for example, that an analyst’s stock coverage crosses 
over three industries, it can be that all of the individual stocks covered, bar two, are in one 
of those industries, implying that the analyst’s overall workload is still highly specialized 
to a single industry. My HHI accounts for this and will therefore be better able to capture 
the degree of work specialization there is within an analyst’s portfolio.  
To test my hypothesis the preliminary analyses consists of generating panel 
regression results using the full sample of 535,203 analyst earnings forecasts during the 
period from 2005 to 2016 obtained from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) database. After this, and to deal with endogeneity concerns, I conduct a quasi-
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natural experiment following the lead of Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and use M&As 
between brokerage firms to capture changes to the work specialization of those analysts 
who continue to work in the merged firms after an M&A. Using a difference-in-
differences (DiD) regression approach, I compare the change in forecasting performance 
of analysts that have experienced a change in their work specialization through an M&A 
(my treatment group) with those that have not gone through an M&A (my control group), 
and then between superior and inferior analysts within the treatment group. In addition, 
to ensure I have accounted for analyst fixed effects, stock fixed effects and year fixed 
effects, I repeat the above procedure for treatment forecasts that are then matched with a 
comparable portfolio of control forecasts, leaving changes in analysts’ work 
specialization due to M&As as the only primary factor that can affect analysts’ 
performance. 
 Finally, I conduct a number of robustness tests in recognition of the fact that 
changes to analysts’ work specialization caused by brokerage M&As may not be 
completely exogenous in eliminating all confounding factors that can affect both analysts’ 
work specialization and forecasting performance. My robustness tests include sub-
sampling my data based on the findings of Wu and Zang (2009) who examine what type 
of analysts are more or less likely to remain following an M&A. I also utilize alternative 
measures for analyst forecasting performance and work specialization, utilizing 
alternative cut-offs to classify superior and inferior analysts, accounting for forecasts that 
come from teams of analysts, and performing the analyses when aggregating all variables 
at the analyst level. In all cases, my conclusions still hold. 
The regression results from both the unmatched and matched samples provide 
similar outcomes. When comparing my M&A treatment sample with the matched control 
sample I show that an increase of one standard deviation in analyst work specialization 
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(HHI) leads to superior analysts becoming 77% more accurate compared to the average 
analyst covering the same stock (i.e. the industry consensus).18 This is a substantial 
improvement given that, prior to the M&A, an average superior analyst in my sample is 
30% more accurate than the industry consensus. In contrast, I find no significant impact 
of work specialization on inferior analysts. These findings suggest we should no longer 
treat all analysts the same when assessing how their performance is affected by work 
specialization. 
My study, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to examine the impact that 
work specialization has on the performance of superior and inferior analysts. By doing so 
I complement the studies of Clement (1999), Jacob et al. (1999), and Clement et al. (2007) 
who focus on one specific aspect of analyst work complexity (i.e. workload).  
My findings also provide an explanation for the mixed results in the literature 
studying the average effect of industry concentration on analysts’ performance, as I show 
it is a specific cohort of analysts that benefit from work specialization. By introducing the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure industry concentration I also provide a 
more refined measure to capture how specialized the workload of an analyst is within a 
limited number of industries.  
Based on my findings, brokerage firms should consider allocating different types 
of work to fit with the skill-sets of superior and inferior analysts to effectively enhance 
their forecasting performance. In particular, I provide evidence supporting the view that 
superior analysts should specialize, whereas there is no evidence to suggest inferior 
analysts also benefit from concentrating their coverage to fewer industries.  
The remainder of this study is structured into five sections. Section 3.2 is the 
                                                          
18 A one standard deviation increase in HHI in my sample represents a 40.4% increase in the industry 
concentration of an analyst’s portfolio. 
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hypotheses development. Section 3.3 reports preliminary results when I utilize a complete 
sample of analyst forecasts during the studied period. In section 3.4 I present my empirical 
results when restricting my analyses to the M&A sample, and in section 3.5 I provide my 
robustness tests. Section 3.6 contains my conclusion.  
 
3.2. Hypothesis development 
The literature focusing on the aggregate impact of work complexity on analysts’ 
performance provides inconclusive results. For example, Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. 
(1999) find that the number of industries covered by an analyst is negatively associated 
with analysts’ forecast accuracy. Accordingly, knowing the number of firms and 
industries followed by an analyst may provide sufficient information to investors to 
predict economically meaningful differences in analyst forecast accuracy. As indicated 
by Clement (1999), the ability to identify a small systematic difference in forecast 
accuracy among the analysts can provide significant benefits to large institutional 
investors.  
While research continues to find other factors that can explain analyst 
performance, including the advantage of being a local analyst (Bae, Stulz and Tan, 2008) 
and the type of work experience analysts have before joining the brokerage industry 
(Bradley et al., 2017), further evidence of the impact that industry coverage has on 
performance is weak. Specifically, Mikhail et al. (1997) find little support for the positive 
relationship between forecast accuracy and industry concentration. Also, Kim et al. 
(2011) show that there is no relationship after controlling for the timing of analyst 
forecasts and Bolliger (2004) finds no evidence that the relationship holds for European 
analysts. Additionally, Clement et al. (2007) find that the impact of the number of covered 
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industries has on analysts’ forecast accuracy disappears after controlling for analysts’ 
innate ability.  
Separate to the above literature, there is research that suggests analysts provide 
more industry/market wide information, as opposed to firm-specific information, to both 
the domestic US market (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004) and international markets (Chan 
and Hameed, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008; Kim and Shi, 2012). Analysts seem to 
be able to extract core industry information from public news events to make meaningful 
inferences about other firms’ future earnings within the same industry. This indicates that 
the primary information production activity of analysts facilitates intra-industry 
information transfer.  
Complimentary to the above findings, Clement et al. (2007) find that analysts with 
high innate ability can apply task-specific knowledge to improve their current forecasting 
performance, whereas analysts with low innate ability cannot. I expect this is also true 
when applied to utilizing intra-industry information to price different stocks in the same 
sector. This leads me to conjecture that superior analysts will be better able to take 
advantage of tracking stocks within the same industry. I therefore hypothesize that if there 
is an increase in the level of work specialization (a.k.a. industry concentration), it is the 
superior analysts who should experience an improvement in their forecasting accuracy: 
H3.1: An increase in the level of work specialization leads to a positive impact on 




3.3. Analyses based on all analyst forecasts 
3.3.1. Data and methodology 
I collect data on annual earnings per share forecasts from analysts between 2005 
and 2016 from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. My period 
of analysis starts from 2005 so that I only examine analyst forecasts after Global 
Settlement was introduced, which can potentially affect analyst forecasting behavior.19 
Also, I limit my analyses to one-year ahead annual EPS forecasts. In addition, to avoid 
the effects of reiteration, I follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) to only use the most recent 
analyst forecast for each stock in their tracking portfolio prior to the end of a forecast 
period. This leads to a sample of 535,203 forecasts.  
For my econometric model, I follow Clement (1999) and Bradley et al. (2017) to 
use the proportional mean absolute forecast error (PMAFEi,j,t) to capture analyst 
performance. Specifically: 
PMAFEi,j,t=
AFEi,j,t - AFEi,t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
AFEi,t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 (3.1) 
where AFEi,j,t is the absolute forecast error for analyst j’s forecast for stock i within 
forecast period t. AFEi,t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean absolute forecast error across all analysts issuing 
forecasts for stock i in forecast period t. To ensure that the estimation of  AFEi,t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is 
meaningful, I require that there are at least three analysts covering stock i to construct this 
variable. A negative value of PMAFE suggests the forecast is more accurate than the firm 
average, whereas a positive value of PMAFE suggests the opposite.20 This results in my 
                                                          
19 This is an enforcement agreement reached in 2003 that requires the physical and operational separation 
between the investment banking and research departments of brokerage firms to mitigate the potential of 
biased forecasts for investment banking clients. 
20 I follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) to winsorize this variable by 2.5% in each tail to address the outlier 
issue caused by I/B/E/S coding errors.  
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reduced sample of 467,588 forecasts from 47,726 analyst-year observations (3,826 firm-
year observations). 
As for my main independent variable of interest, I employ the Herfindahl-






where n is the number of industries (identified by two-digit SIC codes) that analyst 
j covers, and Sk is the proportion of stocks in analyst j’s portfolio that belong to industry 
k. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index was originally used as a measure of market 
concentration to capture whether market share is concentrated within a small number of 
firms within one industry (Hirschman, 1945; Herfindahl, 1950). Other uses of the index 
include measuring competition in elections (Stigler, 1972), inequality of income (Owen, 
Ryan and Weatherston, 2007), the level of industry specialization within a firm (Gompers, 
Kovner and Lerner, 2009), individual task specialization (Narayanan, Balasubramanian 
and Swaminathan, 2009), and attention diversification (Boydstun, Bevan and Thomas, 
2014). I believe HHI is also a suitable measure to capture analyst work specialization. For 
example, consider two analysts covering the same number of industries, but one has a 
large proportion of stocks in their portfolio belonging to one industry whereas the other 
has an equal stock allocation across industries. Obviously, the level of work specialization 
of the first analyst will be higher than the second analyst, which cannot be captured if I 
simply look at the number of industries they cover. However, since HHI accounts for both 
the number of industries assigned to the analyst and the proportion of stocks in the analyst 
portfolio that belongs to each industry, it can efficiently capture the differing levels of 
specialization between these two analysts.  
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I also employ two ‘ability’ dummies to classify analysts into superior and inferior 
analysts. I define Superiorj,t to be equal to one if analyst j is ranked within the top 20% of 
all analysts within the brokerage industry in year t, and zero otherwise. I also adopt 
Inferiorj,t, which equals to one if analyst j is ranked within the bottom 20% during year t, 
and zero otherwise. For each analyst, I calculate an average value for PMAFE across all 
stocks in their portfolio and use this as the ranking criteria.  
 With regards to my control variables, I utilize a number of variables that can affect 
analyst forecasting performance based on the prior literature. These include brokerage 
firm size (Sizej,t) to control for analyst resources and Experiencej,t to control for analyst 
years of general experience (Clement, 1999). I also control for analyst workload measured 
by the number of stocks the analyst covers in year t (Workloadj,t), the number of stocks 
that are new to the analyst portfolio in year t (New stocksj,t), and whether the stock belongs 
to the S&P500 index in year t (SP500i,t). These three variables account for the complexity 
of an analyst’s tracking portfolio with respect to the analyst total workload, the difficulty 
experienced when forecasting new stocks, and the availability of stock information, 
respectively.21 Next, I control for the number of days from when the analyst makes a 
forecast until the end of the forecast period (Horizoni,j,t). I use this measure to account for 
the fact that the closer a forecast is to the forecast period end date, the more information 
is available to analysts to base the forecast on (Kim et al., 2011). Finally, based on the 
work of Kim et al. (2011), I account for the number of forecast revisions an analyst issues 
for a stock within a year (Revisionsi,j,t). Appendix B outlines how each of these variables 
is calculated in detail. 
                                                          
21 I do not control for the number of industries an analyst covers as it is directly represented in the calculation 
of HHI.  
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 My preliminary regression model to examine the different impact that work 










                 + β
5
Inferior + γ'X + ε 
(3.3) 
In this model, my measure of analyst performance (PMAFE) is regressed against 
HHI plus its interactions with Superior and Inferior, and a vector X, representing my 
control variables. The coefficient 𝛽1 represents the impact that HHI has on analyst 
forecast errors. 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 indicate the different impact that HHI has on superior and 
inferior analysts.  
 
3.3.2. Summary statistics and preliminary regression results  
Table 3.1 presents the summary statistics plus correlation matrix of all variables 
across my complete sample of analyst forecasts. The mean forecast error (PMAFE) in my 
sample is 1.1229, with the average forecast being issued 77 days before the financial year 
end date (Horizon) and with 25.25% of forecasts being for S&P500 stocks (SP500). The 
table also shows that, on average, an analyst issuing forecasts in my sample works for a 
brokerage firm employing 66 analysts (Size). Also, of the 10 stocks (Workload) that the 
average analyst covers, 2 are likely to be newly assigned for the year (New stocks). The 
average analyst also issues 3 forecast revisions per stock each year (Revisions). 
Figure 3.1 graphs the proportion of analysts by their HHI value and by the number 
of industries that they follow.22 While the largest cluster of analysts, representing 44% of 
my sample, follow only one industry with an HHI = 1, another 34% of analysts cover two 
                                                          
22 Also, the squared bins that are not shaded are indicative of combinations of HHI and Industry that are 
populated by less than 1% of analysts (for a total of 5% of my sample). 
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to three industries, with their HHI varying between 0.3333 and 0.9524. This range also 
incorporates the mean and median HHI of my entire sample (0.7114 and 0.7734, 
respectively). The remaining 22% of analysts cover a dispersed range of stocks across 
four or more industries. This latter group have an average HHI of 0.4.  
The correlation matrix shows that analyst forecast errors (PMAFE) are positively 
correlated with analyst work specialization (HHI). At the same time, PMAFE is 
negatively correlated with analyst Workload, the number of New stocks in the analyst 
portfolio, analyst Experience, and the number of Revisions the analyst issues for the stock 
being forecasted. PMAFE is positively correlated with the dummy variable identifying an 







Table 3.1: Summary statistics and correlation matrix for the complete sample of analyst forecasts. 
 Summary statistics  Correlation matrix 
   Mean Med.   Std.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) PMAFE 1.1229 0.0044 3.2165  1.0000         
(2) HHI 0.7114 0.7734 0.2947  0.0027* 1.0000        
(3) Size 65.7225 38 67.5630  0.0010 0.0256*** 1.0000       
(4) Workload 9.8691 8 8.4582  -0.0130*** -0.2091*** 0.0692*** 1.0000      
(5) New stocks 2.4531 1 3.4724  -0.0035** -0.1229*** 0.0451*** 0.5892*** 1.0000     
(6) SP500 0.2525 0 0.4344  0.0236*** -0.0245*** 0.0787*** 0.0558*** 0.0061*** 1.0000    
(7) Horizon 77.0111 58 85.3517  0.2009*** -0.0005 -0.0502*** -0.0427*** -0.0546*** -0.0246*** 1.0000   
(8) Experience 8.4719 5 8.7824  -0.0215*** -0.0933*** 0.0322*** 0.2742*** 0.0771*** 0.1074*** -0.0234*** 1.0000  
(9) Revisions 3.1874 3 3.6277  -0.0660*** 0.0290*** 0.0717*** 0.0500*** 0.0196*** 0.0901*** -0.3502*** 0.0558*** 1.0000 
This table reports the summary statistics and correlation matrix of all the variables across my sample containing 467,588 earnings forecasts from 47,726 analyst-year 




 Figure 3.1: The distribution of the number of industries and work specialization of 
analysts. 
  
This figure shows the distribution of analysts during the period of 2005 to 2016, in terms of the number of 
industries they cover and the value of the analysts’ work specialization, measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). The value of each variable is divided into deciles, resulting in 100 bins of value. 
The vertical axis shows the percentage of analysts belonging to each bin. For illustrative purposes, I exclude 
from the histogram analysts in my sample who cover more than 10 industries. Also, the squared bins that 
are not shaded are indicative of a combination of HHI and Industry that are populated by less than 1% of 
analysts (for a total of 5% of my sample).   
 
 My regression results, utilizing Equation (3.3), on the complete sample of analyst 
forecasts are reported in Table 3.2. Column (1) shows the results when I regress PMAFE 
against my variable of interest HHI, the dummy identifying Superior analysts, the 
interaction between HHI and Superior, and all control variables. In Column (2), I use the 
same model as in Column (1) but replace Superior by Inferior. In Column (3), I include 
both ‘ability’ dummies, plus their interactions with HHI in the model. I include year fixed 
effects and brokerage firm fixed effects in all three regressions. 
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In Column (1), the interaction coefficient for HHI×Superior is -0.3884, significant 
at a one percent level. This indicates superior analysts tend to show more improvement in 
forecasting performance compared to other analysts given an increase in work 
specialization. In contrast, the coefficient for HHI×Inferior in Column (2) is positive and 
significant at 0.9177. This means, relative to other analysts, inferior analysts see a decline 
in their performance when the level of work specialization increases.  
Focusing on Column (3), I find that the sum of the coefficients for HHI and 
HHI×Superior is -0.2455, significant at the one percent level.23 This means, given an 
increase of one standard deviation in HHI (i.e. 0.2936 – see Table 3.1), the PMAFE of a 
superior analyst will reduce by 0.07. When comparing this with the average PMAFE of -
0.2671 across forecasts by superior analysts, this suggests a 26% improvement in their 
performance. In contrast, I find that HHI has an adverse impact on the performance of 
inferior analysts. The sum of the coefficients for HHI and HHI×Inferior is 0.6771, 
significant at a one percent level (F-stat = 150.87). This means when an inferior analyst 
experiences a one standard deviation increase in HHI, analyst PMAFE will increase by 
0.20. Given that the average PMAFE across forecasts by inferior analysts is 2.7521, this 
suggests a 7% decline in their performance. Overall, the results in Table 3.2 support my 
hypothesis that work specialization has a greater, positive impact on the performance of 
superior analysts relative to inferior analysts.  
  
                                                          
23 The F-test statistic for the significance of the sum of the estimated coefficients for HHI (-0.1207) and the 




Table 3.2: Regression results using the full sample of analyst forecasts. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  PMAFE  PMAFE PMAFE 
    
HHI 0.1208*** -0.2106*** -0.1207*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0169) (0.0185) 
Superior -1.0895***  -0.9154*** 
 (0.0176)  (0.0160) 
HHI×Superior -0.3884***  -0.1248*** 
 (0.0257)  (0.0226) 
Inferior  1.1748*** 1.1325*** 
  (0.0376) (0.0378) 
HHI×Inferior  0.9177*** 0.7978*** 
  (0.0564) (0.0566) 
Size -0.0004 -0.0006** -0.0007** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Workload -0.0065*** -0.0038*** -0.0078*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
New stocks 0.0039*** 0.0057*** 0.0047*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
SP500 0.1374*** 0.1104*** 0.1108*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0121) (0.0120) 
Horizon 0.0081*** 0.0072*** 0.0069*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Experience -0.0024*** -0.0012** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Revisions 0.0055*** 0.0052*** 0.0032* 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Broker FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 467,588 467,588 467,588 
This table reports the results of panel regressions (Equation 3.3) on the complete sample of analyst forecasts 
during the studied period. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the variables. ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
3.4. Analyses using brokerage M&As as a quasi-natural experiment 
3.4.1. Data and methodology 
One issue with the above panel regressions is that they may suffer from 
endogeneity problems. One can argue, for instance, that superior analysts can have more 
power in negotiating for a higher level of specialization in their work. Therefore, it is 
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uncertain whether work specialization results in a better performance for superior 
analysts, or the improvement in performance allows analysts to negotiate for more work 
specialization. This reverse causality problem can lead to an estimation bias.  
In an attempt to reduce endogeneity concerns, I next focus on a subset of forecasts 
issued by analysts who experience a change to their work specialization after their 
brokerage firm has gone through an M&A. I posit that when the two brokerage firms are 
merged, there can be substantial changes to the work arrangement among analysts from 
the two counterpart firms, leading to changes to the level of work specialization for all 
involved analysts. Since an M&A between two brokerage firms is neither within the 
control of individual analysts nor easily anticipated by the analysts, it can help remove 
potential endogeneity problems. I consider some other endogeneity issues later as well.  
I collect data on broker M&As between 2005 and 2016 from the SDC Mergers 
and Acquisition database. Following Wu and Zang (2009), I identify broker M&As by 
restricting my sample to M&As in which the targets’ four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes are either 6211 (including investment banks and brokerage 
firms) or 6282 (including independent research firms). I also require that the acquirers 
belong to the three two-digit SIC codes including 60 (commercial banks), 62 (securities 
firms), and 63 (insurance companies). In addition, I only examine completed M&As of 
which the targets are 100% owned by the acquirers after the transaction. This is to make 
sure that the two counterparty firms entirely merged into one entity after the M&As.  
I then proceed to manually match target and acquirer names with brokerage house 
abbreviations (IDs) from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Database. 
This is also the source of my analysts’ earnings forecasts. To make sure that the names 
are correctly matched, I require the targets’ IDs to disappear from the database after the 
M&A effective date. In addition, I require that analysts from the targets change their 
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broker IDs to the acquirers’ IDs after the merger. This results in a sample of 21 M&As 
with 806 retained analysts (approximately 66% of all analysts involved in the M&A). 
Panel A of Table 3.3 documents my process of M&A sample selection with the number 
of M&As dropped after each filter. 
I follow Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) and use a two-year window around the 
M&A dates. However, I differ from them by including a cooling-off period from six 
months before to six months after the event to avoid any changes to analyst forecasting 
abilities caused by M&A news and to account for the fact that some analysts can depart 
from the merged firm during this period. To be able to observe the change in the accuracy 
of forecasts for individual stocks across the event window, I only look at forecasts for 
stocks that appear in the retained analysts’ portfolio both before and after an M&A. Also, 
I require that the forecasts are issued on the closest date to the cooling-off period. This 
results in my reduced sample of 585 analysts from 21 M&As, with 5,816 forecasts before 
and after the M&As.  
One potential concern with the above setup is that the merged firms may adjust 
the level of work specialization for the retained analysts based on their past performance, 
implying that changes in work specialization is still endogenous to the outcomes of the 
M&A. However, this is something that I can check. The statistics in Panel B of Table 3.3 
show that 274 analysts in my M&A sample experience an increase in HHI, with an 
average increase of 0.0990. This is compared to 283 analysts who see a decline in HHI, 
with an average reduction of -0.1126. Importantly, my test results show that there is no 
significant difference between the average forecast error (PMAFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) among analysts who 
experience an increase in HHI and those who see a decrease in HHI (-0.0278 and -0.0398, 
respectively). This means analysts who see an increase or a decrease in HHI following an 
M&A are equally accurate. In addition, the number of superior analysts, as a proportion 
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of the total number of analysts that experience an increase or a decrease in HHI is not 
significantly different (15.9% and 16.8%, respectively). Likewise, this is also true of 
inferior analysts (35.7% and 30.1%, respectively). Overall, Panel B shows no evidence 
that the change to analyst work specialization after an M&A is dependent on analyst prior 
performance. This is most likely due to the firms not being able to control the substantial 
shock M&As cause to analyst workload from a combination of the retained analysts 
having to cover a number of stocks from those analysts that have left the firm (which 
unlikely would be pre-planned), to needing to follow new stocks, as well as drop those 
that might already be covered by the counterpart brokerage firm. 
 
Table 3.3: Summary of the M&A sample.  
Panel A: Sample selection procedure 
Data from CRSP Number of M&A 
All M&As between U.S. targets and U.S. acquirers between 1st Jan 2005 and 31st 
Dec 2016 
109,789 
Less uncompleted M&As 17,489 
Less M&As in which targets are not 100% owned by acquirers after 
transactions 
14,108 
Less M&As with targets’ primary SIC not being 6282 (including 
investment banks and brokerage firms) and 6211 (including 
independent research firms) 
76,955 
Less M&As with acquirers’ primary SIC not being 60 (commercial banks), 
62 (securities firms), and 63 (insurance companies) 
394 
Less M&As not matched with the I/B/E/S database 822 
Final sample 21 







Number of analysts 274 283 -9 
Average change in HHI post-M&A (∆HHI̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 0.0990 -0.1126 0.2117*** 
Mean forecast errors pre-M&A ( PMAFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) -0.0278 -0.0398 0.0120 
% of analysts as Superior 15.8845 16.7832 -0.8987 
% of analysts as Inferior 35.7401 30.0699 5.6701 
This table provides a summary of my M&A sample. Panel A describes the sample selection procedure. In 
Panel B, I report a summary of the change to analyst work specialization after the M&As, then perform 
tests for the difference in the ex-ante performance of analysts who see an increase versus a decrease in work 
specialization following an M&A. Appendix B provides a detailed description of the variables. ***, **, and 
* represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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I adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) regression approach in which I compare 
changes to my treatment sample with changes to a control sample of analyst forecasts. 
My treatment sample includes forecasts issued by analysts involved in the M&As and are 
retained in the merged entities. My control sample contains all forecasts issued by analysts 
who are not involved in the M&As. However, I do exclude forecasts issued by analysts 
who change their broker IDs during the event window from the control sample to make 
sure that any changes in forecast accuracy observed in the control sample is not due to 
analysts’ job departure. This results in my final control sample of 156,179 earnings 
forecasts from 24,404 analyst-year observations (1,946 firm-year observations). 
 For my DiD regression, I estimate DiD for each variable and utilize the DiD 
estimations as the regressors instead of using the variables themselves as in Equation 
(3.3). This is done by contrasting the change in the observed variable from a treatment 
sample (T), before (pre-M&A) and after (post-M&A) an event, with the average change 
observed in a control sample (C):  
DiDi,j=(Tpost-M&A - Tpre-M&A) - (Cpost-M&A - Cpre-M&A) (3.4) 
In my DiD regression model, all analyst fixed effects and stock fixed effects will 
be differenced away and will not appear in the model, these also includes the two ‘ability’ 
dummies. The variable Experience will not appear in this model either since the change 
in Experience (i.e. one year) is the same across all analysts. My final DiD regression 
model is: 







                            γ'DiD.X + ε 
(3.5) 
In this model, I regress the DiD estimation of analyst performance (DiD.PMAFE) 
against the DiD estimation of work specialization (DiD.HHI) plus its interactions with 
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Superior/Inferior, and a vector DiD.X, representing the DiD estimation of my control 
variables. The coefficients 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 indicate the different impact that a shock to HHI has 
on superior and inferior analysts.  
 
3.4.2. Summary statistics and regression results  
Panel A of Table 3.4 reports the summary statistics for all the variables across my 
treatment and control samples of analyst forecasts. The statistics show that, compared to 
the control forecasts, my treatment forecasts are more accurate (PMAFE), are issued 
closer to the financial year end date (Horizon), and are less likely to cover an S&P500 
stock (SP500). I also find analysts issuing the treated forecasts have a higher level of work 
specialization (HHI), work for larger brokerage firms (Size), cover more stocks 
(Workload), have more new stocks in their portfolio (New stocks), and are more 
experienced (Experience). 
My DiD regression results, utilizing Equation (3.5), are reported in Panel B of 
Table 3.4. Column (1) shows my results when I only include the interaction of DiD.HHI 
with Superior in the model. In Column (2), I only include the interaction of DiD.HHI with 
Inferior. Then in Column (3), I include the interactions of DiD.HHI with both ‘ability’ 
dummies. I also account for year fixed effects and M&A deal fixed effects in all 
regressions. 
The results in all three regressions are consistent in showing that superior analysts 
can benefit from work specialization, whereas the impact is not significant for inferior 
analysts. Focusing on the results in Column (3), I find that the coefficient for 
DiD.HHI×Superior is negative and significant at a five percent level, indicating that 
superior analysts show more improvement than an average analyst when there is an 
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increase in work specialization. The coefficient for DiD.HHI×Inferior is, however, not 
significant. When I consider the total impact of a change to HHI on the two groups of 
analysts, I find that the sum of the coefficients for DiD.HHI and DiD.HHI×Superior is 
1.7659 (F-stat=5.78, p-value=0.02). This is equivalent to a reduction of 0.5 in the PMAFE 
of a superior analyst when they experience an increase of one standard deviation in HHI. 
In contrast, the total impact is not significant for inferior analysts. Again, these findings 
further support my hypothesis that superior analysts benefit more from an increase in 
work specialization compared to inferior analysts.24   
                                                          
24 My main findings still hold when I cluster standard errors by analyst, or analyst and M&A deals, or 
analyst and year.   
90 
 
Table 3.4: DiD analyses using the M&A sample and an unmatched control sample. 
Panel A: Summary statistics of the treatment and control sample of forecasts prior to the M&As 
 Treatment sample  Control sample   
  Mean Median  Std.   Mean  Median  Std.  Diff. in 
means 
PMAFE 0.6031 -0.1007 2.4933  0.7527 -0.0698 2.7180  -0.1496*** 
HHI 0.6723 0.6676 0.2919  0.6457 0.6235 0.2939  0.02676** 
Size 112.5426 67 99.7793  56.4441 32 56.9813  56.0985*** 
Workload 15.3353 16 7.7007  13.3115 13 8.3194  2.0238*** 
New stocks 3.8765 3 3.9060  3.5533 3 3.8121  0.3232** 
SP500 0.2860 0 0.4519  0.2990 0 0.4578  -0.0130** 
Horizon 45.4001 56 56.6442  47.7708 56 59.2703  -2.3702*** 
Experience 13.7044 14 7.9943  12.1897 11 8.7340  1.5147*** 
Revisions 3.5871 3 2.4811  3.5501 3 4.1788  0.0370 
Panel B: Regression results when comparing the M&A sample and an unmatched control sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES DiD.PMAFE DiD.PMAFE DiD.PMAFE 
    
DiD.HHI 0.3771 -0.0149 0.3806 
 (0.4705) (0.3911) (0.4442) 
DiD.HHI×Superior -2.1430**  -2.1465** 
 (0.8633)  (0.8457) 
DiD.HHI×Inferior  0.3864 -0.0227 
  (1.8663) (1.8779) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,816 5,816 5,816 
This table reports the test results when examining the M&A sample and an unmatched control sample of 
forecasts. Panel A shows the summary statistics of forecasts in the M&A sample and a control sample 
during the period prior to the M&A. My M&A sample contains 5,816 forecasts before and after the M&As 
from 585 analysts in 21 M&As. The control sample contains of 156,179 earnings forecasts from 24,404 
analyst-year observations (1,946 firm-year observations). Panel B shows the results of DiD regressions 
(Equation 3.5) to compare a treatment sample of forecasts issued by analysts who experience an M&A and 
are retained in the merged firm with an unmatched control sample of forecasts issued by analysts who do 
not experience an M&A. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. Appendix 
B provides a detailed description of the variables. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, 
and 10%, respectively.  
 
One issue with the above treatment and control samples is that they may not share 
the same characteristics (see Panel A of Table 3.4), which can affect the results of my 
regressions. To address this issue, I proceed to construct a matched control sample that is 
comparable to my treatment sample of analyst forecasts. I follow the method used by 
Hong and Kacperckyk (2010) and match each treatment forecast with one benchmark 
portfolio of control forecasts based on pre-M&A characteristics. I first rank all forecasts 
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within each event window into terciles according to the average forecast error of analysts 
who issue the forecasts (𝑃𝑀𝐴𝐹𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). Then, I repeat the ranking process using HHI, Size, 
and Experience. All forecasts belonging to the same tercile for all the ranking criteria 
forms one benchmark portfolio. This process results in 81 (34) benchmark portfolios for 
each M&A event. I proceed to match each treatment forecast with one benchmark 
portfolio that the treatment forecast belongs to.  
I then estimate the benchmark DiD for each variable by contrasting the change in 
the observed variable from a treatment sample (T), before (pre-M&A) and after (post-
M&A) an event, with the average change observed in the matched benchmark portfolio of 
control forecasts (BC).  
BDiDi,j=(Tpost-M&A-Tpre-M&A)-(BCpost-M&A-BCpre-M&A) (3.6) 
The benchmark DiD estimations (Equation 3.6) of the variables are now used as 
the regressors in Equation (3.5). The results reported in Table 3.5 are similar to my main 
findings. I find that a change in HHI has a significant total impact of -1.6208 on superior 
analyst forecast errors (F-stat=5.52, p-value=0.02). This suggests a reduction of 0.47 in 






Table 3.5: Benchmark DiD analyses using the M&A sample and a matched control 
sample. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE 
    
BDiD.HHI 0.4112 -0.0352 0.3201 
 (0.4461) (0.3708) (0.4223) 
BDiD.HHI×Superior -2.0334**  -1.9409** 
 (0.8155)  (0.7990) 
BDiD.HHI×Inferior  0.9459 0.5847 
  (1.7312) (1.7422) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,816 5,816 5,816 
This table reports the test results when examining the M&A sample and a matched control sample. Each 
treatment forecast is matched with one portfolio of control forecasts issued by analysts having similar 
PMAFE, HHI, Size, and Experience characteristics. The results are from DiD regressions (Equation 3.5). 
Appendix B provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
3.5. Robustness tests 
While I find no evidence that the re-assignment of work specialization following 
an M&A is related to past analyst performance (Panel B of Table 3.3), I nevertheless 
conduct a robustness test to further limit the impact that past performance can have on 
determining who is retained. Wu and Zang (2009) examine the characteristics of those 
analysts who are more/less likely to depart. They find that there are several factors 
associated with the retention of an analyst that are not related to analyst performance. In 
particular, analysts from the acquiring firms are more likely to stay in the merged firms. 
Also, analysts who have no direct competitor have a higher chance to be retained.25 Based 
on this, I rerun my analysis on a subset of forecasts that are (i) issued by analysts from 
the acquirer firms, and (ii) do not have a direct competitor. This group of analysts will 
                                                          
25 A direct competitor is defined by Wu and Zang (2009) as another analyst in the counterpart firm whose 
portfolio is at least 50% similar to the studied analyst. 
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have a higher chance of being retained for reasons unrelated to past performance. The 
statistics in Panel A of Table 3.6 confirm this. I find that analysts from the acquirer firms 
are 39.72% more likely to be retained in the merged entity following an M&A. I also find 
that the probability of retention for analysts who have no direct competitor are 22.03% 
higher compared to those having at least one competitor. For analysts coming from the 
acquiring firm that also have no competitor, the chance of being retained is 55.87% higher 
compared to target analysts having competitors.  
Panel B of Table 3.6 shows the results from rerunning my DiD regressions 
(Equation 3.5) using this subsample of treatment forecasts.  The results are consistent with 
my main findings. For example, in Column (3), the coefficient for BDiD.HHI×Superior 
is negative and significant at a five percent level, suggesting that superior analysts show 
more improvement than other analysts when their work specialization increases. At the 
same time, I document the total impact of a change in HHI on superior analyst forecast 
errors is -2.0190 (F-stat=5.20, p-value=0.02). This is equivalent to a reduction of 0.59 in 
forecast error given an increase of one standard deviation in work specialization. In 







Table 3.6: Regression results using a treatment sample of forecasts from analysts who 
are more likely to be retained in the merged firm.  
Panel A: Probability of retention across different analyst groups 
 (1) First group  (2) Second group  
 Obs. Average 
prob. of 
retention 





(1) From acquirer vs. (2) From target 815 0.9780  231 0.5108 0.3972*** 
(1) Have no competitor vs. (2) Having 
at least one competitor 
969 0.8369  77 0.6104 0.2203*** 
(1) From acquirer & having no 
competitor vs. (2) From target & 
having at least one competitor 
778 0.9087  40 0.3500 0.5587*** 
Panel B: Regression results using a sample of forecasts from analysts who have a higher probability 
of retention after an M&A. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE 
    
BDiD.HHI 0.4842 0.0645 0.4696 
 (0.5154) (0.4288) (0.4819) 
BDiD.HHI×Superior -2.5035**  -2.4886** 
 (1.0244)  (1.0075) 
BDiD.HHI×Inferior  0.4948 0.0841 
  (1.8876) (1.9006) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,683 4,683 4,683 
This table reports results from a sample of forecasts issued by analysts who are more likely to be retained 
in the merged firms following an M&A. In Panel A, I examine the probability of retention across different 
groups of analysts. Panel B reports the results of DiD regressions (Equation 3.5) when examining a 
treatment sample of forecasts issued by analysts who are from the acquirer firm and have no direct 
competitor in the target firm compared to a matched control sample. A direct competitor is another analyst 
whose portfolio is at least 50% similar to the studied analyst. Appendix B provides a detailed description 
of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
One issue with using PMAFE as a measure of analyst performance is that the 
standard deviation for this variable is high. This is potentially caused by low value of 
AFEijt̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in the denominator of the equation. Therefore, it is possible that my results are 
driven by outliers. To address this problem, I employ an alternative measure of analyst 
forecasting performance (FA) as suggested by Hong and Kubik (2003) and Clement and 





Number of analysts - 1
] ×100 (3.7) 
I first sort all analyst forecasts covering one stock within one forecast period using 
their PMAFE to obtain a Rank. The most accurate forecast (lowest PMAFE) receives the 
lowest rank. Number of analysts is the number of analysts who issue forecasts for the 
same stock in one forecast period. FA is therefore a measure of forecast accuracy as the 
more accurate forecast receives a higher value.  
 I then rerun my DiD regression, utilizing Equation (3.5), with the benchmark DiD 
estimation of FA (BDiD.FA) across the event window as my new dependent variable. The 
results in Panel A of Table 3.7 are consistent with my main results. I find, as I expect, that 
the coefficient for BDiD.HHI×Superior is positive and significant at the five percent 
level, whereas the coefficient for BDiD.HHI×Inferior remains insignificant. The total 
impact of a change in HHI on analyst accuracy (the sum of the coefficient for BDiD.HHI 
and BDiD.HHI×Superior) is 18.8481 (F-stat=3.94, p-value=0.05). Given a one standard 
deviation increase in HHI, this is equivalent to a jump of almost one place in the ranking 
if I consider that there are, on average, 17 analysts covering one stock. Whereas for 
inferior analysts, the total impact is not significant.  
 Next, I utilize an alternative measure for analyst work specialization (Entropy) to 





 where n is the number of industries (identified by two-digit SIC code) that analyst 
j cover, Sk is the proportion of stocks in the analyst portfolio allocated to industry k. 
Entropy is a measure of dispersion, and has been previously used to measure industrial 
diversification within a firm (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985; Raghunathan, 
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1995), geographic diversification (Vachani, 1991), and market competition (Horowitz 
and Horowitz, 1968; Nawrocki and Carter, 2010). Within my study, the higher value for 
Entropy indicates less work specialization. As HHI is a nominalized measurement (having 
values from 0 to 1), it is insensitive to any change near the maximum and minimum values 
of specialization (Boydstun et al., 2014). The value of Entropy, however, moves in a wider 
range and therefore minimizes this problem. At the same time, the use of Entropy allows 
me to test the impact of work specialization on analyst performance in both directions, 
when specialization increases or decreases.  
I rerun my DiD regression, utilizing Equation (3.5), with the benchmark DiD 
estimation of Entropy (BDiD.Entropy) as the variable of interest. The results in Panel B 
of Table 3.7 show that with an increase in Entropy, there is a significant increase in the 
forecast error of superior analysts, whilst there is no significant impact on the performance 
of inferior analysts. These results are consistent with my main findings showing that work 








Table 3.7: Regression results using alternative measures for the variables of interest. 
Panel A: Regression results using an alternative measure for analyst forecast error 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ΔFA ΔFA ΔFA 
    
BDiD.HHI -6.8606 -2.2891 -7.0257 
 (4.4110) (4.3302) (4.7710) 
BDiD.HHI×Superior 25.7062**  25.8738** 
 (10.3330)  (10.4860) 
BDiD.HHI×Inferior  -3.7552 1.0596 
  (11.8196) (11.9978) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,816 5,816 5,816 
Panel B: Regression results using an alternative measure for analyst work specialization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE 
    
BDiD.Entropy -0.2851 -0.0243 -0.1771 
 (0.2264) (0.1962) (0.2194) 
BDiD.Entropy×Superior 1.1091***  0.9964** 
 (0.4300)  (0.4241) 
BDiD.Entropy×Inferior  -0.8303 -0.6733 
  (0.8189) (0.8243) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,816 5,816 5,816 
This table reports the test results when using alternative measures for the variables of interest, on the M&A 
sample and a matched control sample. Panel A documents the results of DiD regressions (Equation 3.5) 
using an alternative measure of analyst forecast accuracy (FA). Panel B documents the regressions results 
when using an alternative measure for analyst work specialization (Entropy). Appendix B provides a 
detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. 
***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
  
Another concern is that my results can be biased due to how I classify analysts as 
being either inferior or superior. To mitigate this concern, I rerun my results using a 30% 
cut-off, and then a 10% cut-off to identify superior and inferior analysts. The results are 
reported in Panels A and B of Table 3.8, respectively. My conclusion remains the same 
regardless of the cut-off I use for my classification. As one would expect, I also notice 
that the total impact of a change to HHI on superior analysts’ performance becomes less 
significant when I use the wider 30% cut-off (the total impact of -0.9547 in Column (3) 
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of Panel B, F-stat=3.06, p-value=0.08). This is reasonable since I utilize a more relaxed 
way to classify analysts, leading to the impact of a change in HHI on this group of superior 
analysts to be less pronounced. 
 
Table 3.8: Regression results using different cut-offs to classify superior and inferior 
analysts. 
Panel A: Classification of superior and inferior analysts using a 10% threshold 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE 
    
BDiD.HHI 0.2436 -0.0649 0.0907 
 (0.4163) (0.3737) (0.3960) 
BDiD.HHI×Superior10 -2.1882**  -2.0364** 
 (0.9705)  (0.9588) 
BDiD.HHI×Inferior10  2.0774 1.9258 
  (2.4555) (2.4579) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,816 5,816 5,816 
Panel B: Classification of superior and inferior analysts using a 30% threshold 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE 
    
BDiD.HHI 0.4811 0.0485 0.5862 
 (0.5007) (0.3554) (0.4606) 
BDiD.HHI×Superior30 -1.4343*  -1.5409** 
 (0.7393)  (0.7097) 
BDiD.HHI×Inferior30  0.1891 -0.3592 
  (1.3558) (1.3887) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,816 5,816 5,816 
This table reports the test results when using different cut-offs for the classification of superior and inferior 
analysts, on the M&A sample and a matched control sample. Panel A documents the results of DiD 
regressions (Equation 3.5) when I use a cut-off of 10% to classify superior and inferior analysts. Panel B 
documents the regression results when I use a cut-off of 30% to classify analysts. Appendix B provides a 
detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. 





In Table 3.9, I perform two additional robustness tests to control for other potential 
confounding factors that can affect my results. In Panel A, I try to account for forecasts 
by teams of analysts since I cannot observe the change to the performance of individual 
analysts in a team. I identify teams of analysts as analyst codes that cover more than 25 
stocks, then remove forecasts by those analyst codes from my treatment sample and rerun 
the regressions.26 In Panel B, I report the regression results when examining the 
aggregated forecast error at an analyst level. My main analyses only focus on forecasts 
for stocks that appear in an analyst portfolio both before and after the M&A. This means 
I do not account for any stocks that the analyst drops after the M&A, and new stocks that 
are assigned by the merged firm. To address this issue, I aggregate forecast errors across 
all stocks in an analyst portfolio to get a forecast error score for each analyst, before and 
after the M&A. The benchmark DiD estimation of the aggregated forecast error 
(BDiD.PMAFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is now used as the dependent variable for my regressions. I also utilize 
Equation (3.5) for my regressions but exclude all forecast-level control variables. In both 
tests, the results align with my main findings.  
  
                                                          
26 The results are also robust if I use a cut-off of 20 stocks or 30 stocks. 
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Table 3.9: Further robustness tests on the impact of work specialization on analyst 
performance. 
Panel A: Regression results when forecasts by teams of analysts are excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE BDiD.PMAFE 
    
BDiD.HHI 0.4228 -0.0396 0.3288 
 (0.4685) (0.3824) (0.4374) 
BDiD.HHI×Superior -2.0468**  -1.9493** 
 (0.8573)  (0.8376) 
BDiD.HHI×Inferior  0.9509 0.5804 
  (1.7757) (1.7873) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,115 5,115 5,115 
Panel B: Regression results when all variables are measured at the analyst-level 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES  BDiD.PMAFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BDiD.PMAFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BDiD.PMAFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
    
BDiD.HHI 0.5402 0.1202 0.3421 
 (0.3519) (0.3614) (0.3796) 
BDiD.HHI×Superior -2.2479***  -2.0555** 
 (0.8296)  (0.8350) 
BDiD.HHI×Inferior  1.4952 1.2701 
  (1.0321) (1.0343) 
    
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Deal FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 585 585 585 
Panel A documents the results of DiD regressions (Equation 3.5) when excluding forecasts issued by teams 
of analysts from the sample. I identify teams of analysts from analyst codes that cover more than 25 stocks 
in their portfolios. Panel B shows the regression results when all variables are measured at the analyst-level. 
Appendix B provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in 




Using initially a large panel data set and, subsequently, broker M&As as a quasi- 
natural experiment, I examine the impact of work specialization (how concentrated the 
stocks an analyst tracks are across industries) on the forecasting performance of superior 
and inferior analysts. My main findings suggest that the impact that work specialization 
has on forecast accuracy is significantly different between these two groups of analysts. I 
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find superior analysts can benefit from an increase in specialization in their portfolio, 
while I do not find evidence of inferior analysts significantly benefiting. My findings are 
consistent across several robustness tests.  
 I contribute to the literature on financial analysts by showing that there is a 
heterogeneous impact of work specialization on analysts. While the prior literature has 
provided mixed results from examining the average effect that work specialization has on 
analyst performance, I show that it is necessary to consider how the impact may vary 
across analysts with differing abilities. Specifically, that it is the superior analysts that can 




4. Job loss and analyst forecast pessimism 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The paper in this chapter examines whether the experience of a recent job loss 
leads to analysts issuing less optimistic forecasts (i.e. forecast optimism) and, rather, more 
pessimistic recommendations. Research that examines potential bias in analyst forecasts 
tends to show that they have a predilection to issue optimistic forecasts. In particular, the 
extant literature has consistently shown that career concerns encourage forecast optimism. 
Examples of this include the pressure to please investment banking clients (Dugar and 
Nathan, 1995; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Michaely and Womack, 1999), the desire to 
have favorable career outcomes (Hong and Kubik, 2003), the incentive to generate trading 
commissions (Jackson, 2005; Cowen et al., 2006), and the pressure from institutional 
clients to support their stock positions (Mola and Guidolin, 2009; Firth et al., 2012; Gu, 
Li and Yang, 2012).  There is, however, only limited cases where forecast pessimism has 
been displayed. Some evidence of this comes from Ke and Yu (2006), Hilary and Hsu 
(2013) and Horton et al. (2017), who find that analysts try to please firm managers by 
adjusting their forecasts downward before an earnings announcement date so that firms 
can more easily beat analysts’ latest forecasts.  
In this paper, I examine a behavioral reason for expecting analysts to post 
pessimistic forecasts, and the resulting implication it has on forecast accuracy. 
Specifically, I examine the performance of analysts who are rehired after losing their prior 
job as a result of a brokerage firm closure. I expect that the experience of a recent job loss, 
that is not directly related to their own performance, will lead to analysts issuing less 
optimistic forecasts and, rather, more pessimistic recommendations when rehired. This 
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assertion is based on evidence originating from the career transition literature that shows 
the experience of a job loss has a considerable impact on the mental disposition of 
employees, even in the case where they are immediately rehired and experience no period 
of unemployment (Latack et al., 1995; Brand, 2015). Feelings of low self-esteem and 
anxiety are not uncommon, which occur due to the change in their social status, however 
brief, and the need to find employment elsewhere (Cohn, 1978; Donovan and Oddy, 1982; 
Pugh et al., 2003; Waters, 2007).   
The career transition literature also establishes that a job loss will continue to 
affect the attitude and self-esteem of employees after they get rehired (Cohn, 1978; Leana 
and Feldman, 1995; Waters, 2007). I base my hypothesis on these observations and that 
there also exists a strong relationship between feelings of self-esteem and individuals 
having a personal disposition towards being optimistic/pessimistic (Mäkikangas et al., 
2004; Lyubomirsky et al., 2006). My hypothesis is that financial analysts who have 
recently experienced a job loss are more likely to have lower self-esteem and a 
correspondingly more pessimistic outlook of their environment. I expect this will carry 
through to how they analyze firms and make recommendations. Specifically, they are 
more likely to issue pessimistic forecasts when re-employed, as their general mental frame 
of mind will tend to be more negative. 
My choice of focusing on analysts who lose their jobs specifically due to a 
brokerage closure is based on the need to account for endogeneity and selection bias. For 
example, it is not uncommon for someone to be let go due to their under-performance, 
and it is this under-performance that may be driving the observation of pessimistic 
forecasts. In selecting my sample, it is therefore important that I minimize the role that 
the analyst’s specific characteristics contribute to losing their job. To deal with this, I 
follow Hamilton et al. (1993), Leana and Feldman (1995), and Gowan and Gatewood 
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(1999) and focus on analysts that lose their jobs due to the employer closing down, as 
under these conditions the actual behavior of the individual employee is less likely to be 
directly responsible for their displacement (Brand, 2015). Doing so allows me to conduct 
quasi-natural experiments where I focus on a treatment group of analysts who experience 
a brokerage firm closure and subsequently seek employment at another firm. I then study 
how their tendency to offer either optimistic or pessimistic forecasts changes against 
differently constructed control groups, to account for other possible explanations and 
endogeneity concerns that I then also consider.  
To capture the potential bias in forecasts, I utilize an established measure that the 
literature has used to estimate forecast optimism. The measure, as constructed by Cowen 
et al. (2006), is based on the difference between an analyst’s earnings forecast and the 
average of the most recent forecasts for the same stock made by other analysts, adjusted 
by the standard deviation of those forecasts. This measure can effectively capture both 
forecast optimism and pessimism at the same time. For the purpose of this paper, I re-
label this measure and call it Predilection. While a positive value of Predilection indicates 
that analysts are optimistic in their forecasts, a negative value of Predilection indicates 
forecast pessimism. 
My sample period is from 2004 to 2018. I exclude the years before 2004 to 
mitigate the impact of the Global Analyst Research Settlement (Global Settlement)27 on 
analyst forecast optimism. To avoid any confounding effects that can arise from being 
unemployed for a lengthy period of time, I also limit my attention to analysts that have 
                                                          
27 This is an enforcement agreement reached in 2003 that requires the physical and operational separation 
between the investment banking and research departments of brokerage firms to mitigate the potential of 
biased forecasts being issued for investment banking clients. 
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experienced a recent job loss and are subsequently rehired within a twelve-month period 
from when their brokerage firm closes. This implies that I am capturing the impact of a 
job loss from those analysts that will be least affected by their displacement, relative to 
those who find it harder to gain re-employment. my final treatment sample contains 13 
brokerage firm closures, involving 143 analysts who issued 1,262 forecasts both before 
and after the respective closure dates.  
My baseline multivariate analysis utilizes a difference-in-difference approach 
(DiD) to compare my treatment group of forecasts from analysts who have recently lost 
their job with a control group of forecasts from analysts who have not experienced a job 
loss. To ensure analyst forecasts are not influenced by news of the impending brokerage 
closure, as well as to account for a ‘settling in’ period at the new firm when they are 
rehired, I focus on forecasts outside of a cooling-off period that lasts for six months prior 
to a firm’s closure, and six months after the analyst joins a new firm.28 I then compare the 
level of Predilection in the treatment group between the last forecast an analyst issues for 
a stock outside the cooling-off period when working for their former employer and the 
first forecast that the analyst issues for the same stock in the new brokerage firm after the 
cooling-off period. The control group is similarly formed from forecasts made during the 
same periods from analysts that have not experienced a job loss. All forecasts that I 
examine must also be issued within a twelve-month period either side of the cooling-off 
periods, although I later consider the impact of examining longer periods in my 
subsequent analysis. 
                                                          
28 It is common to utilize a cooling-off period when examining the impact of job loss on employees (see 
Leana and Feldman, 1995). my results do not qualitatively change if I shorten or lengthen the cooling-off 
period. I provide some evidence of this in my robustness tests. 
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My univariate tests document that analysts who have experienced a recent job loss 
will tend to switch from issuing optimistic forecasts to pessimistic forecasts. Predilection 
changes from being a positive value (0.1295, significant at 5%) for analysts before they 
lose their job, to a negative value (-0.1533, significant at 1%) for forecasts issued by the 
displaced analysts when they work for a new firm. my baseline DiD regression results 
also support this view, with a reduction of more than 100% in forecast optimism among 
those analysts who have gone through a recent job loss and subsequently get rehired by 
another brokerage firm. Importantly, I also document that analyst forecast pessimism after 
a job loss is associated with an increase of up to 54% in analyst forecast error. This implies 
that forecast pessimism following a job loss can significantly affect the forecasting 
performance of these analysts.   
Although my baseline results are compelling, it is possible that they are being 
driven by differences between my treatment and control forecasts, including ex ante 
differences in the level of analyst forecast optimism between the treatment and control 
groups, plus differences in the characteristics of the stocks that are being followed. To 
account for this, I proceed to first match each forecast in the treatment sample with a 
forecast for the same stock from an analyst in the control sample that has a similar level 
of Predilection. Qualitatively, the results from this matching process remain consistent 
with my baseline results. A similar result is also obtained when I use an alternative 
matching process and pair treatment and control forecasts using other analyst and stock 
characteristics. Additionally, the results hold when using alternative measures to capture 
analyst forecast optimism/pessimism within my DiD regressions.  
To add further insight, I examine whether job loss has the same impact on analysts 
with different personal attributes, how competitive the job market is for analysts and how 
persistent forecast pessimism is. I first re-run my DiD regressions using subsamples of 
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forecasts issued by analysts who have either high or low forecasting ability, relative to the 
whole industry. A benefit of conducting this sub-sample analysis is that it also accounts 
for the possibility that those brokerage firms that close do so because they have a 
disproportionate number of under-performing analysts. This can influence the prior 
results. By focusing on analysts with a similar forecasting performance prior to the 
brokerage closure, I can correct for this potential bias. Secondly, I also split my sample 
between analysts who have either a limited, or extensive, experience in the brokerage 
industry.  In both cases, my subsample analyses show that the impact of job loss on 
forecast optimism is more pronounced among analysts who have a higher forecasting 
ability and/or more years of experience within the brokerage industry. The reason for the 
latter observation is likely linked to the fact that the experienced analysts will also be 
older, and research has shown that age is negatively related to how well an individual 
deals with a job loss (Leana and Feldman, 1990).  
 My final sub-sample analysis checks to see if my results still hold during a period 
of increased labor market competition. Peer analysts who do not lose their jobs but see 
the job market shrink will be inclined to work harder, potentially affecting their 
forecasting behavior. To check whether this affects my results I split my sample into two 
periods. The first covers the global financial crisis period and the second captures all other 
periods. Regardless of the period of examination and the state of the labor market, analysts 
who have recently experienced a job loss consistently demonstrate a negative 
Predilection. 
In addition to the above, in all the sub-sampling analyses I conduct, I show that 
the effect of issuing pessimistic forecasts is present for the first couple of years of being 
rehired before dissipating by the third year. 
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I also consider if there are alternative explanations for the change in analyst 
Predilection, apart from the impact of experiencing a job loss. According to both Bauer 
et al. (2007) and Saks et al. (2007), individuals can experience unfamiliarity in a new 
work environment, which in turn can lead to a greater level of uncertainty and 
subsequently bias forecasts. In addition, the resources available at the new firm may vary, 
including the amount of support and infrastructure available to the analyst. This can also 
affect forecasting performance (Clement, 1999). To control for these two items that are 
related to the new work environment, I re-run my DiD regressions using a control sample 
of matched forecasts issued during the same period by analysts who job-hop to a new firm 
with similar resources (measured by the size of the brokerage firm) to show that my 
baseline results still hold.  
Another factor that I consider is whether my results can be driven by feelings of 
career insecurity which analysts can experience after a job loss. Analyst career concerns 
can lead to what is termed as an OP pattern where analysts will issue more optimistic 
(pessimistic) forecasts at the beginning (end) of the fiscal year as it allows for the 
forecasted stocks to look good, which enhances trading activity and generates more 
commissions for analysts (Chan et al., 2007; Horton et al., 2017).  If my results are due 
to the experience of a job loss then I should find a decline in the typical OP pattern, as it 
will suppress the level of optimism exhibited in the first forecast of the fiscal year relative 
to later forecasts (as the psychological effect of experiencing a job loss dissipates). To test 
this, I re-sample the data to compare forecasts from my treatment group of analysts that 
are made at the beginning of the fiscal year with those made at the end of the fiscal year. 
I use a dummy variable to signify the presence of an OP pattern and run DiD logistic 
regressions using this measure as my dependent variable. As expected, I find that while 
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the control sample of analysts display an OP pattern, my treatment group show significant 
evidence of a decline in the OP pattern.  
I finish my empirical analyses with some further robustness tests. I re-run my 
regressions on a subsample which excludes all forecasts for stocks that have less than 
three analysts following them to make sure that the lack of available information 
surrounding stocks with low analyst coverage is not affecting my results. I also re-run my 
regressions on a subsample that excludes forecasts for large firms since analysts have 
incentives to issue biased forecasts for large firms to boost trading commissions or to win 
an investment banking client (Horton et al., 2017). Next, I examine a subsample that 
excludes forecasts issued by analysts with large portfolios. This is to account for the fact 
that forecasts issued by those analysts appear multiple times in the treatment sample, 
thereby potentially driving my results. In addition, I also show results generated from 
aggregating my Predilection measure at the analyst level (i.e. I aggregate and average 
Predilection across forecasts of all stocks in the analyst’s portfolio). This allows me to 
not only focus on forecasts for stocks that appear in the analyst portfolio both before and 
after their job loss, but also consider forecasts for stocks that an analyst drops after a job 
loss, and any new stocks that they are assigned by their new firm. Finally, I show results 
for when I extend the cooling-off period to 18 months prior to the brokerage firm closing. 
By extending the period of time that I examine forecasts before the closure date to one 
and a half years, I am further minimizing the possibility that my results are contaminated 
by analysts hearing news of the closure of the firm they work for.  In all cases, my main 
findings remain robust.  
My study contributes to the literature on financial analysts by showing that there 
are factors that can explain the presence of analyst forecast pessimism. While previous 
studies, including Hong and Kubik (2003), Chan et al. (2007), and Horton et al. (2017), 
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examine analyst career concerns and work incentives as factors that motivate analysts to 
issue more optimistic forecasts, I find that analysts who have recently experienced a job 
loss are more inclined to issue pessimistic forecasts when they are rehired. In the same 
vein as those studies that have investigated the impact that life events have on managerial 
and investor behavior (Hood et al., 2013; Roussanov and Savor, 2014; Bernile et al., 2017; 
Shi et al., 2017), I show how financial analysts respond to a life event can also be an 
important line of study, considering their role as disseminators of financial information to 
the market. 
Second, my study highlights that forecast pessimism can have a significant impact 
on the accuracy of analyst forecasts in much the same manner that forecast optimism can. 
I show that analyst forecast pessimism following a job loss is associated with a decline in 
analyst forecast accuracy. This supplements the findings by both Hong and Kubik (2003) 
and Cowen et al. (2006), who document that a high level of forecast optimism is 
negatively associated with analyst forecast accuracy. my results suggest that a reduction 
in forecast optimism does not necessarily mean an improvement in analyst forecast 
accuracy if, for example, analysts become too pessimistic. my findings suggest that 
brokerage firms should adopt policies aimed at supporting newly hired employees who 
have just gone through a job loss. Such strategies could be instrumental in resolving latent 
psychological issues that may be affecting their forecasting performance.  
 My third contribution is that I highlight the value of the career transition literature 
to help explain the impact of a job loss on the predilection of financial analysts to issue 
pessimistic forecasts. The career transition literature shows that a job loss can adversely 
affect the mental health of individuals, and that this can persist even when they are rehired. 
I show that an individual’s disposition towards optimism is affected by this event, and it 
is a channel that can partly explain the change in analyst forecasting behavior following 
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a job loss. I also directly contribute to the career transition literature by showing that 
financial analysts provide a good setting to examine the impact of job loss on performance 
at the individual level. While the previous studies that focus on the impact of job loss on 
individuals generally rely on survey data in which individual performance is self-
evaluated by the interviewees (Cohn, 1978; Leana and Feldman, 1995; Waters, 2007), I 
can objectively measure analyst performance by comparing analyst forecasts against 
actual earnings and/or a consensus forecast.  
 The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a 
literature review of the career transition literature plus hypothesis development, while 
Section 4.3 outlines my data and methodology. In Section 4.4 I present my empirical 
results, discuss the main findings, and provide additional robustness checks. Section 4.5 
contains my conclusion.  
 
4.2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
There is a well-established literature that examines how financial analysts tend to 
provide optimistic forecasts as a result of their career concerns. For example, Dugar and 
Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1998), and Michaely and Womack (1999) document 
that underwriter analysts tend to issue more favorable forecasts compared to unaffiliated 
analysts due to the pressure to please their investment banking clients. Hong and Kubik 
(2003) find that analysts who issue more optimistic forecasts tend to have better career 
outcomes as they can promote their firms’ underwriting business and generate more 
trading commissions. Jackson (2005) and Cowen et al. (2006) also show that trading 
commissions are important factors that explain analyst forecast optimism. Mola and 
Guidolin (2009), Firth et al. (2012) and Gu et al. (2012) show that analyst 
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recommendations for stocks held by their firm’s mutual fund clients are more favorable 
relative to the consensus. This is due to the pressure to support mutual funds’ stock 
positions in exchange for trading commissions.  
The analyst literature does also provide some limited evidence of situations where 
there is a pessimistic bias in analyst forecasts. For example, Ke and Yu (2006) and Hilary 
and Hsu (2013) find that analysts adjust their forecasts downward before earnings 
announcement dates so that firms can more easily beat analysts’ latest forecasts. This is 
to carry favor with firm managers in exchange for private information to enhance analyst 
forecast accuracy. Horton et al. (2017) also document that banking analysts issue more 
pessimistic forecasts toward the end of the fiscal year to please banks that could be their 
future employers, which leads to favorable career outcomes. There is also evidence of 
analyst forecast pessimism when analysts are faced with an unpleasant condition and/or 
a traumatic event. For example, Bourveau and Law (2016) document analyst forecast 
pessimism among those who are affected by Hurricane Katrina. Antoniou et al. (2016) 
find analysts who locate near a terrorist attack tend to issue more pessimistic forecasts. 
Dehaan et al. (2017) find evidence that unpleasant weather induces analyst pessimism and 
delay in response to earnings news. However, the impact of a personal life event on 
analyst forecast pessimism has yet been investigated.  
In this paper I examine how forecast pessimism can arise as a result of a personal 
experience, in my case, a job loss. Job loss is defined as a life event that occurs when 
individuals experience an involuntary termination of employment (Latack et al., 1995; 
Brand, 2015). It ranks in the top quartile, in terms of stress, of impactful life events 
(Holmes and Rahe, 1967; Paykel et al., 1971). Job loss is different from voluntarily 
quitting in the sense that it is a career transition that individuals have no control over. 
While one can lose their job due to performance, it can also occur when individuals are 
113 
 
fired or laid off as a result of firms downsizing, restructuring, closing plants, or relocating 
(Brand, 2015). It is this latter situation that I consider in this paper where employees are 
laid-off due to no direct fault of their own. 
 A study by Latack and Dozier (1986) that focuses on managers and professionals, 
documents that job loss has a considerable impact on displaced employees, even in the 
case where they are immediately rehired and experience no period of unemployment. 
Cohn (1978) shows that job loss leads to a decrease in self-satisfaction due to the change 
individuals experience in their social role. In addition, a job loss entails the need to find 
new work, which itself can increase stress, even for individuals that are highly 
employable. Donovan and Oddy (1982) report a rise in depression and anxiety, as well as 
a decline in self-esteem. Pugh et al. (2003) find that displaced employees tend to also 
display negative feelings and distrust toward their new employer due to the violation of 
their psychological contract with their former employer.  
Other studies also examine whether the negative consequences of job loss 
disappear when individuals get rehired. Cohn (1978) finds that individuals continue to 
suffer from self-dissatisfaction after being re-employed. Leana and Feldman (1995) 
document some recovery among the re-employed compared to those who remain 
unemployed following a job loss, however the difference among these two groups is not 
as strong as they expected. The re-employed report psychological distancing compared to 
the second group. Likewise, Waters (2007) finds that those who experience a job loss 
report higher levels of depression even after they get a new job. This can include feelings 
of pessimism as Mäkikangas et al. (2004) show that both self-esteem and 
optimism/pessimism are related to the same construct that deals with the ability of people 
to cope with challenging situations. 
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Given the above evidence that an experience of a job loss can affect an employee’s 
mental disposition in their new role, I expect that analysts who have suffered from a recent 
job loss will not only have reduced self-esteem, but will also view the world from a more 
pessimistic perspective. I expect that this pessimistic attitude will also carry through to 
how they evaluate firms and provide earnings forecasts, leading to my first hypothesis: 
H4.1: Experience of a recent job loss results in analyst forecast pessimism when 
rehired. 
Biased forecasts have performance implications. Specifically, the financial analyst 
literature examining biased forecasts has shown that they can lead to significant declines 
in forecast accuracy. In particular, research has shown that forecast optimism leads to a 
rise in forecast errors (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990; Bulter and Land, 1991; Hong and 
Kubik, 2003; Cowen et al., 2006). I therefore expect that the forecast pessimism exhibited 
by those analysts that have experienced a recent job loss will also result in a significant 
decline in the accuracy of their forecasts. This leads me to my second hypothesis: 
H4.2: Forecast pessimism, caused from a recent job loss, reduces analyst 
forecasting accuracy. 
 
4.3. Data and methodology 
4.3.1. Data 
I focus on a sample of earnings forecasts issued by analysts who experience a job 
loss due to the closure of their brokerage firm. This allows me to segregate analyst job 
loss from other types of analyst job departure. At the same time, this quasi-natural 
experiment allows me to reduce selection bias in my preliminary sample, since these 
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analysts are laid off when the entire firm closes, regardless of their personal performance 
and specific characteristics (Brand, 2015).  
I collect data on brokerage closures between 2004 and 2016 by looking for broker 
IDs that disappear in the I/B/E/S database during the period. I then check whether those 
broker IDs are related specifically to a brokerage closure (as opposed, for example, to a 
merger) by manually searching for brokerage closure news in Factiva which matches with 
the broker IDs. As I focus my study on the effect of analysts that experience a recent job 
loss, I only track analysts who used to work for a closed firm and have then moved to 
another firm within a 12-month period.29 For each analyst, I focus on their earnings 
forecasts for the same stock before and after their job loss to study the change in their 
forecast Predilection. I select only the forecasts that are closest to the closure date (both 
before and after) while allowing for a six-month cooling-off period on either side of the 
closure date to avoid the possibility that the forecasts are being influenced by knowledge 
of the closure event itself and to also allow time for analysts to settle in their new job. As 
a double-check, I also manually check that there is no news in Factiva to suggest that 
there was knowledge of an impending brokerage closure outside of the six-month cooling-
off period. This whole process results in my final treatment sample consisting of 13 
brokerage closures, involving 143 analysts who get a new job after the closure and their 
1,262 forecasts before, and 1,262 forecasts after, the closure events. 
 
                                                          
29 I identify this group of analysts as those who change their broker ID after a brokerage closure. my results 
remain the same if I include analysts who find it more difficult to get re-employed after a 12-month period. 
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4.3.2. Research design 
 I adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) regression approach in which I compare 
changes in my treatment sample with changes in the control sample of analyst forecasts. 
My initial control sample contains all forecasts issued by analysts who do not experience 
any job change (i.e. no change in their broker ID) during each closure event window. This 
results in my control sample containing 97,060 earnings forecasts from 18,210 analyst-
year observations.   
For my model, Predilectionijt is set as my dependent variable. It is measured as 
the difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast (𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡) and the average of the most 
recent forecasts for stock i made by other analysts except analyst j during the same 
forecast period (pre-revision consensus - 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ); divided by the standard deviation among 
those forecasts (𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡). I require there are at least three forecasts contributing to the pre-
revision consensus. A positive value of Predilection indicates that analysts are optimistic 





As for my independent variables, I employ Treatijt, a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the forecast belongs to my treatment sample and zero if it belongs to the control 
sample; and Postijt, a dummy variable that is equal to one if the forecast is issued after the 
brokerage closure and zero if it is before the closure. Following Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2010) and Horton et al. (2017), I also include a set of control variables that account for 
brokerage firm size, analyst characteristics, and stock characteristics. Brokerage firm size 
(Sizekt) is measured as the number of analysts employed by the firm in a particular year. 
As for analyst characteristics, I control for the years of analyst general experience (Gen 
Experjt), years of analyst experience following a particular industry (SIC Experjt), years 
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of analyst experience following a particular stock (Stock Experjt), the number of stocks 
covered by the analyst (Tic Complexjt), and the number of industries covered by the 
analyst (SIC Complexjt). Stock characteristics that I control for include the number of 
analysts following the stock (Coverageit), log of the total asset value of the firm (Lnsizeit), 
stock return (Retannit), stock return volatility (Sigmait), log of the book to market value 
of the firm (Lnbmit), return on equity of the firm (ROEit), volatility of return on equity 
using the past ten–year return series (Var ROEit), operating income adjusted for asset 
value of the firm (Profitabilityit), and whether the stock is included in the S&P 500 index 
(SP500it). I obtain data on stock returns and S&P returns from the CRSP database; data 
on stock fundamentals from the Compustat database; and data on brokerage firms and 
financial analysts from the I/B/E/S database. Appendix C provides detailed definitions of 
my control variables. 
My regression model to examine analyst forecast optimism after a job loss is: 
Predilectionijt=α+β1Treatijt+β2Postijt+β3Treatijt×Postijt+ γ'Xijkt+εijt (4.2) 
where my dependent variable Predilection, is regressed against the Treatijt and 
Postijt dummies, plus their interaction. The coefficient of the interaction term represents 
the impact that a job loss has on analyst forecast optimism. Vector Xijkt incorporates my 
control variables. I also include brokerage closure fixed effects. 
 
4.4. Empirical results 
4.4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics of my treatment sample variables for the 
period before the analysts lose their jobs. Regarding my dependent variable 
(Predilection), there is no significant difference between my treatment and control 
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forecasts. Nonetheless, I document that my treatment and control sample are different in 
several ways. For example, analysts who issue treatment forecasts are more experienced 
(Gen Exper, SIC Exper, Stock Exper), tend to cover fewer industries (Industries), and 
work for larger firms (Size) than those who issue control forecasts. The treatment forecasts 
are for stocks with more analyst coverage (Coverage), larger firm size (Lnsize), higher 
risk (Sigma, Var ROE), lower return (Retann), and have greater likelihood to be an 
S&P500 stock (SP500) compared to my control sample stocks. These differences can 








 Treatment sample 
(Forecasts by analysts  
with a recent job loss) 
 Control sample  
(Forecasts by analysts  
with no job loss) 
 
Diff. in means 
 Mean Median StDev  Mean Median StDev  
            
Dependent variable           
Predilection NA  0.1295 0.1912 1.0410  0.0936 0.1449 0.9720  0.0359 
            
Control variables           
Gen exper Year  20.2448 24 8.1338  12.6314 11 8.9781  7.6134*** 
SIC exper Year  10.0233 10 5.3177  6.9573 6 5.3279  3.0659*** 
Stock exper Year  8.1714 6 7.8967  4.5331 3 4.8259  3.6382*** 
Stocks Stock  17.8299 17 6.9545  17.9340 17 8.7317  -0.1041 
Industries Industry  3.8923 3 1.8912  4.3490 4 2.3707  -0.4568*** 
Size Analyst  76.5863 104 40.0608  72.4128 53 63.2670  4.1735* 
Coverage Analyst  20.2521 19 10.5341  19.5295 18 11.4627  0.7226* 
Lnsize NA  8.8173 8.8046 1.7454  8.4966 8.4461 1.9399  0.3207*** 
Sigma %  49.5217 43.5470 27.8896  39.7303 35.3631 19.4403  9.7914*** 
Retann %  -11.0871 -7.8266 48.7396  11.2392 12.3800 40.5307  -22.3263*** 
Lnbm NA  -0.7078 -0.6285 0.9084  -0.7523 -0.7509 0.9134  0.0445 
ROE NA  0.2149 0.2858 1.9669  0.4255 0.2487 5.8987  -0.2106 
Var ROE %  0.3463 0.0122 1.5331  0.4918 0.0153 1.9157  -0.1455** 
Profitability NA  0.0809 0.0786 0.1213  0.0817 0.0809 0.1297  -0.0008 
SP500 Dummy  0.4590 0 0.4986  0.3931 0 0.4884  0.0659*** 
This table presents the summary statistics of my variables for the treatment and control samples during the period before brokerage firm closures occur. Appendix C provides 
a detailed description of the variables. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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4.4.2. Main findings 
I utilize Equation (4.2) to run my preliminary regressions and the results are 
reported in Table 4.2. Regression 1 in Table 4.2 shows the results when I regress 
Predilection against Treat, Post, and their interaction. In Regression 2, I include my 
control variables in the model, and in Regression 3 I also include brokerage closure fixed 
effects. My results are consistent across all regressions and show a significant reduction 
in analyst forecast optimism following a job loss. For example, in Regression 3, the 
coefficient for the interaction term is -0.1320 and significant at the one percent level. This 
indicates that analysts who recently experience a job loss exhibit a significant reduction in 
Predilection in their forecasts relative to those who do not lose their job during the same 
event window. On an absolute basis, the change in Predilection among my treatment 
sample after the job loss event is -0.1893, which is the sum of the coefficients for Post (-
0.0573) and Treat×Post (-0.1320). When I consider that the average level of Predilection 
for the treatment forecasts before analysts lose their jobs is 0.1295 (see Table 4.1), it 
indicates that overall Predilection has become pessimistic. In other words, these analysts 
have a Predilection to provide optimistic forecasts before they lose their jobs, and after 
they tend to provide more pessimistic forecasts.30  
  
                                                          
30 My tabulated results are based on using robust standard errors, but also hold if I cluster them by analyst. 
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Table 4.2: The impact of job loss on analyst forecast predilection - DiD regression results. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Predilection Predilection Predilection 
    
Treat 0.0361 -0.0153 0.0435 
 (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0368) 
Post -0.0753*** -0.0598*** -0.0573*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Treat×Post -0.2078*** -0.1359*** -0.1320*** 
 (0.0477) (0.0473) (0.0474) 
Gen exper  0.0007* 0.0004 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
SIC exper  -0.0019*** -0.0009 
  (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Stock exper  -0.0002 -0.0004 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Stocks  0.0008** 0.0010*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Industries  -0.0017 -0.0010 
  (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Size  -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Coverage  0.0000 -0.0005* 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Lnsize  0.0022 0.0075*** 
  (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Sigma  0.0007*** 0.0019*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Retann  -0.0020*** -0.0021*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Lnbm  -0.0012 -0.0067** 
  (0.0032) (0.0032) 
ROE  -0.0003 -0.0001 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Var ROE  -0.0007** -0.0010*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Profitability  0.0703*** 0.0909*** 
  (0.0188) (0.0193) 
SP500  0.0136** 0.0138** 
  (0.0067) (0.0067) 
    
Observations 195,679 195,679 195,679 
Deal fixed effects No No Yes 
This table reports DiD regression results on the treatment sample and an unmatched control sample of 
earnings forecasts by analysts who do not move to a new job across the event window. The regressions 
utilize Equation (4.2). Appendix C provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors 
are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively.  
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While the above analysis provides a baseline result, there are two major issues with 
it. The first is that although I follow analyst forecasts for the same stock both before and 
after a brokerage closure, I do not match stocks between the treatment and control groups. 
The stock characteristics themselves may be driving the results. In addition, although 
Table 4.1 suggests that there is no difference in the overall level of Predilection between 
the treatment and control groups prior to a job loss, differences may still exist once stocks 
are matched between the two groups. To account for this, I re-run my model after 
performing a nearest neighbor match to pair each treatment forecast of a stock with one 
comparable control forecast for the same stock that also has the same level of Predilection. 
In doing so I lose a number of observations as I require that the control forecast 
Predilection must be within one standard deviation from the treatment forecast 
Predilection.31 The results from Panel A of Table 4.3 shows that my stock-matched 
treatment and control samples are statistically comparable in terms of their Predilection 
prior to the brokerage closures. I re-run my regressions using Equation (4.2) for my 
matched samples and report the results in Panel B of Table 4.3. The results are consistent 
with my preliminary results. Specifically, in Regression 3, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is -0.1471, significant at the five percent level. This, again, indicates that those 
analysts that have experienced a recent job loss issue pessimistic forecasts compared to 
those who have not experienced a recent job loss. 
  
                                                          
31 This is the standard deviation of Predilection among all forecasts for the same stock within the same 
forecast period.  
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Table 4.3: DiD regression results using a matched control sample.  
Panel A: Summary statistics of the matching covariate Predilection 
 Treatment sample Control sample p-value for diff. 
in means test  Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
        
Predilection 0.0869 0.1378 1.0627 0.0602 0.1421 1.0756 0.6029 
Panel B: Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Predilection Predilection Predilection 
    
Treat 0.0706 0.0862 0.0929 
 (0.0564) (0.0571) (0.0585) 
Post -0.1191** -0.0295 -0.0278 
 (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0520) 
Treat×Post -0.1902*** -0.1505** -0.1471** 
 (0.0725) (0.0713) (0.0715) 
    
Observations 2,904 2,904 2,904 
Control variables No Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects No No Yes 
This table reports DiD regression results on the treatment sample and a matched control sample. Specifically, 
each treatment forecast is matched with a control forecast for the same stock, within the same forecast period, 
that has the closest level of Predilection. Treatment forecasts that cannot be matched within a one standard 
deviation threshold are discarded from the sample. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the matched 
covariates in my treatment and matched control samples. In Panel B, I perform DiD regressions utilizing 
Equation (4.2) to compare my treatment sample against the matched control sample. Appendix C provides 
a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. 
***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
Although the above matching criteria provides closely matched treatment and 
control samples, it does lead to a substantial decline in the sample size. This can lead to a 
loss of information from the discarded observations. As an alternative approach, I perform 
an alternative matching process using an entropy matching technique which allows me to 
retain all the observations while still having a well-balanced control sample to compare 
with my treatment sample (Hainmueller, 2012). To perform my entropy match, I follow 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) to match my treatment and control samples based on several 
brokerage firm, analyst, and stock characteristics that have been linked with analyst 
forecast optimism. My selected matching covariates include analyst years of experience 
(Gen exper) and the number of stocks in an analyst’s portfolio (Stocks) to account for 
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analyst characteristics; the number of analysts working in the brokerage firm (Size) to 
account for the size of the brokerage firm; and the number of analysts following the stock 
(Coverage) and log of the firm’s total asset value (Lnsize) to account for stock 
characteristics. I then calibrate a unit weight to each control observation, so that the 
treatment and weighted control samples are comparable in all matching covariates.32  
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows the summary statistics of the matching covariates in 
my treatment and weighted control samples where both samples are shown to be 
statistically comparable in terms of all five covariates. In Panel B of Table 4.4, I show the 
regression results using Equation (4.2) to compare my treatment sample and the weighted 
control sample. Consistent with my main findings, the results show a significant decrease 
in Predilection after analysts lose their job. For example, in Regression 3, the coefficient 
of the interaction term is -0.1227, which is significant at the five percent level. When 
adding this with the coefficient for Post (-0.0552), I get the absolute impact of the job loss 
on my treatment sample of -0.1779. Compared to the average level of Predilection of my 
treatment sample before a job loss of 0.1295, it suggests Predilection declines by more 
than 100%, leading to a tendency for these analysts to issue pessimistic forecasts. 
  
                                                          
32 My results are based on an entropy match that balances the first moment (mean) of the covariates in the 
two samples. However, the results still hold if I also balance the second moment (variance) and third moment 
(skewness) of the covariates. 
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Table 4.4: DiD regression results using a matched control sample using entropy matching. 
Panel A. Summary statistics of the matched covariates 
 Treatment sample Weighted control sample p-value for 
diff. in means 
test 
 Mean Median Stdev Mean Median Stdev 
Gen exper 20.2448 24 8.1338 20.2440 5.8015 29.3767 0.9994 
Stocks 17.8299 17 6.9545 17.8298 9.6632 18.8417 0.9999 
Size 76.5863 104 40.0608 76.5858 32.0942 121.7247 0.9999 
Coverage 20.2521 19 10.5341 20.2521 10.3087 25.7550 0.9999 
Lnsize 8.8173 8.8046 1.7454 8.8173 4.7504 9.4109 0.9999 
Panel B. Regression results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Predilection Predilection Predilection 
    
Treat 0.0332 -0.0218 0.0324 
 (0.0366) (0.0369) (0.0371) 
Post -0.0794*** -0.0568*** -0.0552*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) 
Treat×Post -0.2057*** -0.1254*** -0.1227** 
 (0.0485) (0.0483) (0.0484) 
    
Observations 195,679 195,679 195,679 
Control variables No Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects No No Yes 
This table reports DiD regression results on the treatment sample and a weighted control sample constructed 
using entropy matching. Specifically, I calibrate and set unit weights to my control observations so that the 
treatment and weighted control samples are comparable across five covariates: Gen exper, Stocks, Size, 
Coverage, Lnsize. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the matched covariates in my treatment and 
weighted control samples. In Panel B, I perform DiD regressions utilizing Equation (4.2) to compare my 
treatment sample against the weighted control sample. Appendix C provides a detailed description of the 
variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent 
significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
In Table 4.5, I repeat my analysis using Equation (4.2) with alternative measures 
of analyst forecast optimism to test for the robustness of my baseline results. In Regression 
1, I use Actual Predilectionijt, which is the difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast 
(𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡) and the actual earnings per share of stock i for the same forecast period (𝐴𝑖𝑡), all 







This alternative measure allows me to both examine whether analysts are 
optimistic/pessimistic relative to actual earnings, and at the same time will indicate the 
analyst deviation from issuing an accurate forecast. 
I also test whether the experience of a recent job loss can affect the level of 
optimism in other types of analyst forecasts. In Regression 2, I examine the impact of job 
loss on analyst price target forecasts. I follow Cowen et al. (2006) and utilize Target 
Predilectionijt as the dependent variable. It is measured as the difference between analyst 
j’s price target forecast (𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡) and the average of the most recent price target forecasts for 
stock i made by other analysts except analyst j during the same forecast period (pre-
revision consensus - 𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅); divided by the standard deviation among those price forecasts 








 In Regression 3 of Table 4.5, I examine the impact of job loss on analyst 
recommendations. I follow Cowen et al. (2006) and utilize Recommendationijt as the 
dependent variable. Recommendation equals 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0 for strong buy, buy, hold, 
under-perform and sell recommendations, respectively. 
 Regardless of the measures I use, I still document a significant reduction in analyst 
optimism. For example, in Regression 1, the coefficient of the interaction term for Treat 
and Post is -0.2495, significant at the one percent level. In Regression 2, the coefficient of 
the interaction term is -0.2460, which is also significant at the one percent level. Finally, 
in Regression 3, the coefficient of the interaction term is -0.1455, significant at the ten 
percent level. These results suggest that analysts who recently experience a job loss tend 
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to issue more pessimistic earnings forecasts, more pessimistic price target forecasts, and 
more negative recommendations compared to those who do not experience any job loss.  
 
Table 4.5: DiD Regressions using alternative measures for analyst forecast predilection. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Actual Predilection Target Predilection Recommendation 
    
Treat 0.0855 0.2082*** 0.0348 
 (0.0691) (0.0531) (0.0835) 
Post 0.0633*** -0.1187*** 0.2000*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0101) (0.0224) 
Treat×Post -0.2495*** -0.2460*** -0.1455* 
 (0.0843) (0.0536) (0.0868) 
    
Observations 194,908 29,734 6,792 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports DiD regression results using alternative measures of analyst forecast predilection. The 
regressions utilize Equation (4.2). Appendix C provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
4.4.3. Analyst pessimism and forecast accuracy 
 Previous studies (Walter and Willis, 2009; Hribar and McInnis, 2012) document 
the impact of investors’ collective optimism about stocks on the accuracy of analyst 
forecasts. Hong and Kubik (2003) and Cowen et al. (2006) also document that a high level 
of analyst optimism is negatively associated with analyst forecast accuracy. While the 
evidence in the previous section indicates that analysts become pessimistic in their 
forecasts following a job loss, I now test whether this forecast pessimism will also lead to 
a change in analyst forecast accuracy. 
I conjecture that, similar to forecast optimism, pessimism in analyst forecasts can 
lead to a decline in analyst forecast accuracy. To confirm this conjecture, I first perform 
univariate tests for the change in my measures of predilection before and after a job loss 
to highlight the magnitude of the change from forecast optimism to pessimism. The results 
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are reported in Panel A of Table 4.6. I find that the level of Predilection among the 
displaced analysts in my sample changes from 0.1295 prior to a job loss to -0.1533 
following a job loss, indicative of a switch from forecast optimism to pessimism. In 
addition, these results also indicate that analyst deviation from the consensus forecast is 
larger when they become pessimistic following their job loss. I also show the result when 
using Actual Predilection, which compares analyst forecasts against the actual earnings 
per share announced by the firms. Before the job loss the average value for Actual 
Predilection is 0.2708, which subsequently drops to -0.3118 after the job loss. These 
results further show that analyst forecasts deviate more from the actual earnings per share 
when the analysts turn pessimistic after their job loss. 
The univariate test results are visualized in Figure 4.1, in which the orange and 
blue lines represent the change in Predilection and Actual Predilection, respectively, 
before and after analysts experience a job loss.  I can observe that both lines cross the 
horizontal axis, implying that analysts turn from being optimistic to being pessimistic 
following their job loss. In addition, after the job loss, the diversion of both lines from the 
horizontal axis becomes larger, which means analysts deviate further from the consensus 
forecast/actual earnings per share.  
Next, I test whether the switch from optimism to pessimism in analyst forecasts 
following a job loss can have a significant impact on forecast accuracy in a multivariate 
setting. In Panel B of Table 4.6, I utilize Equation (4.2) to run my regressions, however, I 
use different measures of analyst forecast error as the dependent variable. In Regression 
1, my dependent variable is absolute forecast error (FEijt), measured as the absolute 
difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast and the actual earnings of stock i 
announced by the firm (Hong et al., 2000). In Regression 2, I follow Mikhail et al. (1997) 
and Hong and Kubik (2003) and use adjusted forecast error (AdFEijt) as the dependent 
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variable. It is calculated as the absolute forecast errors (FEijt) adjusted by the stock price 
on the forecast date.  
 The regression results show that, on average, analysts experience a significant 
increase in their forecast errors following a job loss. In Regression 1, the coefficient of the 
interaction term is 8.5480, significant at the one percent level, suggesting that analysts 
who recently lose their jobs tend to issue less accurate forecasts compared to those who 
do not leave their brokerage firm across the event window. The absolute impact of job loss 
on forecast errors is 12.31%.33 Given that the average value for FE among my treatment 
forecasts prior to analyst job loss is 26.9%, this indicates an increase of 46%, in absolute 
terms, of the forecast error after analysts lose their jobs. In Regression 2, I document that 
the coefficient on the interaction term is 0.4484 and the sum of the coefficients for Post 
and Treat×Post is 0.7611. This indicates an increase of 54% in the adjusted forecast error 
among displaced analysts given that the average value for AdFE prior to job loss is 1.42. 
These findings suggest that analyst pessimism is associated with a decrease in forecast 
accuracy.  
Overall, I find that both optimism and pessimism indicate a diversion of analyst 
forecasts from the consensus forecast/actual earnings per share, and the diversion is larger 
when analysts become pessimistic following a job loss.  
  
                                                          
33 This is the sum of the coefficients for Post (8.5480) and Treat×Post (3.7629). 
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Table 4.6: The impact of a job loss on analyst forecast accuracy. 
Panel A: Univariate tests 
 Before job loss After job loss Diff. (After – Before) 
Predilection 0.1295** -0.1533*** -0.2828*** 
Actual Predilection 0.2708*** -0.3118*** -0.5827*** 
Panel B: DiD regressions 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES FE AdFE 
   
Treat -4.4935** -0.1782** 
 (1.8811) (0.0884) 
Post 3.7629*** 0.3127*** 
 (0.2237) (0.0093) 
Treat×Post 8.5480*** 0.4484*** 
 (2.7672) (0.1200) 
   
Observations 189,839 189,839 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects Yes Yes 
This table presents the test results for the impact that an experience of a job loss has on analyst forecast 
accuracy. Panel A shows the results of univariate tests on analyst forecast predilection among my treatment 
sample, before and after a job loss. Panel B reports DiD regression results, utilizing Equation (4.2), with 
measures of analyst forecast accuracy as the dependent variable. Appendix C provides a detailed description 
of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * 
represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
 
Figure 4.1:  The change in analyst forecast Predilection and Actual Predilection before 
and after a job loss. 
 
 
This figure shows the change in analyst forecast Predilection and Actual Predilection before and after a job 
loss. The vertical axis shows the value of Predilection/Actual Predilection. The horizontal axis shows the 
time before and after analyst job loss. The figure visualizes the univariate test results tabulated in Panel A 



















4.4.4. Subsampling analyses and the persistence of the impact from a job loss 
While the impact of a recent job loss in driving forecast pessimism holds for the 
full sample, there can be a variation on the impact it has among different subsamples of 
forecasts issued by analysts with different characteristics. For example, Leana and 
Feldman (1990) find that individuals of different ages and levels of education do not 
necessarily react to a job loss in the same manner. Within the financial analyst literature, 
Cowen et al. (2006) find that analysts with better forecasting ability and less experience 
tend to issue less optimistic forecasts. This motivates me to test whether the impact of a 
job loss on Predilection is the same for analysts with different forecasting ability and 
years of experience.  
I first perform univariate tests for the change in Predilection before and after a job 
loss among two subsamples of forecasts issued by superior/inferior analysts who belong 
to the top and bottom terciles of analysts, based on forecast accuracy, during the year prior 
to the job loss. I repeat the same tests for two subsamples of forecasts issued by 
experienced/ inexperienced analysts who belong to the top and bottom terciles of the 
number of years of experience the analyst has in working in the brokerage industry. The 
results are reported in Panel A of Table 4.7. I find that Predilection does tend to become 
more negative after the event for both superior and inferior analysts, although the decline 
in forecast optimism is more pronounced among superior analysts (a decrease of 0.3550 
in Predilection, significant at the one percent level), relative to inferior analysts (a 
decrease of 0.2258 for inferior analysts, significant at the ten percent level). I also 
document that the impact is stronger among experienced analysts (a decrease of 0.3178 
in Predilection, significant at the one percent level) compared to an insignificant change 
for inexperienced analysts. 
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To further confirm these results, I run my DiD regressions on these four 
subsamples and report the results in Panel B, Table 4.7. Regressions 1 and 2 show the 
results for my subsamples of forecasts issued by superior/inferior analysts, while 
Regressions 3 and 4 report the results for experienced/inexperienced analysts. I find that 
the coefficient of the interaction term for Treat and Post is negative and statistically 
significant only for my subsample of forecasts issued by superior/experienced analysts. 
These results suggest that the impact of job loss on analyst forecast optimism is more 
negative among superior analysts as well as experienced analysts, which is consistent with 
my univariate test results in Panel A of Table 4.7. I expect that the reason why 
superior/experienced analysts are more significantly affected by a job loss is because, in 
the case of superior analysts, they may be less expecting having to deal with losing a job. 
In the case of the experienced analysts, they will also be older (as the number of years of 
experience working as an analyst is directly related to age) and the career transitions 
literature highlights that this is a factor that can significantly explain how well employees 
deal with a job loss (Leana and Feldman, 1990). There is also an overlap of those analysts 
which are either both superior and experienced, or inferior and inexperienced. However, 
even if I exclude those analysts who intersect both categories, my results remain similar. 
Table 4.7 also reports the results from sub-sampling the data based on periods of 
high and low competition for analyst jobs. At the start of the housing and global financial 
crisis (GFC), as well as the proceeding recession, a sizable number of brokerage firms 
closed, leading to a tight labor market for analysts seeking work. Specifically, three 
brokerage closures occur in 2007, one in 2008 and two in 2010, representing 46% of my 
sample. Under a tight labor market, employed analysts will be more concerned about their 
jobs, potentially altering the quality of their forecasts relative to periods of low labor 
market competition. To examine if this affects my results, I split my samples between a 
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period of time that captures the start of the housing crisis and GFC plus the subsequent 
recessionary period (2007-2010), and all other years. To ensure I am matching the tighter 
labor conditions for the analysts that have been let go and then get rehired, and in 
acknowledgement that over 50% of the analysts in my sample specialize in just one 
industry, I further restrict my analysis to treatment and control forecasts that are made by 
analysts that track the top ten 2-digit SIC codes (industries) that have seen the greatest 
number of analyst redundancies. In doing this I not only account for the tighter labor 
market conditions for analysts as a whole, but for the particular analysts that have seen 
their peers, who follow similar stocks, experience the largest number of redundancies. 
The results, however, tabulated in the last two columns of Table 4.7, show that regardless 
of labor market conditions, newly rehired analysts who have experienced a recent job loss 





Table 4.7: Subsample analyses. 
Panel A: Univariate tests 
 
Predilection 
Before job loss 
Predilection 
After job loss 
Diff. (After – Before) 
Superior analysts 0.1424** -0.2126*** -0.3550*** 
Inferior analysts 0.0876 -0.1381 -0.2258* 
Experienced analysts 0.1177*** -0.2001*** -0.3178*** 
Inexperienced analysts 0.1646 -0.0447 -0.2093 
High competition period 0.1424*** -0.1897*** -0.3321*** 
Low competition period 0.0867 -0.1583*** -0.2450*** 
Panel B: DiD regressions 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
SUBSAMPLES Superior Analyst Inferior Analyst  Experienced Analyst Inexp. Analyst  High competition  Low competition  
VARIABLES Predilection Predilection  Predilection Predilection  Predilection Predilection 
         
Treat 0.0737 -0.0471  0.0048 0.0371  0.1529*** 0.0196 
 (0.0705) (0.0785)  (0.0458) (0.1113)  (0.0536) (0.0675) 
Post -0.0411*** -0.0829***  -0.0703*** -0.0732***  -0.1479*** -0.0670*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0088)  (0.0081) (0.0084)  (0.0179) (0.0120) 
Treat×Post -0.2252** -0.0586  -0.1189** -0.0854  -0.1978*** -0.1760** 
 (0.0900) (0.1051)  (0.0582) (0.1412)  (0.0656) (0.0829) 
         
Observations 47,040 52,910  55,877 60,425  13,413 22,036 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
This table presents the results for the impact of experiencing a job loss on analyst forecast accuracy using different subsamples of analyst forecasts. Panel A shows the results 
of univariate tests on analyst forecast predilection among subsamples of forecasts by superior/inferior analysts, experienced/inexperienced analysts, and forecasts issued during 
high/low periods of job market competition. Panel B reports DiD regression results utilizing Equation (4.2). Superior/Inferior analysts are identified as being ranked in the 
top/bottom terciles of performers (in terms of forecasting accuracy) during the year prior to the job loss. Experienced/Inexperienced analysts are identified as being part of the 
top/bottom tercile in terms of years of experience working in the brokerage industry. The high job market competition period is from 2007 to 2010 and the low job market 
competition period includes the remaining time in my sample. Appendix C provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 
for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
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While Cohn (1978), Leana and Feldman (1995) and Waters (2007) show that 
individuals will continue to emotionally suffer from the experience of a job loss after they 
get re-employed, their evidence of this spans only for a short period of time after the 
person is rehired. At the same time, Jackson et al. (1983) find that psychological distress, 
in general, reduces when individuals are rehired. I therefore examine how long the impact 
of the job loss affects the predilection of analyst forecasts once displaced analysts find a 
new job. In addition, I utilize subsample analyses to test whether the persistence of this 
impact is the same among analysts with different characteristics.  
First, in Panel A of Table 4.8, I re-run my DiD regression comparing the level of 
analyst forecast Predilection one year before a job loss against the level of Predilection 
two years after the event among four subsamples of forecasts issued by superior/inferior 
and experienced/inexperienced analysts.34 Then, in Panel B of Table 4.8, I repeat the tests 
in Panel A but compare Predilection one year before a job loss against Predilection three 
years after the event. I find that in the second year after displaced analysts get a new job, 
only superior analysts suffer from significant, negative Predilection (see Column 1, Panel 
A of Table 4.8). However, this impact disappears in the third year (see Column 1, Panel 
B of Table 4.8). For the other five subsamples, I find no significant difference between 
forecast optimism one year before and two (three) years after an analyst experiences a job 
loss. Taken together, these results show that while the effect of experiencing a job loss on 
analyst Predilection dissipates for most analysts by the second year of re-employment, it 
takes a little longer for superior analysts to return to their prior levels of forecast optimism 
that they exhibited prior to the job loss. 
 
                                                          
34 I use the first forecast the analyst makes in the second year of employment with their new employer for 
each stock that is matched with the pre-event period. 
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Table 4.8: The longer-term impact of job loss on analyst forecast predilection. 
Panel A: DiD regressions – Two and a half years after experiencing a job loss 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
SUBSAMPLES Superior Analyst Inferior Analyst  Experienced Analyst Inexp. Analyst  High competition  Low competition  
VARIABLES Predilection Predilection  Predilection Predilection  Predilection Predilection 
Treat 0.0662 0.0090  0.0831** 0.0485  0.0173 0.0191 
 (0.0548) (0.0515)  (0.0327) (0.0755)  (0.0396) (0.0530) 
Post 0.0026 -0.0030  -0.0135 -0.0385**  -0.0212 -0.1051*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0146)  (0.0145) (0.0182)  (0.0233) (0.0355) 
Treat×Post -0.1712** -0.0205  -0.0540 0.1241  -0.0312 0.1107 
 (0.0742) (0.0685)  (0.0463) (0.1340)  (0.0501) (0.1027) 
         
Observations 15,527 14,036  17,140 18,042  6,697 3,962 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Panel B: DiD regressions - Three and a half years after experiencing a job loss 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
SUBSAMPLES Superior Analyst Inferior Analyst  Experienced Analyst Inexp. Analyst  High competition per. Low competition per. 
VARIABLES Predilection Predilection  Predilection Predilection  Predilection Predilection 
Treat 0.0724 0.0713  0.0625 0.2702**  -0.0497 0.2183** 
 (0.0600) (0.0579)  (0.0381) (0.1262)  (0.0456) (0.1077) 
Post -0.0244 -0.0031  -0.0116 0.0045  -0.0677** -0.0901** 
 (0.0176) (0.0198)  (0.0186) (0.0264)  (0.0268) (0.0442) 
Treat×Post 0.1298 0.0266  0.0388 0.2853  0.0704 0.0547 
 (0.0907) (0.0843)  (0.0554) (0.2484)  (0.0589) (0.1444) 
         
Observations 10,714 9,096  12,478 12,093  5,473 1,553 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
This table reports DiD regression results examining the longer-term impact of experiencing a job loss on analyst forecast predilection. The regressions utilize Equation (4.2). 
Panel A and B shows the impact on Predilection among different subsamples of analyst forecasts 2.5 and 3.5 years after an analyst experiences a job loss, respectively. 
Appendix C provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, and * represent significance levels 
of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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4.4.5. Alternative explanations 
Although I appropriate the experience an analyst has of a recent job loss to 
explaining subsequent forecast pessimism, there can be other potential explanations. First, 
according to Bauer et al. (2007) and Saks et al. (2007), individuals can experience 
unfamiliarity with a new working environment, which leads to a greater level of 
uncertainty. There is also evidence that uncertainty can lead to biases in analyst forecasts 
(Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005; Nolte et al., 2014). Therefore, it is possible 
that the change in the Predilection of analyst forecasts documented in my main results is 
driven by analysts being unfamiliar with the new working environment of the firm that 
hires them rather than it being related to their recent experience of losing their job. In 
addition, analysts moving to a new brokerage firm may find that they have a different 
level of support and infrastructure at the new firm to what they were previously used to. 
This too can have an impact on the forecasts that they issue and potentially influence the 
results. 
To examine the above issue, I compare my treatment sample of forecasts issued 
by analysts who experience a job loss and then move to a new firm against a control 
sample of forecasts issued by those analysts who do not experience a brokerage closure 
but nonetheless job-hop to work in a new brokerage firm.35 Importantly, I match treatment 
and control forecasts such that they originate from analysts that work for similarly-sized 
brokerage houses, both before and after they move to a new employer. Specifically, 
analysts must be working in the same quartile-sized brokerage firm, as measured by my 
variable Size (the number of analysts working for a firm).  This allows me to control for 
                                                          
35 I identify this group of analysts in the I/B/E/S database as those who change their broker ID across the 
event window but are not included in my treatment sample.  
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the impact that a new working environment may have on the Predilection of analyst 
forecasts. I re-run my regressions using Equation (4.2) and report the results in Panel A 
of Table 4.9. The results are consistent with my main findings. For example, in Regression 
3, the coefficient for the interaction term of Treat with Post is -0.1353, significant at the 
one percent level. The absolute impact of experiencing a job loss on Predilection among 
my treatment sample is -0.2129.36 Compared to the average value of Predilection among 
my treatment sample prior to analysts losing their jobs (0.1295), the results indicate that 
analyst Predilection turns negative only after the experience of a job loss. This result 
highlights that it is specifically those analysts that experience a recent job loss, and not 
simply any analyst who switches to a new employer, that subsequently exhibit forecast 
pessimism. 
Secondly, previous studies document a strong link between analyst career 
concerns and their forecast optimism. For example, Chan et al. (2007) conclude that 
analysts tend to issue less optimistic forecasts toward the end of the forecast period to 
generate earnings surprises for the firms they follow to please management. Horton et al. 
(2017) also document that analysts who desire to work for the firms they follow tend to 
issue optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts at the beginning (end) of the fiscal period (i.e. the 
OP pattern) to please firms. While a more optimistic forecast at the beginning of the fiscal 
year can provide a better outlook about the forecasted stocks, a pessimistic forecast 
towards the end of the period can create a positive earnings announcement surprise. If my 
treatment group of analysts are rehired closer to the end of the fiscal year, they may be 
tempted to issue pessimistic forecasts for this reason, which would be unrelated to how 
they are dealing with recently losing their previous job. I therefore need to consider when 
                                                          
36 This is the sum of the coefficients for Post (-0.0776) and Treat×Post (-0.1353). 
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the forecasts are made in relation to the fiscal year. In addition, and in contrast to the 
generally observed OP pattern, I conjecture that my treatment group of analysts should 
exhibit a decline in the OP pattern, as the longer they remain employed at their new job, 
the impact of their experience from a job loss has on their likelihood of posting pessimistic 
forecasts will diminish (see Table 4.8). 
To test this, I re-sample my data so that for each stock that is matched between 
my treatment and control groups I capture a forecast for it that the analyst makes at the 
start, and then at the end, of the fiscal year that is before (for the pre-event period) and 
after (for the post-event period) the brokerage closure occurs. I then construct a dummy 
variable, OP, that is equal to one whenever I notice that the forecast issued at the start of 
the fiscal year is higher than the actual earnings for the firm, plus that the last forecast 
made for the stock in the same fiscal year is lower than the actual earnings; and zero 
otherwise (Libby et al., 2008).  
I utilize Equation (4.2) in a DiD logistic regression framework with OP as the 
dependent variable and report the results in Panel B of Table 4.9. The results show a 
significant decrease in OP among forecasts of analysts who recently experience losing a 
job relative to the control forecasts. Combining these results with Table 4.8, it supports 
the view that forecasts issued closer to when the analyst is rehired will be more pessimistic 




Table 4.9: Alternative explanations of analyst predilection following a job loss. 
Panel A: DiD regressions using a control sample of forecasts from analysts who change jobs across 
the event window 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Predilection Predilection Predilection 
    
Treat 0.0394 0.0031 0.0997* 
 (0.0481) (0.0514) (0.0551) 
Post -0.0801*** -0.0776*** -0.0776*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0232) 
Treat×Post -0.2542*** -0.1543** -0.1353** 
 (0.0608) (0.0627) (0.0628) 
    
Observations 8,188 8,188 8,188 
Control variables No Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects No No Yes 
Panel B: DiD logistic regressions examining the impact of career concerns on analyst OP pattern 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OP OP OP 
    
Treat 0.0059 -0.1086 0.0407 
 (0.0822) (0.0828) (0.0852) 
Post -0.1206*** -0.1017*** -0.1223*** 
 (0.0110) (0.0113) (0.0114) 
Treat×Post -0.4319*** -0.3680*** -0.3467*** 
 (0.1237) (0.1238) (0.1255) 
    
Observations 174,550 174,550 174,550 
Control variables No Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects No No Yes 
This table reports test results examining alternative explanations for the impact of experiencing a job loss 
on analyst forecast predilection. The regressions utilize Equation (4.2). Panel A presents DiD regression 
results on the treatment sample and a control sample of earnings forecasts by analysts who experience a job 
change across the event window. I further require that analysts in both samples move to a new brokerage 
firm that are in the same quartile ranking as their former employer in terms of the number of employed 
analysts. Panel B presents logistic regression results that examine the impact of analyst career concerns 
following a job loss on the analyst optimism – pessimism (OP) pattern. Appendix C provides a detailed 
description of the variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses for all regressions. ***, **, 
and * represent significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
In addition to the above two issues, there can be other factors that can potentially 
distort my main results. For example, if there are less than three analysts covering one 
stock, there would likely be a lack of available information surrounding the stock, which 
can result in analyst forecast bias (Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan, 1998). Therefore, 
in Regression 1 of Table 4.10, I report results from excluding all forecasts for stocks with 
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low analyst coverage from my sample. In Regression 2 of Table 4.10, I consider the fact 
that some analysts cover a large portfolio of stocks, leading to their forecasts appearing 
multiple times in the treatment sample, thereby potentially disproportionally driving my 
results. I therefore exclude from my sample any forecasts by analysts who are ranked in 
the top decile, in terms of the number of stocks they have in their tracking portfolio. 
In Regression 3 of Table 4.10, I account for the possibility that analysts might 
issue biased forecasts for stocks of large firms in order to boost trading commissions or 
to win an investment banking client (Horton et al., 2017). To deal with this I exclude 
forecasts for stocks belonging to the top decile of the largest firms (based on market 
value). In Regression 4, I address the issue that my main regressions only examine 
forecasts for stocks that appear in an analyst’s portfolio both before and after a job loss. 
This means any stocks that an analyst drops after a job loss, and any new stocks that they 
are assigned by their new firm, are not considered. Therefore, I aggregate and average 
analyst Predilection across forecasts of all stocks in the analyst portfolio and re-run my 
regressions at the analyst level. Finally, in Regression 5, I present results for when I extend 
the cooling-off period to 18 months prior to a brokerage firm closure. Even if no formal 
announcement has been made, employees may get wind of the firm imminently closing. 
This is despite me checking for any news during this time period that may allude to this. 
To err on the side of caution, I therefore extend the cooling-off period to last for a period 
of one and a half years prior to the closure date to account for the above possibility. 
In all cases, my results in Table 4.10 are consistent with my baseline results. In 
particular, the interaction coefficient between Treat and Post remains significant at either 




Table 4.10: Other robustness tests. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
SUBSAMPLES Exclude low coverage 
stocks 
Exclude analysts with large 
portfolios 
Exclude stocks of large 
firms 
Aggregate at the analyst 
level 
Extend the pre-closure 
cooling off period to 18m. 
VARIABLES Predilection Predilection Predilection Predilection̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ Predilection 
      
Treat 0.0387 0.0259 0.0472 0.0763* -0.0034 
 (0.0370) (0.0377) (0.0379) (0.0393) (0.0410) 
Post -0.0652*** -0.0678*** -0.0624*** -0.0487*** 0.0423*** 
 (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0060) 
Treat×Post -0.1248*** -0.1120** -0.1308*** -0.2353*** -0.1113** 
 (0.0475) (0.0482) (0.0500) (0.0480) (0.0526) 
      
Observations 190,663 176,733 174,639 36,634 115,167 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports the results of other robustness tests on the impact of experiencing a job loss on analyst forecast predilection. The regressions utilize Equation (4.2). Column 
(1) shows the regression results using a subsample of analyst forecasts for stocks with at least three analysts following. In Column (2), I exclude from my sample any forecasts 
by analysts who belong to the top 10% of analysts in terms of the number of stocks they have in their tracking portfolio. In Column (3) I exclude forecasts for stocks that belong 
to the top 10% of the largest firms in my sample based on market value. Column (4) presents DiD regression results at the analyst level. Column (5) reports the regression 
results when I extend the cooling-off period prior to the closure date to 18 months. Appendix C provides a detailed description of the variables. Robust standard errors are 




Utilizing brokerage firm closures as a quasi-natural experiment, I find that 
analysts who have a recent experience of losing their job are more prone to provide 
pessimistic forecasts. Importantly, I document that analyst forecast pessimism 
significantly increases analyst forecast errors. This impact, however, dissipates within a 
two to three-year period of being rehired. 
My study contributes to the literature on financial analysts by examining factors 
that explain analyst forecast pessimism. By building on the extant career transition 
literature, I argue and find that financial analysts, as is the case with other types of 
employees, experience a negative emotional mindset from losing a job, which is not 
totally resolved when they are rehired, and that this subsequently leads to analyst forecast 
pessimism.  
My findings have implications for brokerage firms as I suggest that they should 
adopt policies to support newly hired employees who have recently experienced a job loss 
to ensure they overcome their predilection to issue pessimistic forecasts. my study also 
suggests an avenue for future research that focuses other important life events that may 
affect financial analyst forecasting performance. While several studies (Hood et al., 2013; 
Roussanov and Savor, 2014; Bernile et al., 2017; Shi et al., 2017; Shu, Sulaeman and 
Yeung, 2017) have investigated the impact of life events on the behavior of firm 
management and investors, studies on how financial analysts respond to such events can 
be equally meaningful given the important role they play in facilitating the efficient 







This thesis consists of three studies that utilize different analyst career events as 
quasi-natural experiments to examine the determinants of analyst forecasting 
performance. From a methodological perspective, I contribute to the extant literature by 
utilizing quasi-natural experiments to minimize the endogeneity problems that are 
prevalent when examining financial analyst performance. From a theoretical perspective, 
I introduce a number of psychological and career transitions theories to the financial 
analyst literature by showing that career related life events can have a significant impact 
on analyst forecasting performance. My findings also have important practical 
implications since analyst performance is closely linked to the efficiency of capital 
markets (Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002; Elgers et al., 2003). My studies, therefore, 
suggest that brokerage firm management should adopt suitable policies to support 
financial analysts during important life events to ensure their forecasting performance and 
subsequently enhance market efficiency.  
The remaining of Chapter Five provides a summary of findings and contributions 
for each study in this thesis, research limitations, and directions for future research.  
 
5.1. Summary of main findings and contributions 
The first study presented in Chapter Two investigates the impact of employment 
change on analyst herding behavior. To ensure the robustness of the main findings, I 
utilize quasi-natural experiments by focusing on analysts who change job following 
brokerage firm M&As. My results show that analysts exhibit strong herding behavior 
following an employment change. Specifically, they are more inclined to issue forecasts 
that are close to a consensus forecast. Also, relative to their peers, they are slower in 
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issuing forecasts and, as a result, issue forecast revisions less frequently. I also find that 
the market can recognize this herding behavior and show weaker reaction to forecasts 
issued by those analysts.  
These findings contribute to the financial analyst literature by examining analyst 
job changes as a source of herding behavior, while previous studies only show that analyst 
forecasting ability and experience are the two main factors that explain herding (Stickel, 
1992; Trueman, 1994; Graham, 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005). Given 
a large number of analysts change jobs every year, the impact of employment change on 
the performance of the intermediary function that analysts serve within the market can be 
potentially significant.  
My findings, therefore, have an important human resource management 
implication. In particular, I highlight the need for brokerage firms to adopt appropriate 
socialization strategies for newcomers (see Saks et al., 2007) to manage the unfamiliarity 
that arises from employment changes in order to enhance the quality of analyst forecasts. 
In Chapter Three, my second study examines the heterogeneous impact that work 
specialization has on superior and inferior analysts. I conduct quasi-natural experiments 
by utilizing brokerage firm M&As to capture changes to the work specialization of 
analysts who continue to work in the merged firms after the M&A events. My results 
show that the forecast accuracy of superior analysts improves when their stock portfolio 
is more concentrated within a few industries. However, there is no evidence of an 
equivalent improvement for inferior analysts.  
This study, to the best of my knowledge, is the first to examine the different impact 
that work specialization has on the performance of individual analysts. My findings, 
therefore, provide an explanation for the mixed results in the literature studying the 
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average effect of industry concentration on analysts’ performance (Clement ,1999; Jacob 
et al., 1999; Clement et al., 2007), as I show that only superior analysts can benefit from 
work specialization. In addition, while prior studies utilize a naïve industry count to 
capture industry coverage, my study introduces the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
to measure industry concentration. This is a more refined measure to capture how 
specialized the workload of an analyst since it accounts for both the number of industries 
assigned to the analyst and the proportion of stocks in the analyst portfolio that belongs 
to each industry. 
Based on my findings, brokerage firms should consider allocating different types 
of work to fit with the skill-sets of superior and inferior analysts to effectively optimize 
their forecasting performance. Specifically, my findings support the view that superior 
analysts should concentrate within fewer industries, whereas there is no evidence that 
inferior analysts also benefit from industry specialization.  
Finally, in Chapter Four, I utilize brokerage firm closures as quasi-natural 
experiments to examine a recent job loss due to firm closures as a channel to explain 
analyst forecast pessimism when they get rehired. I find that individuals who have 
recently experienced a job loss tend to issue more pessimistic forecasts compared to both 
their peers and the actual earnings. Importantly, my study provides evidence that analyst 
forecast pessimism following a job loss leads to a decline in analyst forecast accuracy 
when the analysts work in the new firm.  
While previous studies, including Hong and Kubik (2003), Chan et al. (2007), and 
Horton et al. (2017), focus on examining analyst forecast optimism and its impact on 
analyst performance, my study contributes to the literature by showing that there are also 
factors that explain analyst forecast pessimism. In particular, I find that an experience of 
a recent job loss can lead to analyst forecast pessimism and that forecast pessimism can 
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have a significant impact on the accuracy of analyst forecasts in much the same manner 
that forecast optimism can. 
My findings, therefore, suggests that brokerage firms should adopt policies to 
support newly hired employees who have recently gone through a job loss. Such strategies 




 The first limitation of this thesis is primarily related to the limitations of the data 
source that I utilize (i.e. the I/B/E/S database). Although the database provides an 
extensive source of data on analyst forecasts, it is based on the voluntarily reported data 
from individual analysts. Therefore, the database itself is exposed to selection bias as 
analysts can decide whether they disclose their information, or which forecasts they would 
disclose. In addition, to observe the change to analyst career as well as its timing, I track 
the change in their brokerage firm IDs and the time that analysts issue their forecasts 
under the new brokerage firm IDs. This method, however, can result in errors as it also 
depends on the decision of analysts to report their information. Another issue with the 
database is that analyst characteristics, particularly demographic factors, are not 
disclosed. Therefore, my thesis cannot consider the moderation and/or mediation roles of 
those factors on the impact of life events on analyst forecasting performance.  
 My thesis also suffers from the limitations of the quasi-natural experiment 
methodology. As mentioned in Chapter One, a quasi-natural experiment is different from 
a natural experiment in terms of the degree of randomization. While a natural experiment 
involves actual randomization, a quasi-natural experiment is “patterned after randomized 
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experiments” (DiNardo, 2010). Therefore, there can potentially be criticism about the 
events I utilize as quasi-natural experiments in my studies. For example, one may argue 
that the decision to retain or let go analysts following a brokerage M&A is related to their 
relative performance compared to peers. Similarly, it is arguable that job loss due to 
brokerage firm closures can be explained by employee poor performance, which triggers 
the closure of the firms. Therefore, these career events may not be completely random. 
Apparently, much of these issues can be resolved when using a difference-in-differences 
approach in conjunction with the quasi-natural experiments, which explains the 
methodological approach that I took. At the same time, I have conducted several 
robustness tests in each study to ensure this problem with the randomization of quasi-
natural experiments does not fundamentally affect my main findings. However, this latent 
issue does not allow my thesis to fully address endogeneity problems. 
 
5.3. Directions for future research 
Given the significant impact that life events have on analysts forecasting 
performance, future studies on financial analysts could investigate how analysts respond 
to other important life events. These can include fully exogenous events such as a personal 
accident or sudden illness, death of family member(s), or career related events of a spouse. 
Although this research direction requires the collection of additional data apart from the 
available database on analyst forecasts (for example I/B/E/S), it can provide further 
information on analyst characteristics to supplement the analyst forecast database. At the 
same time, such exogenous events would, at least, not suffer from endogeneity problems. 
Another research direction could focus on evaluating the effectiveness of various 
policies from policy makers as well as brokerage firm management to support financial 
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analysts during the period surrounding their important life events. The outcomes of this 
research direction would provide valuable information to policy makers and firm 
management in the process of adopting suitable policies to enhance the performance of 
financial analysts. At the same time, it will also help enhance capital market efficiency, 
which partially relies on the efficiency of financial analysts. 
Future studies should also examine the extent to which capital markets recognize 
and respond to the change in analyst performance due to important life events. This 
research direction could also involve suggesting and investigating the effectiveness of 







Variable definitions – Chapter 2 
 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in Chapter 2. 
Variable Unit Definition 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Boldijt Dummy =1 if the forecast for stock i issued by analyst j in forecast period t is: 
(1) greater than both the pre-revision consensus* (i.e. the average of the 
most recent forecasts for stock i made by other analysts except analyst 
j during the same forecast period) and the analyst’s most recent 
forecast;  
or 
(2) less than both the pre-revision consensus and the analyst’s most recent 
forecast. 
=0 otherwise 
* I require there are at least three forecasts contributing to the pre-revision 
consensus. 
CARijt % The absolute value of the two-day cumulative market-adjusted daily returns 
from the day of, to the day after, the analyst forecast date for stock i for 
forecast period t. 
Frequencyijt Revision Number of forecast revisions issued by analyst j for for stock i in forecast 
period t minus the average number of forecast revisions issued by all analysts 
for the same stock within the same forecast period.  
Speedijt Dummy The subtraction of 100 by analyst j’s ranking over the number of analysts 
following stock i times 100. Analyst ranking is the order of analysts in issuing 
their first forecasts for a stock within a forecast period, with the first analyst 
receiving the lowest rank. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Moveijt Dummy =1 if the forecast for stock i is issued by analyst j who experiences an 
employment change in year t 
=0 otherwise. 
Postijt Dummy =1 if the forecast for stock i issued by analyst j in forecast period t is after the 
event date 
=0 otherwise. 
Treatijt Dummy =1 if the forecast for stock i issued by analyst j in forecast period t belongs 
to the treatment group 
=0 otherwise. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Coverageit Analyst Number of analysts across the whole industry following stock i in forecast 
period t. 
Gen Experjt Year Number of years from the first forecast of analyst j. 
Industriesjt Industry Number of industries covered by analyst j in forecast period t. 
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Lnbmit NA Log of the book to market value of firm i in forecast period t. 
Lnsizeit NA Log of the total asset value of firm i in forecast period t. 
Profitabilityit NA Operating income over book value of assets of firm i in year t. 
Retannit % Annualized average monthly returns of stock i in year t.  
ROEit NA Annual return on equity (ROE) ratio of firm i in year t. 
SIC Experjt Year Number of years from analyst j’s first forecast for a stock within one two-
digit SIC code. 
Sigmait % Annualized daily return volatility of stock i in year t.  
Sizekt Analyst Number of analysts employed by brokerage firm k in year t. 
SP500it Dummy =1 if stock i is included in the S&P 500 index in year t 
=0 otherwise. 
Stock Experjt Year Number of years from analyst j’s first forecast for stock i. 
Stocksjt Stock Number of stocks covered by analyst j in forecast period t. 
Var ROEit % The variance of the residuals from an AR(1) model for stock i’s ROE using 






Variable definitions – Chapter 3 
 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in Chapter 3. 
Variable Unit Definition 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
FAi,j,t NA A measure of analyst forecast accuracy. It is measured as the subtraction 
of 100 by analyst j’s ranking over the number of analysts following the 
same stock times 100.   
PMAFEi,j,t NA A measure of analyst forecast error. It is the difference between analyst 
j’s absolute forecast error for stock i in year t and the mean absolute 
forecast error across all analysts following stock i in the same year, 
divided by the mean absolute forecast error.  
* I require that there are at least three analysts covering stock i in year t 
to construct this variable. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Entropyj,t NA A measure of work diversification that is equal to the negative value of 
the sum of the multiplication between the proportion of stocks within 
each industry that analyst j covers in year t and the natural log value of 
the proportion.  
HHIj,t NA A measure of work specialization that is equal to the sum of the squared 
proportion of stocks within each industry that analyst j covers in year t. 
Inferiorj,t Dummy A dummy variable that is equal to one if analyst j is ranked within the 
bottom 20% of all analysts within the brokerage industry in year t, and 
zero otherwise. 
For the M&A sample, this variable is identified using the analyst 
performance in the year prior to the M&A. 
Inferior10j,t Dummy Similar to Inferior except that it is equal to one if analyst j is ranked 
within the bottom 10% of all analysts within the brokerage industry in 
year t. 
Inferior30j,t Dummy Similar to Inferior except that it is equal to one if analyst j is ranked 
within the bottom 30% of all analysts within the brokerage industry in 
year t. 
Superiorj,t Dummy A dummy variable that is equal to one if analyst j is ranked within the 
top 20% of all analysts within the brokerage industry in year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
For the M&A sample, this variable is identified using the analyst 
performance in the year prior to the M&A.  
Superior10j,t Dummy Similar to Superior except that it is equal to one if analyst j is ranked 




Superior30j,t Dummy Similar to Superior except that it is equal to one if analyst j is ranked 
within the top 30% of all analysts within the brokerage industry in year 
t. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Experiencej,t Year The number of years analyst j works in the brokerage industry till year t. 
Horizoni,j,t Day The number of days from analyst j forecast for stock i in year t till the 
end of the forecast period. 
New stocksj,t Stock The number of stocks that analyst j issues forecasts for the first time in 
year t. 
Revisionsi,j,t Revision The number of forecast revisions that analyst j issues for stock i in year 
t. 
Sizej,t Analyst The number of analysts employed by the brokerage firm that analyst j 
works for in year t. 
SP500i,t Dummy A dummy variable that is equal to one if stock i in year t belongs to the 
S&P500 index, and zero otherwise.  









Variable definitions – Chapter 4 
 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the construction of all the variables used in Chapter 4. 
Variable Unit Definition 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
AdFEijt NA The absolute difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast and the 
actual earnings of stock i released by the firm, adjusted by the stock 
price on the forecast date. 
FEijt Dollar The absolute difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast and the 
actual earnings of stock i released by the firm. 
Predilectionijt NA The difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast and the average 
of the most recent forecasts for stock i made by other analysts except 
analyst j during the same forecast period (pre-revision consensus); 
divided by the standard deviation among those forecasts.  
 
* I require that there are at least three forecasts contributing to the 
pre-revision consensus. 
Actual Predilectionijt NA The difference between analyst j’s earnings forecast and the actual 
earnings of stock i released by the firm; divided by the standard 
deviation among all earnings forecasts for stock i during the same 
forecast period. 
Target Predilectionijt NA The difference between analyst j’s price target forecast and the 
average of the most recent price target forecasts for stock i made by 
other analysts except analyst j during the same forecast period (pre-
revision consensus); divided by the standard deviation among those 
forecasts.  
 
* I require that there are at least three forecasts contributing to the 
pre-revision consensus. 
OPijt Dummy =1 if  
(1) the first forecast for stock i issued by analyst j in forecast 
period t is higher than the actual earnings, and 
(2) the last forecast for stock i issued by analyst j in forecast 
period t is lower than the actual earnings 
=0 otherwise 
 
* I require that the first forecast is issued before the mid-fiscal-year 
date and the last forecast is after the mid-fiscal-year date.  
Recommendationijt NA It equals 4, 3, 2, 1 and 0 if the recommendation for stock i issued by 
analyst j in forecast period t is strong buy, buy, hold, under-perform 
and sell, respectively. 
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Postijt Dummy =1 if the forecast for stock i issued by analyst j in forecast period t is 
after the event date 
=0 otherwise. 
Treatijt Dummy =1 if the forecast for stock i issued by analyst j in forecast period t 
belongs to the treatment group 
=0 otherwise. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Coverageit Analyst Number of analysts across the whole industry following stock i in 
forecast period t. 
Gen Experjt Year Number of years from the first forecast of analyst j. 
Industriesjt Industry Number of industries covered by analyst j in forecast period t. 
Lnbmit NA Log of the book to market value of firm i in forecast period t. 
Lnsizeit NA Log of the total asset value of firm i in forecast period t. 
Profitabilityit NA Operating income over book value of assets of firm i in year t. 
Retannit % Annualized average monthly returns of stock i in year t.  
ROEit NA Annual return on equity (ROE) of firm i in year t. 
SIC Experjt Year Number of years from analyst j’s first forecast for a stock within a 
specific two-digit SIC code. 
Sigmait % Annualized daily return volatility of stock i in year t.  
Sizekt Analyst Number of analysts employed by brokerage firm k in year t. 
SP500it Dummy =1 if stock i is included in the S&P 500 index in year t 
=0 otherwise. 
Stock Experjt Year Number of years from analyst j’s first forecast for stock i. 
Stocksjt Stock Number of stocks covered by analyst j in forecast period t. 
Var ROEit % The variance of the residuals from an AR(1) model for stock i’s ROE 
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